Aquinas, the "Plotiniana Arabica", and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality (original) (raw)

Being and Essence of Creation in Liber de Causis and Aquinas’s Reception

Religions

Derived from Proclus’s Elementatio Theologica, Liber de Causis (LDC), with the concept of “creation” at its core, provides a substantial monotheistic adaptation of the former that was absorbed and criticized by medieval philosophers represented by Aquinas. Taking Aquinas’s classical distinction between being and essence as the axis of inquiry, this paper first points out that, in contrast to Proclus, LDC not only introduces the concept of creation but also includes in this concept the distinction between being and essence. By reviewing the different readings of Avicenna and Aquinas on the division, this paper then sketches out two different tendencies in the medieval Arab and Latin worlds to either accept the concept of creation in LDC that both being and essence of individua are given from the One via intelligence or to take a further monotheistical transformation, which declaims the One bestowing the being of creations directly. Through this case study, this paper attempts to show...

Cornelio Fabro on Ens as the Point of Departure of Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics

The Incarnate Word Journal, 2011

The purpose of this article is to present Cornelio Fabro’s claim that for Aquinas being (ens) is grasped by the intellect’s first operation. Otherwise, he maintains, any other possibility, such as judgment regarding the existence of a being, may lead to idealism. He also argues that according to the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas the act of being is somehow present in the first apprehension of ens, since ens is “id quod habet esse,” that which has being. This presentation will focus on Fabro’s interpretation of the matter; however, other interpretations will be briefly mentioned since his claim produced much controversy among scholars, as might be expected.

Aquinas on The Distinction Between Esse and Esse: How the Name 'Esse' Can Signify Essence

New Blackfriars, 2023

In a number of texts throughout his career, Thomas Aquinas identifies different senses of the term 'esse'. Most notably, he notes that according to one sense, the term signifies the act of existence (actus essendi), which he famously holds is really distinct from essence in all beings other than God. Perhaps surprisingly, he also notes on a number of occasions that according to another sense, the term 'esse' can signify that very principle that he says is distinct from the act of existence, namely, essence. In light of Aquinas's semantic theory, this paper investigates how he coherently holds within his metaphysical system that this term 'esse' can signify in different ways both essence and the act of existence. More broadly, what it shows is how, for Aquinas, the metaphysician can look to the modes of signification (modi significandi) of terms and as well as their modes of predication (modi praedicandi) to draw careful conclusions about the modes of existence (modi essendi) of real beings. These considerations reveal that in Aquinas's view, although the grammarian and logician in their way are also concerned with these semantic modes, it is not their job to employ them to discern the various senses of the term 'being' or the fundamental modes of being. In the end, this is a task for the metaphysician.

Ens multipliciter dicitur: the semantics and metaphysics of being in St. Thomas Aquinas

This paper examines the multiple semantic functions Aquinas attributes to the verb 'est', ranging from signifying the essence of God to acting as a copula of categorical propositions to expressing identity. A case will be made that all these apparently radically diverse functions are unified under Aquinas's conception of the analogy of being, treating all predications as predications of being with or without some qualification (secundum quid or simpliciter). This understanding of the multiplicity of the semantic functions of this verb as conceived by Aquinas will enable us to have a better understanding of the meaning of his metaphysical claims and arguments. In particular, with this understanding of Aquinas' conception of being, we will be able to see how Aquinas's famous "intellectus essentiae" argument for the thesis of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures can work, despite Anthony Kenny's arguments to the contrary in his book Aquinas on Being.

RESEARCH PROJECT ON AQUINAS'S WAY OF PHILOSOPHIZING THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AS IPSUM ESSE

PROJECT ABSTRACT In order to elucidate Aquinas’s philosophical method and rigor in arriving at his teaching of Ipsum Esse Subsistens, it is useful to refer to works such as his Treatise on Separate Substances, but above all to his Commentary on Metaphysics. Here Aquinas states that Aristotle concludes, correctly, that there is a Being in Itself and a One in Itself which is the cause of the being of all other beings, but which is not their substance, but only its own substance. According to Aquinas, this conclusion is based on the teachings of act and potency, of substance and of being understood as act, within the framework of Aristotle’s science of being qua being. Aquinas states that although Aristotle inherited the seed of this teaching from Plato, he arrived at it by a different speculative path, rejecting the temptation to conceptualize a subsistent universal being.

Thomas Aquinas On Being and Essence

Because a small error in the beginning grows enormous at the end, as the Philosopher remarks in Book 1 of On the Heavens and the World, 1 and being and essence are the first things to be conceived by our understanding, as Avicenna declares in Book 1 of his Metaphysics, 2 in order to avoid falling into error about them, and to reveal their difficulties, we should see what are signified by the names of being and essence, how these are found in various things, and how they are related to the logical intentions 3 of genus, species, and difference.

Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcendentals

Metaphysics is defined as the science of being as being and its properties by its ultimate causes. The identity between metaphysics and philosophical theology 1 necessitates founding both ontologically (per causas intrinsecas) and theologically (per causas extrinsecas) the transcendental properties of being as being : res, unum, aliquid, verum, and bonum. Unfortunately, with the separation of ontology from rational theology in modern rationalism, the requirement for the theological foundation was somewhat forgotten, namely the need to relate the transcendentals to God as to their cause. The rediscovery in Twentieth-century Thomism of actus essendi and the notion of participation has redimensioned Thomistic metaphysics by placing participated actus essendi as act of all acts and perfection of all perfections at the center of metaphysical inquiry. Consequently, we have the opportunity of investigating more deeply the speculative novelties that emerge from a study of the transcendentals with this new perspective, namely, a study of the transcendentals in the light of the real composition and the doctrine of participation.

Research Statement Aquinas's way of philosophizing the doctrine of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens

Aquinas's philosophical way of proceeding in his metaphysical analysis by means of which reached his doctrine of Ipsum Esse Subsistens was typically Aristotelian while at the same time assuming the substance of Plato's intuitions and some elements of Plato's philosophical way of proceeding. The aim of this research is to demonstrate which of these views most faithfully reveals Aquinas's genuine thinking on Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Research Plan The research project is postdoctoral or similar; its objective is to conclude the writing of a journal article or a book chapter or both, and it will be deployed in the following phases. 1) First Phase: The Contemporary Debate About Aquinas's Ipsum Esse Doctrine I will contrast the two interpretations of Aquinas's Ipsum Esse doctrine that clash in the contemporary philosophical arena. Scholars of the two currents of interpretation mentioned seem to agree that Aquinas assumes substantially most of Plato's doctrines. For example, in Summa Theologiae 1 q. 6 a. 4 Aquinas maintains that Plato's opinion is "absolutely true" when he affirms the existence of a supreme being "which is essentially good, which we call God." Aquinas thinks that not only is Plato's doctrine correct, but also that "Aristotle agrees with this." And he concludes: "Hence from the first being, which is essentially good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it