A Matching Model of Crowding-Out and On-the-Job Search (original) (raw)

A Matching Model of Crowding-Out and On-the-Job Search (with an Application to Spain)

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002

This paper considers a matching model of heterogenous and jobs which includes on-the-job search. High-educated workers transitorily accept unskilled jobs and continue to search for skilled jobs. We study the implications of this model for the unemployment rates of high and low-educated workers, for the share of mismatched workers and wage nequality both within and between skill groups. The model is used to shed light on the Spanish experience following a large educational upgrading since the mid-eighties.

On-the-Job Search in a Matching Model with Heterogenous Jobs and Workers

2003

This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA's research area Mobility and Flexibility of Labor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

On-the-Job Search in a Matching Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Workers &ast

Economic Journal, 2009

This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA's research area Mobility and Flexibility of Labor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

Search, mismatch and unemployment

European Economic Review, 2008

This paper explores the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with heterogeneous workers and jobs. In the basic setup the labor force is divided in two groups. The high-skill workers are qualified for all jobs, while low-skill workers can perform unskilled jobs but not the more attractive skilled jobs. We demonstrate that the equilibrium with random search and ex post bargaining is never efficient. Under Hosios' condition the average wage is correct, but bargaining compresses the wage distribution relative to workers' shadow values. The wage compression distorts the relative profits of jobs making it too attractive to create skilled jobs. Furthermore, the low skill premium may prevent that the two types of workers efficiently sort in different jobs. In the first case we show that the market offers too few job opportunities for low-skill workers. On the contrary, when mismatch is socially wasteful, we find that low-skill workers experience shorter unemployment spells than in the efficient allocation. Finally, we show that our results generalize to environments with many types of agents and less stringent restrictions on the production technology.

Unemployment and search externalities in a model with heterogeneous jobs and workers

2002

This paper presents a matching model with low-and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. I show that the degree to which low-skilled workers are harmed by high-skilled workers who are willing to temporarily accept simple jobs depends on the relative productivity of high-and low-skilled workers on simple jobs and on the quit rate of high-skilled workers. Under certain conditions, low-skilled workers can benefit from job competition with highskilled workers. Within this framework, some explanations for the high and persistent unemployment rates of lower educated workers in the 1990s are evaluated.

Skill Mismatches in the Spanish Labour Market: a Panel Analysis

2000

The effects of job-worker mismatches on job satisfaction are examined using the eight waves (1994-2001) of Spanish data taken from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The impacts of both educational and skill mismatches are estimated considering unobserved heterogeneity, state dependence and attrition bias. Dynamic analysis shows that skill mismatches emerge as a much better predictor of job satisfaction than

of LaborOn-the-Job Search in a Matching Model with Heterogenous Jobs and Workers

2003

This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA’s research area Mobility and Flexibility of Labor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research resul...

Worker flows, job flows and unemployment in a matching model

European Economic Review, 2010

Standard matching models of unemployment assume that workers and job ßows are identical. This is in stark contrast to empirical evidence that job ßows in fact only account for a fraction of worker ßows, that unemployment exits only account for a fraction of hires and that these fractions vary over the cycle. In this paper, we develop and calibrate a model based on the Mortensen and Pissarides approach but that emphasises this issue.

Can the Matching Model Account for Spanish Unemployment?

investigaciones económicas, 2003

This paper aims at explaining the dynamics of the Spanish labour market, focussing in particular on the high persistence of unemployment and the dy-namics around the Beveridge curve. We develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model in which we assume that the ...