D. Calma, E. King (eds), The Renewal of Medieval Metaphysics Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio on Proclus’ Elements of Theology (original) (raw)
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in "Medioevo", 34 (2009), pp. 9-59., 2009
The essay traces the history of the debate on the nature of metaphysics and its object from Late Antiquity to the 14th century in the frame of the history of the debate on the nature of the subject/object of science. As a consequence it identifies five elements constituting the question of the nature of metaphysics: the epistemological role of the subject/object of science; the degree of insight of metaphysics into that which it considers; the role assigned to God and separate substances within metaphysics; the relationship between metaphysics, or rational theology, and revealed theology; and the different conceptions that authors develop of the notion of being. The positions of a number of authors from Antiquity to the Later Middle Ages concerning this themes are examined here and their historical relationships investigated. As for Thomas Aquinas, for instance, I argue that he does not consider the ens commune, which is the subject of metaphysics, as conceptually identical with transcendental being. For him, transcendental being includes all its inferiors; by contrast, common being includes some inferiors of being (general rationes; rationes of immaterial substances as far as the latter are taken as principles of being), but not all of them (particular rationes of material beings; rationes of immaterial substances different from those which characterize these substances when the latter are taken as principles of being). Thus, in Aquinas’s view, transcendental being is an ontological/metaphysical notion; common being is an epistemological notion. In reality they are identical, but before the mind they are not completely identical. Furthermore, one can notice that the Italian Dominican maintains that God is both cause of the subject of metaphysics and part of it. Ens commune, taken as it is in reality, is identical with transcendental being; hence, on the one hand, it is common both to material substances and to spiritual substances and, on the other, it is in a way posterior to the latter substances, since it depends upon them.
Plato’s Timaeus and Catholic Metaphysics
In light of the Timaeus, I will assess Eusebius of Caesarea’s claim that Plato “has attained the porch of [Christian] Truth”. 1 In analysing this claim, I will expose and then evaluate the more obvious parallels to Christian doctrine and metaphysics that can be found in the Timaeus. My conclusion is that I share Eusebius’s wonder of Plato. I am astounded at the consistency with which Plato arrives at the same conclusions as Revealed Christian doctrine, especially in his marvellously Christian metaphysics, the attributes of God, and his ordering and origins of the cosmos and his belief in the singularity of the Demiurge as creator God
The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics
In this talk I present an argument for the highly innovative or even revolutionary character of Christian theology in the late Patristic period. I suggest that in the working out of the details of Christology, Christian thought burst the categories provided by classical, Greek philosophy. In this sense, the rise of Christian theology spells the end of ancient metaphysics. I do not say, however, that Christian theology is opposed to philosophy. Rather, I suggest that it developed its own Christian philosophy which (I tentatively suggest towards the end of the talk) is more an anticipation of later medieval and modern philosophies than a continuous development from pre-Christian forms of philosophy.
Introduction Medieval and Post-medieval Metaphysics
The present work seeks to document the most important traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even just a few years ago, seen by many as of negligible contemporary interest. The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion. were none the less surprised to see how much valuable work had been achieved in these a·reas not only in the past but also in our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps, since the 13th century. In order to summarize what, from the editors' point of view, seem to be the most important trends underlying these contemporary developments, the present Introduction offers a brief and wilfully selective overview of the contents of this Handbook. Aristotle The founders of Western philosophy in ancient Greece initiated the development of metap...
Metaphysical Thinking after Metaphysics: a Theological Reading of Jan Patočka's Negative Platonism
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2018
WINNER OF THE IJPT ESSAY PRIZE For decades now, the end of metaphysics has been heralded. Engaging with the issue at stake, first, I will present and critically discuss Jan Patočka’s prophetic reflection on the fate of metaphysics after (the end of) metaphysical philosophy. This will show that the problem is far more complicated and that attempts devoted to overcoming metaphysics often unjustly reduce it. To be able properly address the complexities of the crisis of metaphysics, I will move beyond Patočka and will introduce the agent, which played a decisive role in the history of metaphysics and its devel- opment, that is, theology. I will point out that Patočka’s reconsideration of metaphysical thinking via the reinterpretation of the Platonic Idea correlates with the category of faith. Thus, I will argue that ‘a providential marriage’ between Athens and Jerusalem should not be divorced and that, despite numerous attempts to prove the contrary, the alliance of theology metaphysical thinking is unavoidable and even beneficial for both parts.
The Puzzling Science of Metaphysics: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Flandrensis (Draft)
It is not unusual for scholars to recognize the puzzle that arises from the many and seemingly divergent accounts that Aristotle gives in the Metaphysics of the subject-matter of that work. It is also not unusual for scholars to recognize the way in which Aquinas’s prooemium to his commentary on the Metaphysics offers an ingenious solution to that puzzle. What is unusual is for scholars to recognize that Aquinas’s answer to this question trades one aporia for another. Specifically, Aquinas’s solution to the problem of the subject of metaphysics raises a new problem concerning its principles, for in the prooemium St. Thomas identifies the principles of being as being with separate substances in the plural, and not just with God. In what sense can the angels be counted among the principles of ens inquantum ens? And how is this possible if they also fall under being? While recent interpreters of Aquinas offer few resources for solving this new puzzle, the same is not true when we turn to older commentators. In particular, the purpose of this paper is draw attention to a striking answer offered by the 15th century Dominican metaphysician, Dominic of Flanders (aka Flandrensis), who argues that, unlike God, the angels both fall under being, insofar as they are immaterial beings in the category of substance, and are principles of being, insofar as they are truly causes of categorial being itself. The paper will proceed in three parts: §1 will consider the initial aporia regarding Aristotle’s account of the subject-matter of the Metaphysics; §2 will turn to Aquinas's prooemium to the commentary on the Metaphysics and consider both the answer it provides and the new problem that it raises; §3 will outline Flandrensis’ resolution of this further puzzle, according to which the angels’ causal role as celestial movers renders them not only cosmological principles of change, but ontological principles of being. The paper will then close by asking whether or not this solution itself raises any further puzzles about the science of metaphysics.