The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and Control (original) (raw)

Abstract

As has been shown in the past, financial resources-from domestic budgets or foreign military assistance-are not the only factor that influences arms acquisitions. Perceived internal or external threats to national security, the need to replace or upgrade military inventories, demonstrations of international status, development of domestic arms industries via licensed production and offsets, the desire to strengthen ties with suppliers, and the influence of the military play important roles in the arms acquisition process. Before permitting exports of arms and military equipment, suppliers will assess the potential economic gains and the potential impact of the transfer on their strategic interests and foreign policy. Will the transfer harm or help friendly states or the supplier's international commitments, reputation, or standing? For several reasons, there is no straightforward answer to the question, "How big is the international arms trade?" First, there is no globally agreed definition of "arms." States and international organizations that seek to measure or control the arms trade use lists of items that vary in their complexity and coverage, most notably with regard to their inclusion of "dual-use goods," items with both military and civilian applications. 1 Second, there is no common agreement on what types of activities constitute the arms trade. Examples of areas where differences exist include arms leased to other states; gifts and donations; the transfer of technology to produce arms and military equipment; and upgrades, parts, and services related to the transfer of arms and military equipment. Third, the lack of openness and transparency by many arms suppliers and recipients regarding the value and volume of their arms exports and imports makes it difficult to collect accurate data. As a result, a variety of different definitions of the international arms trade and estimates of its scale exists. This has implications for efforts to establish controls on arms transfers via a future international arms trade treaty (ATT). This article will outline some of the challenges in defining, measuring, and controlling the international arms trade.

Figures (5)

A similar definition of the arms trade is used to compile the U.S. Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) annual report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Devel- oping Nations.” In spite of the name, the report contains estimates for the value of National control lists serve as the basis for national reports on arms exports. As of January 2010, 32 states had published at least one national report on arms exports since 1990, and a further nine states provided information on the value of their export licenses and exports to the 2009 European Union (EU) Annual Report on Arms Exports.” These reports vary in detail but, at a minimum, tend to provide data on the financial value of arms export licenses or arms exports. Several major exporters (e.g., Russia) do not produce such reports, but do release official data on the financial value of their arms exports. Using national reports and official statements, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has attempted to provide esti- A Scorpéne submarine arrives at Port Klang naval base on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, on September 3, 2009 The pictured submarine is the first of two that Malaysia bought from France and Spain. The SIPRI arms transfers database pro- vides information on international arms transfers from 1950 to the most recent calendar year.® Its coverage is narrower than that of the ACDA, CRS, and na- tional control lists; for example, it does not include transfers of most small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, it provides information on the number of units transferred and employs a unique

A similar definition of the arms trade is used to compile the U.S. Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) annual report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Devel- oping Nations.” In spite of the name, the report contains estimates for the value of National control lists serve as the basis for national reports on arms exports. As of January 2010, 32 states had published at least one national report on arms exports since 1990, and a further nine states provided information on the value of their export licenses and exports to the 2009 European Union (EU) Annual Report on Arms Exports.” These reports vary in detail but, at a minimum, tend to provide data on the financial value of arms export licenses or arms exports. Several major exporters (e.g., Russia) do not produce such reports, but do release official data on the financial value of their arms exports. Using national reports and official statements, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has attempted to provide esti- A Scorpéne submarine arrives at Port Klang naval base on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, on September 3, 2009 The pictured submarine is the first of two that Malaysia bought from France and Spain. The SIPRI arms transfers database pro- vides information on international arms transfers from 1950 to the most recent calendar year.® Its coverage is narrower than that of the ACDA, CRS, and na- tional control lists; for example, it does not include transfers of most small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, it provides information on the number of units transferred and employs a unique

Note: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) uses a trend-indicator value (TIV) to compare the data on deliveries of different weapons and to identify general trends. TIVs give an indication only of the volume of international arms transfers and not of the actual financial values of such transfers. Since year on-year deliveries can fluctuate, the above graph shows the average total TIV volumes for five-year periods as a more stable measure of trends. For a description of the TIV and its calculation, see the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme website at www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Feb. 12, 2010 Figure 1: Volume of International Arms Transfers, 1950-2009 (Five-Year Averages

Note: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) uses a trend-indicator value (TIV) to compare the data on deliveries of different weapons and to identify general trends. TIVs give an indication only of the volume of international arms transfers and not of the actual financial values of such transfers. Since year on-year deliveries can fluctuate, the above graph shows the average total TIV volumes for five-year periods as a more stable measure of trends. For a description of the TIV and its calculation, see the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme website at www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Feb. 12, 2010 Figure 1: Volume of International Arms Transfers, 1950-2009 (Five-Year Averages

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (right) inspects Kalashnikov assault rifles at Russia’ Izhmash plant on July 26, 2006. In contrast to the largest suppliers, the largest recipients of major conventional cense holders could produce or export Kalashnikovs without the express per- mission of Russia in the future.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (right) inspects Kalashnikov assault rifles at Russia’ Izhmash plant on July 26, 2006. In contrast to the largest suppliers, the largest recipients of major conventional cense holders could produce or export Kalashnikovs without the express per- mission of Russia in the future.

Singapore has bought 40 Leopard 2A4 tanks from Germany. The tank pictured above was part of a handover of 140 tanks from Germany to Chile in Munich on November 14, 2007. Even within the EU, where states have agreed that their export license deci- sion-making should be guided by eight criteria relating to issues such as conflict prevention, human rights, and economic development, there appear to have been differences of opinion among members regarding exports to Georgia. EU member states reported issuing licenses worth more than $180 million between 2004 Efforts to improve controls on interna- tional arms transfers have primarily been driven and directed by suppliers in North America and Europe. Motivations have included protecting national industries by preventing the spread of technologies and limiting potential adversaries’ access to key technologies. The prevention of conflict and human rights abuses also has long been at the heart of efforts to control the arms trade. States, export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, and regional organizations (e.g., the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of American States) have developed various sets of best-prac- tice guidelines and model legislation to help ensure that arms exports do not provoke or exacerbate conflict and are not used to commit violations of human rights and humanitarian law. In addition, efforts have been undertaken to prevent the diversion of arms to terrorists, crimi- nals, and armed groups.

Singapore has bought 40 Leopard 2A4 tanks from Germany. The tank pictured above was part of a handover of 140 tanks from Germany to Chile in Munich on November 14, 2007. Even within the EU, where states have agreed that their export license deci- sion-making should be guided by eight criteria relating to issues such as conflict prevention, human rights, and economic development, there appear to have been differences of opinion among members regarding exports to Georgia. EU member states reported issuing licenses worth more than $180 million between 2004 Efforts to improve controls on interna- tional arms transfers have primarily been driven and directed by suppliers in North America and Europe. Motivations have included protecting national industries by preventing the spread of technologies and limiting potential adversaries’ access to key technologies. The prevention of conflict and human rights abuses also has long been at the heart of efforts to control the arms trade. States, export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, and regional organizations (e.g., the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of American States) have developed various sets of best-prac- tice guidelines and model legislation to help ensure that arms exports do not provoke or exacerbate conflict and are not used to commit violations of human rights and humanitarian law. In addition, efforts have been undertaken to prevent the diversion of arms to terrorists, crimi- nals, and armed groups.

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