Racial profiling and jury trials (original) (raw)
Related papers
Oxford Anthology on the Philosophy of Race ed. N. Zack
Philosophical reflection on racial profiling tends to take one of two forms. The first sees it as an example of ‘statistical discrimination,’ (SD), or when, if ever, probabilistic generalisations about group behaviour or characteristics can be used to judge particular individuals.(Applbaum 2014; Harcourt 2004; Hellman, 2014; Risse and Zeckhauser 2004; Risse 2007; Lippert-Rasmussen 2006; Lippert-Rasmussen 2007; Lippert-Rasmussen 2014) . This approach treats racial profiling as one example amongst many others of a general problem in egalitarian political philosophy, occasioned by the fact that treating people as equals does not always require, or permit, us to treat them the same. The second form is concerned with how racial profiling illuminates the nature, justification, and reproduction of hierarchies of power and privilege based on skin colour and morphology. This form of reflection on racial profiling is therefore less about the justification for judging people based on the characteristics of the group to which they (appear to) belong, and more concerned with the specific ways in which the association of racialised minorities – and, in particular, black people – with crime, contributes to, and reflects, racial inequality, unfreedom, and oppression.(Kennedy 1998; Zack, 2015; Lever, 2005; Lever 2007). Both approaches to profiling have much to recommend them and, taken together, they form an essential component of the political philosophy of race. The statistical approach has the merits of linking racial profiling, as practice, to a body of other practices that generate and justify inequalities based on factors other than race, but it typically offers little by way of insight into the role of racial profiling itself in sustaining racial inequality and injustice. The racial construction approach, for obvious reasons, is rather better at the latter task, but its insights tend to come at the price of a broader understanding of the ways in which inequality is reproduced and justified, or of the ethical dilemmas raised by our competing claims to security. As we will see, insights from both approaches can be synthesized to clarify what, if anything, is wrong with racial profiling and what broader conclusions for equality and security follow from the study of profiling.
The Art of the Unseen: Three challenges for Racial Profiling
The Journal of Ethics, 2011
This article analyses the moral status of racial profiling from a consequentialist perspective and argues that, contrary to what proponents of racial profiling might assume, there is a prima facie case against racial profiling on consequentialist grounds. To do so it establishes general definitions of police practices and profiling, sketches out the costs and benefits involved in racial profiling in
What's wrong with racial profiling? Another look at the problem
Criminal Justice Ethics, 2007
some terminology before getting under way, however, it might be helpful to recapitulate some terminology. the first is about racial profiling. i am happy to accept risse and Zeckhauser's definition of it as "any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin and not merely on the behavior of an individual." 5 as they say, there are several different forms of profiling, so described. the
Ethno-Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement: Concepts and Recommendations
2009
The question of ethnic and racial discrimination has became an extremely important point in legal discussions relating to the proliferation of new law enforcement authorizations employed in the “war against terrorism”. The old desire within law enforcement to minimize human decision-making and to deploy automated investigating or screening processes brought a revitalization of formerly discredited measures such as profiling. Also, the fast development of informational technology enables the interconnection of various commercial and law enforcement databases, and also the melding of formerly independent immigration, criminal etc. data-sources. The IT sector in the security business brings lucrative opportunities, thus the private sector is no longer only an innocent victim of excessive government legislation, on, for example, reporting requirements, but also a keen partner. In connection with these developments, we can witness a renewed debate over preventive measures based on ethno-racial profiling. Some commentators emphasize that ethnic profiling is in principle unacceptable. The result, according to these critics, is the harassment of the innocent minority middle class, which is subjected to a kind of “racial tax” that affects all aspects of people’s lives. A further unwanted result is the strengthening of racial/ethnic essentialism, reductionism to black and white/Muslim and non-Muslim/Roma and non-Roma/immigrant and non-immigrant, etc.). Another, straightforwardly pragmatic criticism has been calling attention to the practical ineffectiveness of racial profiling: inherent in the prima facie plausible reasoning based on statistics there is a profound (and provable) error, since racial profiles are, both over-inclusive and under-inclusive – over-inclusive in the sense that many, indeed most, of the people who fit into the category are entirely innocent, and under-inclusive in the sense that many other types of criminals or terrorists who do not fit the profile will thereby escape police attention. The essay's scope is limited to clarifying some of the crucial concepts and definitions and enumerating some possible legislative remedies to its problems.
Philosophy <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Public Affairs, 2004
Why Racial Profiling is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33.1. (2005) 94-110
According to Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in a society, such as the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation is found in lesser but, nonetheless, troubling forms of racial inequality.1 Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser recognize, is often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities and by the disproportionate use of race in profiling. These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not mean that all forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling. In fact, one of the aims of their paper is to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality.”2 Hence, one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, is that one can endorse racial profiling without being in any way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial minorities. I I n an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to underestimate the harms of racial profiling.3 I suggested two main reasons why they did so. The first is that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling itself. The second reason is that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I concluded, racial profiling cannot be a normal part of police practice in a society still struggling with racism, although under very special conditions and with special regulation and compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure. I I want to stand by those claims. However, Risse’s response to my arguments persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect.4 So I will start by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made. I will then argue that despite Risse’s patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification of profiling remain valid.
Racial Profiling: Research, Racism and Resistance
Sociological Inquiry, 2011
Page 1. Racial Profiling Page 2. Issues in Crime & Justice Series Editor Gregg Barak, Eastern Michigan University As we embark upon the twentieth-first century, the meanings of crime continue to evolve and our approaches to justice are in flux. ...
Defining racial profiling in a post-September 11 world
American Criminal Law Review, 2003
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was an apparent shift in the debate about racial profiling. After years of condemning the practice of racial profiling as one that violated civil rights, commentators began to accept and even advocate the practice as a necessary tactic to fight terrorism. Public opinion polls reflected a sudden approval of racial profiling as a sacrifice of civil liberties in order to achieve greater security. Arab- Americans, and those with Arab appearances, increasingly were singled out for questioning and security checks based on their skin color, clothing, name, or religious beliefs. Despite this change in support for racial profiling, the practice is no more appropriate after September 11 than it was during the War on Drugs. Using race to signal criminality, either as the sole factor or based on a general or circumstantial perception that there is a correlation between the race of an individual and her propensity to commit a particular crime, violates civil liberties and hinders potential short- and long-term law enforcement effectiveness. The purpose of this Article is to argue that racial or religious profiling is neither necessary nor effective in the War on Terrorism, and to demonstrate that such profiling has serious potentially damaging consequences to long-term investigatory activities. Furthermore, racial or religious profiling is ineffective because it keeps law enforcement from digging deeper into criminal investigation. When law enforcement relies on a broad, superficial category such as race or religion, this shortcut interferes with more effective techniques such as behavioral cues and suspect- or crime-specific descriptions or evidence.