Intentions are explanations, not brain states (original) (raw)

Abstract

Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. I argue, however, that adopting the folk notion of ‘intention’ or one of its philosophical descendants in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to a misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action. In fact, I will argue that it is likely that intentions in this guise will never be found in the brain. As a consequence, the general idea of an action hierarchy has to be rethought thoroughly. In the final part of the talk I will zoom out, and discuss the relation between folk concepts and neuroscience, and the role philosophy might play in relating them.

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