Treatment of Legal-Criminal Error in Extreme and Limited Theories of Culpability (original) (raw)
The limited theory of culpability, in terms of legal-criminal error, distinguishes between the error that falls on the technical assumptions of the one who recaines on the existence or limits of the causes of exclusion of illegality (putative discrimination). The error that falls on the existence or limits of the justifying causes is a prohibition error and generates consequences similar to those treated in the extreme theory of culpability. However, when the error that falls on the phonic assumptions of the discrimination, they are considered a type error, it excludes the intent, but allows the punishment of guilt if the error was avoidable (absence of non-observance of the duty of care) and there is culpable prediction for the type. If there is exclusion of the intent, it is concluded that there is also exclusion from the typical fact and, consequently, from the antijuricity and guilt, in other words, there is no offense, in the hypothesis of invincible error. If there is no deceit (nor offense), the subjectthe target of the error, will not be able to act in selfdefense, having to bear the consequences of this fact, because if he reacts, he will have to answer for the delit.
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