Soviet patriotism in a comparative perspective: a passion for oxymora (original) (raw)
Relying primarily on field research in the Siberian city of Omsk, this essay analyses a variety of ways in which state patriotic terminology is used by individuals and groups through the study of organisations and activities that deploy the patriotic label, such as schools, museums, youth clubs, and summer camps. Analysis based on fieldworksuggeststhatalthoughpatriotismincludesabasicconsensusaboutthehomeland,acluetothesuccess oftheconceptisitscapacitytobeappropriated,distorted,orembeddedindiverseunderstandingsandpractices. Easily ‘captured’ by different actors according to their needs and goals, patriotism also appears to be deeply rooted in the personal and the private. Everyday patriotism is thus far from being reduced to its top-down or official dimension. While patriotism is a tool that officials efficiently use to promote their political goals, it is also a symbolic resource that Russian society uses in its attempts to reformulate a new collective identity.
Patriotism: Russian foreign policy’s new paradigm
When reading the Russian press one can deduct that patriotism has become a fundamental key for understanding the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. It is interesting to study the different analyses of this phenomenon, from the most conservative to those most critical of the regime. What does Russian patriotism consist of?
***** 1. AIM AND DELIMITATIONS: Soviet nostalgia occurs in the current Russian society both on the personal and political level. There are several types of nationalist currents in Russia, but the one of interest in this study is the so-called «empire restoring nationalists», or the «impertsy». Other scholars have earlier found that the ideology of this current contains Soviet nostalgia. The aim of this study is to further explore the content of Soviet nostalgia in recent writings of selected current Russian authors in this current, with emphasis on finding which aspects of the Soviet Union these authors harbor nostalgia for. The following delimitations of the study are made: Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov are selected as the authors to be studied, on the basis of their centrality in the impertsy current. Regarding selection of texts to analyze, it’s chosen to examine 516 of their articles published on specified web sites in 2014 and 2015 and four relevant books published in 2014, 2012, 2010 and 2004. ***** 2. ANALYTICAL METHOD: At first, nineteen indicators of Soviet nostalgia are extracted from the scholarly secondary literature on nostalgia in general, political nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia in particular. The purpose of the indicators is to function as a tool for detecting elements of Soviet nostalgia in the upcoming analysis of the selected impertsy texts. The text then proceeds with an analysis of the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia. The following two approaches are used for all texts in the analysis: 1) When one or more of the nineteen indicators of Soviet nostalgia (produced earlier in the study) are observed in a given text, a context specific evaluation is made regarding whether the observation should be considered as a finding of Soviet nostalgia or not. 2) Other background knowledge about Soviet nostalgia and the impertsy ideology is also taken into account during the examination and analysis. This in order to detect instances of Soviet nostalgia in the given text which wouldn’t had been detected with the use of the indicators of Soviet nostalgia alone. ***** 3. RESULTS CONCERNING DUGIN’S NOSTALGIAS: It was found that Dugin is nostalgic for the feeling of «familiarity» (his term) with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, the (perceived) innocence of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, tradition in itself and his three components of tradition – religion, hierarchy and collective identity, what he sees as some of the «real» effects of Marxism put into practice in the Soviet Union (i.e. the creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong traditions), Communism’s social solidarity and social justice aspects, the influence (ideological and real political power) over territories in the former USSR and over other territories in Eastern Europe, the Russians’ role as the «great people» (his term) relative to other and «smaller peoples» (his term), the (perceived) friendship between the peoples, the state’s lost subjectness and independence, the ideological and political leadership over a global alternative to the Western one, the Russians’ role as «the core» of a union (in both the USSR and the Russian Empire) of different peoples and cultures, the Russians’ role as the integrating force in such a union, and for having control over strategic sectors in the economy of such a union. In general, Dugin seldom expresses nostalgia for the USSR specifically. On the contrary, in most cases he shows nostalgia for features which the Russian Empire and the USSR had in common as he sees them, i.e. for features which in his view tie these two periods together, i.e. for Great Russia. However, in a smaller number of cases, he shows nostalgia which is a mix between nostalgia for the USSR and for Great Russia. No instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively were observed, however. That is, many instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were detected, but no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire that weren’t also considered to be features of the Soviet Union. Among Dugin’s nostalgias, his most intense ones seem to be, as a main rule, those for features which the Russian Empire period and the Soviet period had in common. His other nostalgias seem to be less intense and more ambivalent regarding to which degree they are directed towards Great Russia in general or the Soviet Union in particular. Thus, when it comes to the relative intensities of Dugin’s nostalgias, in most cases it seems to be a correlation between the intensity of nostalgia and the object of nostalgia’s perceived degree of continuity in time – from the Russian Empire period to the Soviet period: High continuity usually goes together with high intensity, while low continuity usually goes together with low intensity. ***** 4. RESULTS CONCERNING PROHANOV’S NOSTALGIAS: Prohanov was found to be a nostalgist for the Soviet victory in the WWII, the heroes of the WWII, weapons from the WWII, Stalin, the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, the whole country in the whole Soviet period, the Red Army, the Soviet industry, the Soviet people, the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal in the Soviet period, the Russian people’s function as the organizing force in this struggle, (Stalin as) the strong leader who organized different peoples towards this goal, «the empire» in general, the Soviet civilization, the Soviet state, the «basis» (his term) of the Soviet state, the ideological postulates of the Soviet state, the «constants» (his term) which the Soviet ideology rested on, the Soviet values, the Soviet symbols, the Soviet leaders, the USSR as a great power in general, the USSR’s geopolitical influence in the world (i.e. the USSR’s status as a world power), the bipolar system of balance of geopolitical influence from the Soviet period, the USSR’s position as a pole in this system, the USSR’s geopolitical power over territories which were integral parts of the USSR/the Russian Empire and over other Eastern European countries, the Communist ideal itself, Communism’s strategic goals, Communism’s collective behavior, Communism’s idea of the common future of the peoples, the view from the Soviet period that the US/NATO/the West are the enemies, the unity of the «red» (his term) worldview from the Soviet period and the «white» (his term) worldview from the Russian Empire period. In general, Prohanov shows much more emotional engagement for the Soviet period than for the Russian Empire period. That is, in most cases he shows first and foremost Soviet nostalgia, and only to a lesser degree Russian Empire nostalgia. However, in a smaller number of cases, he primarily shows nostalgia for features which he perceives as being common to the Russian Empire and Soviet history, so in those cases he shows above all nostalgia for features of Great Russia. However, no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively were observed. That is, it was detected some instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, but no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire which weren’t also considered to be features of the Soviet Union. Prohanov’s nostalgias for objects closely associated (in time and/or subject) with the Soviet victory in the WWII and/or with Stalin usually have the highest intensities, while nostalgias for objects more loosely connected to Stalin and/or the victory usually have a lower intensity. Consequently, for most of Prohanov’s nostalgias, it seems to be a positive correlation between the intensity of the nostalgia and the associative proximity to Stalin and/or to the victory in the WWII: High associative proximity usually goes together with high intensity, while low associative proximity usually goes together with low intensity.
Stalinism and Russian Nationalism
A sociologist analyzes the idea of Russian nationalism as it evolved under Lenin and Stalin. Based on a reconsideration of Soviet history and of Stalin's and others' published statements, the article reexamines the relationship between Soviet and Russian identity and nationalism. The article concludes with discussion of the implications of this historical legacy for Putin's Russia.
A Blind and Militant Attachment: Russian Patriotism in Comparative Perspective
SSRN Electronic Journal
Much of the literature on patriotic sentiment in post-Soviet Russia leans on the results of public opinion surveys administered to Russian citizens. Absent a comparison group, such evidence, while helpful, can leave one adrift in trying to assess the significance of any particular polling result. Here, we draw on a shared set of questions from multiple waves of the International Social Survey Program's National Identity and Role of Government modules, as well as the World Values Survey, to benchmark the responses of Russians to those of citizens in a diverse group of middle and high income countries. This exercise highlights that while Russians are not unusual in the degree to which they have a benign attachment to and/or pride in their country, they stand out for espousing a patriotism that has remained consistently blind and militant since at least the mid-1990s. We speculate as to the underlying cause and highlight a potential consequence: the nature of Russian patriotism has lowered the cost to the Russian leadership of military aggression.
The notion of 'socialist patriotism' represents one point of departure of this essay. Throughout the majority of the reign of the communist parties in Eastern Europe, the concept served as a ready-made propaganda tool to fi ght and subdue political opponents, drawing on various patriotic and nationalist feelings and attitudes. 1 However, despite the reservations the notion begets among the current students of the period I am convinced that in a certain time-period the notion of 'socialist patriotism' stood for more than mere political propaganda. As a part of an ambitious project of socialist nation-building its prospects did not always seem as dismal as we tend to think today. The fi rst half of the 1960s was probably the most optimistic time in Soviet history, the era of bold Khrushchevist integration projects that – in the upcoming modernisation leap driven by the scientifi c-technological revolution, overall progress, sweeping urbanisation, and cultural blossoming – should have led to a new stage of economic, social, and political unifi cation and national blending, a 'new historical community of people'. As some scholars argue, it was to be a decisive step in the creation of the Soviet nation as a mixture of all constituent nations and ethnicities under the leadership of Russians. 2 The possible early creation of such a nation was understood as a utopian project and challenged even in the USSR, especially in its western parts. Yet, some of the optimism spilled over to the satellite countries of East-Central Europe, where it found rather incompatible but not altogether hostile conditions. The complicated relationship between the politically promoted and ideologically driven concept of socialist patriotism and the historical studies of nation-building in East-Central Europe is at the centre of the present essay. It starts with a short overview of the ambiguous relationship of radical socialist movements and communist parties in the region to national or nationality question until the end of WWII that foreshadowed the even more complicated development during the communist parties' dictatorial rule. The majority of the essay concentrates on the period between 1956 and 1970. Even though the arguments involved are drawn from the broader geographical area of East-Central Europe, in detail the story concentrates primarily on the examples of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The coun-tries' diverging confi gurations of the offi cial communist politics and the developing Marxist historical nation-building studies at that time provide interesting material for comparison.