The Dualism of Practical Reason: The Profoundest Problem of ethics (original) (raw)

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The dualism of practical reason

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 129.67.176.68 on Mon, M uch moral philosophy can be classed either as moralism or as egoism. By 'moralism', I mean the view that all reasons for action are moral reasons. The most obvious example is Kantianism, but other common views, such as utilitarianism, are also moralistic; thus, our strongest, or even only, reason at any time might be said to be to act on a universalised maxim or to maximise utility. Egoism, on the other hand, is the view that all reasons for action are ultimately self-interested. Much of ancient Greek moral philosophy can plausibly be described as egoistic, as can most versions of modern contractualism. According to egoism, we always have strongest reason to promote our own self-interest.

Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason: Mitigated Aporia

In this dissertation, I reconstruct Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. On the basis of this reconstruction, I defend a distinct interpretation of it. This interpretation, in turn, helps me to develop a response to what Sidgwick deemed ‘the profoundest problem of Ethics’. Chapter one explores the relation between Sidgwick’s axioms and the dualism of practical reason. I contend that these axioms fail to meet Sidgwick’s epistemic standards unless they are revised. These revised axioms may be read from two points of view: the universal and the personal. The former reflects the fact that we are part of a larger whole; the latter, that we each constitute a distinct whole in ourselves. From the universal viewpoint, the axioms support morality. From the personal viewpoint, they support egoism. When egoism and morality conflict, our practical reason is divided against itself, and gives us no guidance. This conflict, I contend in chapter two, challenges moral realism, the internal coherence of practical reason, and the rational authority of morality. I defend three further claims about the conflict between morality and egoism: a) it has an existential dimension; b) it is contingent; and c) it is not just a problem, but also an insight. On the basis of this interpretation, I argue that common scholarly responses to the dualism of practical reason address ‘the profoundest problem of Ethics’ only superficially. The resulting aporia leads me to explore, in the third and final chapter, the possibilities of a different approach. Given that the dualism of practical reason is an insight, we must find a way to sustain it. We may do so by changing the contingencies that give rise to the discord between morality and egoism. I explore two such mitigating strategies: one private, and one political.

Defending the Dualism of the Practical Reason Against Parfit’s" - eScholarship

2008

Famously, Sidgwick claimed that practical reason is divided, since the contradictory demands of two competing principles, Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence, seem equally compelling. John Skorupski (in "Three Methods and a Dualism") argued that there are no competing standards of pure practical reason. Recently, Derek Parfit (in Chapter 2 of his unpublished manuscript Climbing the Mountain) tamed Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason by regarding it as the idea that in certain cases one might have a sufficient reason either to promote one's own good or to promote impartially the good. This paper reacts to these views. First, Parfit's account is assessed. The main conclusion defended is that Parfit's alleged improvement of Sidgwick's dualism is not dualist at all, and therefore misrepresents the original dualism. Second, the plausibility of a competition between the demands of impartiality and the ideal of prudence within a welfarist framework is defended, against Skorupski's contentions. The main argument here relies on a challenge to the idea that the boundaries and the content of pure practical reason can be precisely determined.

The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason*

Ethics, 2012

Sidgwick’s defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized,for example in Bernard Williams’s condemnation of it as ‘Govern-mentHouseutilitarianism.’Itisalsoatoddswiththeideaofmorality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M.Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialismthatitissometimesrighttodoinsecretwhatitwouldnotberighttodoopenly,ortoadvocatepublicly.WedefendSidgwickonthisissue,and show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makesit possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications

E. E. Constance Jones on the dualism of practical reason

Routledge eBooks, 2023

Society, and the author of several textbooks and a monograph, worked in both philosophical logic and ethics. The current paper focuses on Jones' central contribution to ethicsher response to Sidgwick's "dualism of practical reason". Sidgwick held that practical reason has an allegiance to two distinct 'methods': self-love and benevolence. Yet, while both methods are independently rational, they may potentially come into conflict. This, for Jones, presented "the most important difficulty of the system of [Sidgwick's] Universalistic Hedonism". Jones returned to this problem a number of times in the course of her career. We discuss the evolution of her thinking on this problem and argue that her work presents an original and promising line of response to the dualism that worried Sidgwick.

Moral Duty and the Highest Good in the Critique of Practical Reason

Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (eds.) Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, and David Wagner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2018), 1903-1910.

This paper explores the relationship between duty and the highestgood in Kant's philosophy. My main focus is the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV), as Kant'sargument here has come under scrutinyr ecentlyb yL awrenceP asternack.¹ My focus is on Pasternack'st wo-aspect reading of the highest good, especiallyh is claim that Kant conflates the highest good as ad uty and the highest good as an ideal. This paper is ar esponse to Pasternack in which Ip ut forward what I call at wo-aspect interpretation of our morald uty.O nt his view,p romotion of the highestgood is aduty onlyinthat it is an extension of our faculty of reason, the functiono fw hich,i nt he KpV, concerns the stability of reason itself in relation to distinctive features of human nature. To show this, Igiveabrief overview of the relevant aspects of Kant'sp hilosophicals ystem, highlighting his turn to human nature in moral philosophyi nt he KpV, as opposed to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS). Then Io utline Pasternack'sc riticism of the KpVargument for the highestg ood. Finally, Is how how Pasternack'sc riticisms can be met with my two-aspecti nterpretation once human nature and the distinctive nature of human reason are taken into account.The resulti sa n interpretation of Kant in which practical reason leads to the highestgood on account of the distinctive human elements of our reason; this allows for af uller understanding of the role of the highestg ood as Kant attempts to deal with the unity and stability of our entire faculty of reason.

Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology

In The Point of View of the Universe Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer an articulation and defense of Henry Sidgwick's ideas about ethics. They seek to demonstrate a number of ways in which his work can inform contemporary debates in the field. Sidgwick's seminal text The Methods of Ethics left off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are both reasons for egoism and utilitarianism-reasons to adopt both Sidgwick's principle of rational prudence and his principle of rational benevolence-such that reason alone cannot decide what we ought to do when these two principles conflict.

Reason and Human Ethics (Philosophia, 2022)

Reason and Human Ethics, 2022

This is an exact PDF replica of the print-on-demand paperback edition of my book "Reason and Human Ethics" (originally published 2022; errata corrected as of December 19, 2024). This book argues that a secular, biological, teleological basis of human ethics exists and that reasoning and critical thinking about both ends and means are essential to human ethics. It examines how these principles apply in the contexts of individual ethics, social ethics, citizen ethics, media ethics, and political ethics. This PDF does not support toggling between the text and endnotes, as does the Kindle ebook edition. The book is also available at a reasonable price in paperback and Kindle editions on Amazon.com (https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-Ethics-Alan-Johnson/dp/097010555X/ref=monarch\_sidesheet) and other Amazon sites throughout the world.

Defending the Dualism of the Practical Reason Against Parfit's

2008

Famously, Sidgwick claimed that practical reason is divided, since the contradictory demands of two competing principles, Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence, seem equally compelling. John Skorupski (in “Three Methods and a Dualism”) argued that there ...