Knowledge and Knowledge Structure (original) (raw)
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This thesis aims at laying the groundwork for a research program in philosophy of mind by arguing for two theoretical positions, internalism and representationalism (intentionalism), which are rarely defended jointly, but which together can form the basis for a plausible theory of the mind. The first chapter argues for internalism against the dominant externalist view. Firstly, it is discussed what the best way is to elucidate the debate between internalism and externalism rooted in the Twin Earth thought experiment. (Putnam 1975) It is argued that the issue between internalists and externalists is whether concrete items that stand in a referential relation to mental states are among the constitutive bases of mental states. The Dry Earth thought experiment (Boghossian 1998) is introduced to make a case for internalism, relying on concepts that do not refer. Externalist counter-arguments are introduced and rejected. The second chapter argues for representationalism/intentionalism against qualia theory. It is argued that there are no mental qualities (qualia) that account for the qualitative aspects of phenomenology. What do account for the qualitative aspects of phenomenology are apparent qualities of the intentional objects of conscious experiences, the qualities the world is represented as having by the experiences. Three sets of arguments for qualia are introduced and rejected. The first set of arguments are the type of arguments that are variants of the argument from error, which are rejected by an intentionalist analysis of mentality, and an epistemology of experience is developed where experience provides an acquaintance relation between a subject and something abstract such as a possibility. This makes it unnecessary to postulate epistemic relations both to concretely instantiated items in the environment and to mental items such as qualia or sense-data. Arguments based on allegedly non-representational states such as double vision and afterimages are shown to fail by demonstrating that such states are non-endorsed representations. Arguments that rely on spectrum inversion cases where representational content allegedly differs while qualitative phenomenology stays the same are rejected by arguing against the account of representation that underlies such arguments. (The order of the two chapters is largely arbitrary, though a rejection of externalism is useful in arguing against the argument from spectrum inversion.) The account is completed by briefly discussing and rejecting the disjunctivist theory of perception, and some other motivations for externalism such as externalism’s advantage in providing a naturalistic account of mentality is discussed. The thesis concludes by pointing at the naturalistic prospects for an account of mentality that analyses mental states as representational states while the representational content is based neither on mental qualities like qualia, nor on causal-informational relations to environmental items. I further speculate about the role of powers and dispositions of organisms that might underpin a future naturalistic analysis of mentality, and also consider the plausibility of a mysterian account of mind where the special mystery regarding the explanatory gap about consciousness is downgraded by suggesting that explanatory gaps might be widespread in nature, such as in our failure to logically link qualities like color and sound as we experience them to the lower-level physical phenomena they supervene on.
Intentionality – Understanding – Self-knowledge
The main purpose of this book is a philosophical and cognitive analysis of three cognitive abilities: intentionality, understanding and self-knowledge, which play a key role in human cognition. The analysis will be carried out with respect to selected conceptions voiced on the grounds of epistemology and cognitive science.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE BUILT ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE LIGHT OF EXTERNALISM
This article will put forward the thesis that self-knowledge should not be seen as a higher level of self-consciousness but rather as separate and independent from the act of self-consciousness. Only in such an account may self-knowledge avoid the problem of errors in self-identification emerging from all sorts of bodily illusions such as BSI, RHI, and FBI, as well as mental ones, based on a misidentification of propositional attitudes. In the light of the considered conception arguments against resting self-knowledge on self-consciousness will be discussed, leading to the depiction of self-knowledge as compatible with externalism and appealing to the distinction between self-others, although this will not be a distinction referring to bodily self-consciousness but rather ascribing beliefs to others.
2002
This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs.
Self-Consciousness and Knowledge
Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 2013
Self-Consciousness and Knowledge Kant argues that the unity of self-consciousness, that is, the unity in virtue of which representations so unified are mine, is the same as the objective unity of apperception, that is, the unity in virtue of which representations so unified relate to an object and are knowledge. On this identity-the identity of the unity of self-consciousness and the objective unity of apperception-rests the transcendental deduction of the categories. For, the objective unity of apperception is the unity thought in the category; as this unity is the same as the unity of self-consciousness, any representation, specifically any intuition, belonging to this latter unity as such is determined by the category. Commentators have found it difficult to expound this crucial thought of Kant's-that the unity of self-consciousness is the same as the objective unity of apperception-in such a way as to bring out its truth. Indeed, some have gone so far as to declare the thought unfounded. 1 This would seem to indicate that we lack comprehension of the heart and center of Kant's philosophy. I shall make an attempt toward supplying this lack. I proceed as follows. First I explain the notion of synthesis. Then I say why the unity of self-consciousness underlies any synthesis. Then I show why the unity of self-consciousness is nothing other than the unity of knowledge, which, in the case of theoretical knowledge, is the unity of what can be given in sensory intuition. 1 Synthesis Kant begins the deduction of the objective validity of the categories with asserting that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without first having combined it: "[…] wir [können] uns nichts, als im Objekt verbunden, vorstellen […], ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu haben." (B 130) The representation of combination, he says, is the only one that is not given by objects, but performed by the subject: "Unter allen Vorstellungen [ist] die Verbindung die einzige […], die nicht durch Objekte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjekte selbst verrichtet werden kann." (Ibid.) Kant calls a representation of combination "synthesis". So we know what Kant means by "synthesis", if we can reveal synthesis to be a spontaneous representation, which, on account of being spontaneous, is the only manner of representing combination. (I should perhaps state explicitly that I use "representation" to speak of an act of the mind, which is an act of representing that of whichaccording to this use of the word-it is a representation.) Let there be A and B: things to be represented as combined. In order to represent A and B as combined I must represent A and I must represent B. But obviously this does not suffice. We may suppose that, furthermore, my representation of A and my representation of B bear a certain relation to each other. Again, I do not thereby represent A and B as combined. Let us further grant that I am conscious of the fact that my representations of A and of B are related: through the exer
COMPLEMENTARI TY OF CONSTRUCTIVISM AND REALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY Epistemology and Cognition 83
The paper analyzes the limitation of alternative concepts of knowledge, constructivism and realism. A necessity of their complementarity is grounded. The core of controversy between constructivism and realism is a belief about “the given”. The author follows R. Rorty who considers two meanings of a notion of “the given”: “making” and “finding”. The author shows that these different meanings of concept of “the given” are connected with different types of subject consciousness activity. Together with intentional ability of consciousness he considers responsive ability. Both abilities were a subject of phenomenological analysis (E. Husserl, A. Reinach, B. Waldenfels). The author argues that there are certain connections between intentionality and interpretative function of knowledge, on the one hand, and between responsiveness and expressive function of consciousness, on the other hand. Developing the communicative concept of knowledge he shows the meaning of cognitive cycles «interpretation_expression» in the process of knowledge. A consideration of cognitive process as a semiotic one allows to show that interpretation is provided by such kind of basic function of sign as indication, and expression is provided by the other function of sign as substitution, or presentation. The author shows that complementary of interpretation and expression is a consequence of two processes – finding a name and making a meaning. The conclusion about complementary of interpretation and expression leads to a belief about cognition cultures and their types. He shows a place of constructivism and realism in the context of typology of cognition cultures. Key words: constructivism, realism, intentionality, responsiveness, interpretation, expression, cognition culture.
Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism
Rationalität, Realismus, Revision / Rationality, Realism, Revision
The question whether direct, authoritative knowledge of one's own thought contents and an externalist individuation of those contents are compatible has been, and still is, the object of a wide discussion. In this paper I shall present the main lines of the discussion and put forward the makings of an affirmative answer to the compatibility question. Owing to space restrictions, my presentation is bound to be rather sketchy, though I will try to bring out the central points of my perspective as clearly as possible. The simplest way in which incompatibilism could be established would be to start from the premise according to which if content depends on external factors, knowledge of content must depend on knowledge of those factors (cf. Bonjour 1992, p. 136). Given externalism, this premise would entail that in order to know what we think we should first investigate our surroundings, which in turn leads to the conclusion that we do not have direct, authoritative knowledge of our own thoughts. This premise, however, does not seem to be true. Think, for example, that though my existence (metaphysically) depends on my parents' existence, I can know that I exist even if I do not know about my parents' existence. This holds not only in cases of metaphysical dependence, but also in cases of conceptual dependence: someone can know that a certain figure is a triangle and not know that its internal angles measure 180 degress even though this figure's being a triangle depends upon its internal angles' measuring 180 degrees. Some philosophers (Burge 1988, Heil 1988, Davidson, unpubl. ms) have tried to defend compatibilism by noting that reflexive self-ascriptions of thoughts include the content of the ascribed thought itself, whatever the way this content is determined. On the inclusion model of self-knowledge, as this proposal might be called (Bernecker 1996), Cogito-like judgments are reliably true in that they are contextually self-verifying, as Burge insists. A subject need not know what the individuation conditions of his thoughts are in order to correctly ascribe these thoughts, with their right contents, to himself. One major objection to the inclusion model has been put forward by Boghossian (1989, 1992), on the basis of thought experiments in which a subject is unwittingly switched between distinct but observationally undistinguishable environments, say between Earth and Twin Earth. Let's baptize our inter-world traveller 'Peter'. Suppose that Peter is unwittingly 1 Research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Government's DGES as part of the project PB96-1091-C03-02. My thanks to this institution for its help and encouragement. I want also to express my gratitude to Carlos Ulises Moulines, Julian Nida-Rümelin and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl for inviting me to present a version of this paper to the 3rd Congress of the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. I am also grateful to Sven Bernecker, Andreas Kemmerling and Nenad Miscevic for their useful comments and criticism.