Finitude and the Possibility of Philosophy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Philosophy of Finitude: Heidegger, Levinas and Nietzsche
2018
Examining the legacies of Heidegger, along with Derrida, Levinas and Nietzsche, Rafael Winkler argues that it is not the search for truth or even contradictions that stimulates philosophical thought. Instead, it is our exposure to the unthinkable or the impossible – to thought's own limits. An experience of the unthinkable is possible in our encounter with the uniqueness of death, the singularity of being, and of the self and the other. This 'thinking of finitude' also has political implications, as it provides us with a way to talk about, and evaluate, absolute strangeness and, by implication, the absolute stranger or foreigner. Illuminating Heidegger's writings on the question of ontology, ethics and history, Winkler proves that this encounter with thought's limits is one of the mainstays of the philosophies of difference of Heidegger, Levinas, and Nietzsche.
Kom, 2022
In this paper, aligning with the focus international researchers have dedicated to Heidegger's major works in order to contribute to the elucidation of his teachings, our intention is to establish a hypothesis grounded in Heidegger's secondary literature spanning his first, second, and third periods of thought. This will be accomplished through an examination of his speeches, presentations, lectures, correspondences, notes, interviews, and the like. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is aimed at demonstrating that Heidegger's body of work does not constitute a static and definitive delineation of philosophy that commences and concludes in a prescribed manner: instead, it represents a contemplation of the concept of philosophy throughout his entire oeuvre, achieved by engaging in the discourse of philosophy, problematizing metaphysics, and scrutinizing ontology. In this vein, this essay delves into Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and metaphysics during his first period of thought, his comprehension of the problem of metaphysics in his second period of thought, and his interpretation of the interplay between ontology and theology/teologics in his third period of thought. The ultimate objective is to shed light on Heidegger's methodology, which underpins both his initial phenomenology and subsequent thought: the method of posing questions. Specifically, the act of questioning has led to a critique of the obscuring of the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein, a critique that delivers an essential disruption to philosophical thought. Consequently, this underscores the necessity of establishing the foundations for the task of thinking.
Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, and the Phenomenology of Finitude (Draft)
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to an overlooked aspect of Stein’s critique of Heidegger - namely, her critique of his account of human finitude. I argue that this aspect of her critique is overlooked because it is to be found, not in her evaluation of Being and Time, but in her evaluation of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Given that finitude is a dominant theme in Stein’s other work—and particularly in Finite and Eternal Being—it is reasonable to think that careful analysis of what she has to say about finitude in the Kant section of her MHE will shed light on her other works as well.
The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”
The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. http://cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100555210 Chinese translation by Zhuang Zhenhua: Shanghai VI Horae Publishers, 2009. Paperback edition: Cornell University Press, 2013. Preface to the paperback edition available at http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100555210.
Heidegger's Metaphilosophy: A New Reconstruction
Stasis , 2024
The essay proposes a new reconstruction of Heidegger’s metaphilosophy. Providing a common explanation to a variety of Heidegger’s pronouncements on the nature of his discipline in seminars and public addresses, the essay stresses their ties to the phenomenological doctrine of Being and Time. My presentation spans four major theses: (1) Philosophy is actual in the practice of philosophizing, understood as an activity of intrinsic worth; (2) The essential procedure of philosophizing is clarification of experience; (3) The medium of philosophizing is conceptual knowledge; (4) The goal of philosophizing is non-conceptual: a “fundamental attunement.” Focusing on the apparent tension between (3) and (4), I argue that the structural relations between the conceptual and the non-conceptual elements in Heidegger’s metaphilosophy are best accounted for in terms of the duality of understanding (Verstehen) and being-attuned (Befindlichkeit) in the existential analytic. In conclusion, I suggest that the metaphilosophical vision this analysis yields is faithful to the existential promise of philosophy and provides the conceptual resources to defend its essential status as a mode of human realization.
Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger, Metaphysics, and the Transformation to Thinking
Human Studies, vol. 36, n. 2, 2013, pp. 235–257., 2013
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to reinstantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger’s insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being’s ‘self’-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics.
Heidegger on Kant, Finitude, and the Correlativity of Thinking and Being
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2018
Although Heidegger's evaluation of Kant's philosophy underwent a significant change after his early work on Kant, a continuity can be found between his early and late interpretations in terms of a certain common problem they all elaborate on. Through the unitary reconstruction I make of the key moments of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy, I argue that this problem concerns how, within the transcendental framework of Kant's transformation and restriction of traditional ontology, the correlativity of thinking and being is discerned and grounded. In each of the systematic readings he offers of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger attempts to take critique to its highest moment of self-understanding and assess how and why certain aspects and implications of this correlativity can be addressed by tran-scendental critique while others escape it.