Artificial agents and the expanding ethical circle (original) (raw)
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Machine Ethics and the Idea of a More-Than-Human Moral World
2010
To be published in M. and S. Anderson, eds Machine Ethics, Forthcoming 2010, Cambridge University Press. "We are the species equivalent of that schizoid pair, Mr Hyde and Dr Jekyll; we have the capacity for disastrous destruction but also the potential to found a magnificent civilization. Hyde led us to use technology badly; we misused energy and overpopulated the earth, but we will not sustain civilization by abandoning technology. We have instead to use it wisely, as Dr Jekyll would do, with the health of the Earth, not the health of people, in mind."
New Challenges for Ethics: The Social Impact of Posthumanism, Robots, and Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Healthcare Engineering, 2021
The ethical approach to science and technology is based on their use and application in extremely diverse fields. Less prominence has been given to the theme of the profound changes in our conception of human nature produced by the most recent developments in artificial intelligence and robotics due to their capacity to simulate an increasing number of human activities traditionally attributed to man as manifestations of the higher spiritual dimension inherent in his nature. Hence, a kind of contrast between nature and artificiality has ensued in which conformity with nature is presented as a criterion of morality and the artificial is legitimized only as an aid to nature. On the contrary, this essay maintains that artificiality is precisely the specific expression of human nature which has, in fact, made a powerful contribution to the progress of man. However, science and technology do not offer criteria to guide the practical and conceptual use of their own contents simply because...
The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots and Ethics
2012
One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Much recent attention has been devoted to the "animal question"--consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In this book, David Gunkel takes up the "machine question": whether and to what extent intelligent and autonomous machines of our own making can be considered to have legitimate moral responsibilities and any legitimate claim to moral consideration. The machine question poses a fundamental challenge to moral thinking, questioning the traditional philosophical conceptualization of technology as a tool or instrument to be used by human agents. Gunkel begins by addressing the question of machine moral agency: whether a machine might be considered a legitimate moral agent that could be held responsible for decisions and actions. He then approaches the machine question from the other side, considering whether a machine might be a moral patient due legitimate moral consideration. Finally, Gunkel considers some recent innovations in moral philosophy and critical theory that complicate the machine question, deconstructing the binary agent–patient opposition itself. Technological advances may prompt us to wonder if the science fiction of computers and robots whose actions affect their human companions (think of HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey) could become science fact. Gunkel's argument promises to influence future considerations of ethics, ourselves, and the other entities who inhabit this world.
Philosophy & technology, 2024
The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share the material substrate of human beings begins to show signs of a number of properties that are nuclear to the understanding of moral agency. It makes us wonder whether the properties we associate with moral status need to be revised or whether the new artificial entities deserve to enter within the circle of moral consideration. This raises the foreboding that we are at the gates of an anthropological crisis: the properties bound to moral agency have been exclusively possessed in the past by human beings and have shaped the very definition of being human. In this article, I will argue that AI does not lead us to an anthropological crisis and that, if we adhere to the history and philosophy of technology, we will notice that the debate on the moral status of AI uncritically starts from an anthropology of properties and loses sight of the relational dimension of technology. First, I will articulate three criteria for analyzing different anthropological views in philosophy of technology. Second, I will propose six anthropological models: traditional, industrial, phenomenological, postphenomenological, symmetrical, and cyborg. Third, I will show how the emergence of AI breaks with the dynamics of increased relationality in the history and philosophy of technology. I will argue that this aspect is central to debates about the moral status of AI, since it sheds light on an aspect of moral consideration that has been obscured. Finally, I will reject entirely relational approaches to moral status and propose two hybrid possibilities for rethinking it.
Ethics for "Intelligent" Artificial Beings: A Possible Future
Artificial intelligence is a challenge for many scientists and researchers today. On the one hand, the development of artificial intelligence can be beneficial for people as it can significantly facilitate their daily lives and jobs. On the other hand, there is the fear that we will not succeed in developing "friendly artificial intelligence" and that these created intelligent beings becoming autonomous persons will bring many problems. Worries go so far as to assume that artificial intelligence will displace humans and take their place in all spheres of life. In this article, we have tried to present future scenarios concerning the development of artificial intelligence and indicate how necessary it is to have ethics in this discourse.
Discover Artificial Intelligence, 2023
The exponential progress of AI systems today compels scientists and philosophers to redefine their conceptual frameworks to better understand the nature of these new technologies and their moral status. Among the various theories that are used to respond to the challenges posed by intelligent systems are instrumentalism, Socio-technical Systems Theory (STST) and Mediation Theory (MT), all widely adopted in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). This paper intends to present the main features of these theories and provide a comparative analysis of them in order to assess their contribution to the process of understanding the moral status of artificial intelligence. Our investigation intends to show how (1) instrumentalism is inadequate to account for the moral status of AI, (2) STST, while helping to highlight the link between AI, society and morality, lends itself to the criticism of anthropocentrism, (3) MT in its Latourian version has the merit of highlighting the active character of technological artefacts and thus of artificial intelligence in the moral sphere. However, the principle of symmetry it proposes poses the problem of the de-accountability of the human agent. (4) MT in its postphenomenological form seems to partially resolve the problem of moral responsibility, but the opacity of the terminology it employs exposes it to various criticisms. In light of these results, we intend to show how an understanding of the moral status of intelligent systems cannot be based on the diametrically opposed positions that consider technologies either morally neutral or else moral agents similar to humans, whereas particularly useful elements can be found in STST and in postphenomenological MT.
The Machine Question: Ethics, Alterity and Technology
This chapter, published in "Thinking Otherwise: Philosophy, Communication, Technology" (2007) represents something like a manifesto for the rights of machines. It considers the machine (AIs, robots, autonomous systems, etc.) as both moral agent and moral patient and argues for the ethical standing and appropriate treatment of artificial entities. The title refers to and expands on the "animal question," which has had considerable influence in moral philosophy during the later half of the 20th century. The machine question takes this moral innovation one step further by demonstrating that the machine, the other of the animal other, remains one of the last socially acceptable moral prejudices and arguing for a thinking of ethics that is able to proceed otherwise.