Man-in-the-middle attack test-bed investigating cyber-security vulnerabilities in Smart Grid SCADA systems (original) (raw)
Related papers
Simulation of Man in the Middle Attack On Smart Grid Testbed
2019 SoutheastCon
Over the past decade, the frequency of cyber attacks against power grids has steadily increased, requiring researchers to find and patch vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Our research introduces the prototype of a man-in-the-middle attack to be implemented on a microgrid emulator of a smart grid. We present a method of violating the integrity and authentication of packets that are using the IEEE Synchrophasor Protocol in a controlled environment, but this same approach could be used on any other protocol that lacks the proper overhead to ensure the integrity and authenticity of packets. In future research, we plan to implement and test the attack on the previously mentioned smart grid testbed in order to assess the attacks feasibility and tangible effects on Wide Area Monitoring and Control applications, as well as propose possible countermeasures. For this paper, we developed a working simulation of our intended attack using the software ModelSim 10.4. The attack will modify network packet data coming from a Schweitzer Engineering Labs (SEL) Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) hardware sensor, which provides a stream of precise timing values associated with current and voltage values, as these measured values are en route to the Open Phasor Data Concentrator (OpenPDC) application running on a Windows server. Our simulation provides and validates all of the necessary code in order to program a Field Programmable Gate Array and execute our attack on the testbed in future research.
Security Solution to Protect SCADA Systems from Cyber Attacks
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, control and monitor utility infrastructure, such as electricity, gas, water etc, which happen to be part of critical infrastructure. Existing SCADA systems were originally designed for reliability. Initial SCADA systems used proprietary protocols like Modbus, DNP3 to access sensed data and initiate supervisory control. These SCADA systems were not designed with Internet security in mind, which provides challenges as these systems are migrated toward common Internet communication protocols and networks. Compared to IT systems, SCADA systems have a higher requirement concerning reliability, latency and uptime, so it is not always feasible to apply IT security measures deployed in IT systems. This paper provides an overview of security issues in SCADA networks. A range of threats to SCADA network security is offered. Next, attention is focused on security assessment of the SCADA. This is followed by an overview of relevant SCADA security solutions. Finally our security solution approach which is embedded in "bump-in-the-wire" is discussed.
Cyber-security of SCADA systems
2012 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2012
After a general introduction of the VIKING EU FP7 project two specific cyber-attack mechanisms, which have been analyzed in the VIKING project, will be discussed in more detail. Firstly an attack and its consequences on the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) in a power system are investigated, and secondly the cyber security of State Estimators in SCADA systems is scrutinized.
Experimental Analysis of the Internal Attacks on Scada Systems
gazi university journal of science, 2017
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems play important role in electrical power system which is one of the most critical infrastructures. They usually include digital controllers like PLCs to realize the automation of electromechanical processes and to accomplish the real time services. Ensuring a secure communication between these field devices and the command center is vital from the security point of view. Because the most vulnerable part of SCADA systems is their communication protocols, this work focuses on the weaknesses of SCADA systems against the internal cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and Replay. For this aim, a sample SCADA testbed environment has been designed at first and then the attacks mentioned above are tested on it. Experimental results show that although SCADA systems accomplish so me mission critical tasks, the protocols used in their communication systems still lack of crucial security measures. Therefor...
Intrusion avoidance for SCADA security in industrial plants
2010
In this paper we present an overview of security threats to the cyber infrastructure of industrial and power plants and the current state of affairs of industrial and SCADA cyber security. Control systems security is of prime importance especially for energy sector. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued mandatory rules which must be complied by 2010 by all registered power operators in order to ensure control systems security for power plants. Cyber security assessment was conducted on ICS (Industrial control systems) of different companies for a period of four years and several vulnerabilities were identified. Main problems included use of weak encryption, standard protocols and information disclosure using unencrypted communication among ICS hosts on the network. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, a hacker could alter the communication between ICS and controlled equipment, resulting in malfunction. Overcoming these vulnerabilities is essential in order to protect the vital power sector in any country of the world. We present important guidelines and standards in cyber security and propose a simple intrusion detection scheme for SCADA networks.
Multiattribute SCADA-Specific Intrusion Detection System for Power Networks
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 2014
The increased interconnectivity and complexity of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in power system networks has exposed the systems to a multitude of potential vulnerabilities. In this paper we present a novel approach for a next generation SCADA-specific Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The proposed system analyses multiple attributes in order to provide a comprehensive solution able to mitigate varied cyberattacks threats. The multi-attribute IDS comprises a heterogeneous whitelist and behavior-based concept in order to make SCADA cyber systems more secure. This paper also proposes a multilayer cyber-security framework based on IDS for protecting SCADA cyber-security in Smart Grids without compromising the availability of normal data. In addition, this paper presents a SCADA-specific cyber-security test-bed to investigate simulated attacks and which has been used in the paper to validate the proposed approach.
Attacking IEC-60870-5-104 SCADA Systems
2019
The rapid evolution of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) services transforms the conventional electrical grid into a new paradigm called Smart Grid (SG). Even though SG brings significant improvements, such as increased reliability and better energy management, it also introduces multiple security challenges. One of the main reasons for this is that SG combines a wide range of heterogeneous technologies, including Internet of Things (IoT) devices as well as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The latter are responsible for monitoring and controlling the automatic procedures of energy transmission and distribution. Nevertheless, the presence of these systems introduces multiple vulnerabilities because their protocols do not implement essential security mechanisms such as authentication and access control. In this paper, we focus our attention on the security issues of the IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104) protocol, which is widely utilized in the European energy sector. In particular, we provide a SCADA threat model based on a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) and emulate four different types of cyber attacks against IEC-104. Last, we used AlienVault's risk assessment model to evaluate the risk level that each of these cyber attacks introduces to our system to confirm our intuition about their severity.
International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development, 2018
The Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities to citizens such as electricity, natural gas, crude oil and refined petroleum products, waste-water treatment and transportation. This paper looks at SCAD architecture and functions to industrial control system (ICS) as well its security threats, vulnerabilities and attacks that could prevent SCADA from delivering these functions especially in Nigeria. This paper finally recommended far-reaching holistic solutions to the various SCADA's security challenges.