Why Psychiatry and Neurology Cannot Simply Merge (original) (raw)
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Psychiatry and neurology: from dualism to integration
Neurologia i Neurochirurgia Polska, 2013
The two objectives of the following paper are: to make few remarks on the topic absorbing neurologists, psychiatrists, and neuropsychiatrists-integration and division of their specialties; and to describe the situation in Poland, reflected in the latest literature. The authors describe the former and present processes of approaches and divisions in psychiatry and neurology. They indicate dissemination of mutual methods of structural and action brain neuroimaging, neurophysiology, neurogenetics, and advanced neurophysiology diagnostics. As it seems, even the effectiveness of psychotherapy, has recently been associated with changes in brain in functional and even structural markers. The authors indicate the value of the strive to join the still divided specialties, reflected worldwide in attempts of common education and clinical cooperation of physicians. It can be expected that subsequent years will bring further triumphs of neuropsychiatry-a field that combines psychiatry and neurology.
Andrew Scull (ed.), Cultural Sociology of Mental Illness: An A-to-Z Guide, Sage, 2014, pp. 700-702
Psychiatry is not only a medical speciality devoted to treating mentally ill patients, it is also a possible object of investigation for the social sciences and humanities, affording an understanding of contemporary cultural conceptions of subjectivity and personhood through the analysis of the shifting boundaries between the normal and the pathological, or between the mind and the brain. Through its application and popularisation, the sum of this knowledge has transformed the moral language that we use to speak of ourselves and of relationships to others.
The wall between neurology and psychiatry
BMJ, 2002
What is newsworthy? Bad news from research really is headline news Editor-The article by Bartlett et al highlighting the apparent unwillingness of newspaper reporters or their editors to headline good news stories made unsurprising but disappointing reading. 1 It mirrored my own impressions and experiences of television and radio reporting about doctors' communication skills. I have lost count of the mumber of times my group is contacted by reporters wanting examples of poor rather than good doctor-patient communication. The worst example of this was a press release in February this year about a randomised controlled trial we had published in the Lancet. 2 The paper showed the
Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives
2009
Sample chapter available for download! CONTENTS Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview (M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti) Psychiatry as Science Chapter 1. Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? (R. Cooper) Chapter 2. A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. (K.W.M. Fulford and N. Sartorius) Chapter 3. Delusion as a Natural Kind. (R. Samuels) The Nature of Mental Illness Chapter 4. Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. (H. Pickard) Chapter 5. Psychiatry and the Concept of Disease as Pathology. (D. Murphy) Reconciling Paradigms Chapter 6. On the Interface Problem in Philosophy and Psychiatry. (T. Thornton) Chapter 7. What does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. (J. Campbell) Chapter 8. Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion. (P. Gerrans) Psychiatry and the Neurosciences Chapter 9. When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. (D. Lloyd) Chapter 10. Philosophy and Cognitive-Affective Neurogenetics. (D. Stein) Chapter 11. An Addictive Lesson: A Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. (L. Stephens and G. Graham) Phenomenology and Scientific Explanation Chapter 12. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. (M. Ratcliffe) Chapter 13. Delusional realities. (S. Gallagher) Delusions and Cognition Chapter 14. Delusions: a Two-Level Framework. (K. Frankish) Chapter 15. Explaining Pathologies of Belief. (A.M. Aimola Davies and M. Davies) Moral Psychology and Psychopathology Chapter 16. Mental Time Travel, Agency and Responsibility. (J. Kennett and S. Matthews) Chapter 17. Motivation, Depression and Character. (I. Law) Conclusion: The Future of Scientific Psychiatry. (L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome) One of the best books of 2009 for the Guardian, according to Mary Warnock: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/22/books-of-the-year-2009\. For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/psychiatry
philsci-archive.pitt.edu
The contemporary epistemic status of mental health disciplines does not allow the cross validation of mental disorders among various genetic markers, biochemical pathway or mechanisms, and clinical assessments in neuroscience explanations. We attempt to provide a meta-empirical analysis of the contemporary status of the cross-disciplinary issues existing between neuro-biology and psychopathology. Our case studies take as an established medical mode an example cross validation between biological sciences and clinical cardiology in the case of myocardial infarction. This is then contrasted with the incoherence between neuroscience and psychiatry in the case of bipolar disorders. We examine some methodological problems arising from the neuro-imaging studies, specifically the experimental paradigm introduced by the team of Wayne Drevets. Several theoretical objections are raised: temporal discordance, state independence, and queries about the reliability and specificity, and failure of convergent validity of the inter-1 disciplinary attempt. Both modern neuroscience and clinical psychology taken as separate fields have failed to reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. The data acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology and psychopathology are deeply insufficient concerning their validity, reliability, and utility.