Reinhold Niebuhr and the Irony of American History in and after the Cold War, "Telos", 168 (Fall 2014), pp. 85-105. (original) (raw)
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Reinhold Niebuhr and the Irony of the Cold War
Reinhold Niebuhr's "The Irony of American History" (1952) still has immediate contemporary relevance in its "Christian realist" warning about arrogance in foreign policy. But it's also marked by very conventional Cold War analysis and untenable views about "national character" and Eastern cultures.
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2015
This article examines the way in which theological concept has been both utilized and criticized within the discipline of theology. It considers recent attempts to ''end the dialogue between theology and social theory'' and the flaws of that approach, while arguing that sociology can make a significant contribution to the ongoing work of theological analysis. It ends by asking whether this is a one-way relationship, or whether there is a way that theological concepts can be useful in the ongoing constructive work of sociology.
Book Review: Essays in Philosophy: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/ The United States and Terrorism: An Ironic Perspective. Author: Ron Hirschbein. Book Information: Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD. 213 pages. Includes index (nine pages in length). $65.00 hardback, published April 2015. ISBN: 978-1-4422-3777-3 (https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442237773/The-United-States-and-Terrorism-An-Ironic-Perspective). In his recently published The United States and Terrorism: An ironic Perspective, Ron Hirschbein examines the history of war—especially the use of terroristic carpet and/or mass destruction bombings of civilian populations—from the perspective of the many layers of irony which characterize the policies, propaganda, and hubris of United States’ engagement. As an optics, Hirschbein argues that irony offers a unique opportunity to underscore both the immensity of the violence and loss that is war, and the myriad ways in which war is rationalized, euphemized, eulogized, and elided in the interest of objectives often far less noble than the flag-waving rhetoric of its proponents. No doubt, Hirschbein’s right about this much: irony abounds in these accounts. Indeed, given the sheer volume of scholarship devoted to comprehending the out-sized role of the United States in war and terror and, as Hirschbein rightly notes, the extent to which such accounts are themselves party to the ideological mission of defending the country from its critics, his claim to uniqueness is bound to be a tall order. Hence, it’s not necessarily dissuasive that The United States and Terrorism doesn’t quite live up to that promise; what is dissuasive is that he anchors uniqueness to the optics of irony-detection. This strategy, I suggest, sinks Hirschbein’s ship for at least five reasons. Some of these concern his apparent but unexamined assumption that he can advance his argument for a unique perspective by way of spelling out ironies implicit in the political rhetoric of war and terror (reason one); others concern philosophically suspect choices that an optics of irony-detection compel Hirschbein to make. The problem with The United States and Terrorism boils down, however, to this: the optics of irony-detection is ultimately too narrow in its scope to live up to the uniqueness Hirschbein promises; hence, his claim to original insight or depth beyond the scholarship to date is destined to fall flat. And worse: the work ultimately generates its own dark irony in that while Hirschbein argues that what characterizes the 21st century is that we no longer care about truth in justifications for war, he does manifestly care—destining The United States and Terrorism to both the stillborn and, channeling Nietzsche more intimately than he intends, to nihilism.
THE MORALITY, POLITICS, AND IRONY OF WAR: Recovering Reinhold Niebuhr's Ethical Realism
Journal of Religious Ethics, 2008
The American experience of war is ironic. That is, there is often an intimate and unexamined relationship between seemingly contrary elements in war such as morality and politics. This article argues that without understanding such irony, we are unlikely to reflect in morally comprehensive ways on past, present, or future wars. Traditional schools of thought, however, such as moralism and political realism, reinforce these apparent contradictions. I propose, then, an alternative-"ethical realism" as informed by Reinhold Niebuhr-that better explains the irony of war. Through an ethical realist examination of the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and the Iraq War, I consider how American political interests have been inextricably linked with deep moral concerns. Ethical realism charts a middle path that ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism. Ethical realism provides a conceptual framework for evaluating these other frameworks-a distinct form of moral-political deliberation about war.
Tragedy and Irony in the Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr
The Oxford Handbook of Reinhold Niebuhr, 2021
This chapter analyses Reinhold Niebuhr's concepts of tragedy and irony. It explains how he defined these terms and identifies their place in his theological framework. Niebuhr identified the themes of tragedy and irony in his reflection on human nature, the crucifix ion, and moral concepts such as sin, love, and justice. The chapter also explores his use of the terms within the context of twentieth-century global and domestic politics, highlight ing his commentary on the Cold War, capitalism, and democracy in the United States. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the political tragedies and ironies Niebuhr identi fied are still with us today and that his concepts can be used to pursue the goals of his feminist, black, and Latinx critics.
The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy
World Politics, 1952
There seems little doubt that the defense and strengthening of the “free world” in our time depends largely upon American leadership. Confidence that America will continue to play this role in world affairs is weakened by the memory of America's political isolation following World War I, and by certain currents of American opinion noted by observers since World War II.1 Barbara Ward warns the peoples of the West that “we shall certainly fail unless our effort is at once sustained, calm and supremely positive.”