Population and Warfare (original) (raw)
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Population Dynamics and Internal Warfare: a Reconsideration
The hypothesis that population pressure causes increased warfare has been recently criticized on the empirical grounds. Both studies focusing on specific historical societies and analyses of cross-cultural data fail to find positive correlation between population density and incidence of warfare. In this paper we argue that such negative results do not falsify the population-warfare hypothesis. Population and warfare are dynamical variables, and if their interaction causes sustained oscillations, then we do not in general expect to find strong correlation between the two variables measured at the same time (that is, unlagged). We explore mathematically what the dynamical patterns of interaction between population and warfare (focusing on internal warfare) might be in both stateless and state societies. Next, we test the model predictions in several empirical case studies: early modern England, Han and Tang China, and the Roman Empire. Our empirical results support the population-warfare theory: we find that there is a tendency for population numbers and internal warfare intensity to oscillate with the same period but shifted in phase (with warfare peaks following population peaks). Furthermore, the rates of change of the two variables behave precisely as predicted by the theory: population rate of change is negatively affected by warfare intensity, while warfare rate of change is positively affected by population density.
Population and Warfare a test of the turchin model in pueblo societies
2008
E peter Turchin and anthropologist Andrey Korotayev (2006) propose that population size and incidence of internal warfare or sociopolitical instability exhibit a deterministic relationship in prestate societies. Important to their thesis is that both population size and incidence of instability are, and must be treated as, dynamic variables: population growth eventually causes an increase in instability, with a lag, whereas increased instability, also with a lag, eventually leads to decreases in population size. Because of these lags, they argue that a straightforward attempt to cross-tabulate current incidence of warfare against current population size, as done by Keeley (1996, 117–121, 202), for example, is theoretically indefensible and, practically, likely to lead to spurious results. Indeed, Keeley’s tabulation failed to confirm a positive relationship between population size and instability in a series of societies of various scale,1 although Ember (1982) demonstrated a positi...
Population is the main driver of war group size and conflict casualties
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017
The proportions of individuals involved in intergroup coalitional conflict, measured by war group size (W), conflict casualties (C), and overall group conflict deaths (G), have declined with respect to growing populations, implying that states are less violent than small-scale societies. We argue that these trends are better explained by scaling laws shared by both past and contemporary societies regardless of social organization, where group population (P) directly determines W and indirectly determines C and G. W is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent X [demographic conflict investment (DCI)]. C is shown to be a power law function of W with scaling exponent Y [conflict lethality (CL)]. G is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent Z [group conflict mortality (GCM)]. Results show that, while W/P and G/P decrease as expected with increasing P, C/W increases with growing W. Small-scale societies show higher but more variance in DCI and CL than contemporary states. We find no significant differences in DCI or CL between small-scale societies and contemporary states undergoing drafts or conflict, after accounting for variance and scale. We calculate relative measures of DCI and CL applicable to all societies that can be tracked over time for one or multiple actors. In light of the recent global emergence of populist, nationalist, and sectarian violence, our comparison-focused approach to DCI and CL will enable better models and analysis of the landscapes of violence in the 21st century. population scaling | war group size | conflict casualties | conflict investment | conflict lethality N umerous recent publications have addressed the long-term history of human violence to understand both its evolutionary significance (1–3) and how differing social institutions and organizational principles impact the frequency and severity of coali-tional violence or warfare (4, 5). It is variously argued that the modern world is less violent than what was the case for much of human prehistory (6–10) or alternatively, that the development of modern state institutions and economic forms has spurred increases in violence (11, 12). These debates focus largely around two variables: (i) the frequency with which conflicts occur and (ii) the proportion of any given social group (the unit from which a war group is drawn for purposes of this paper) that is engaged in violence and what proportions of those engaged or exposed are killed by violent acts. Ethnographic data suggest that, in small-scale societies, both participation in coalitional violence (proportional war group size) (Fig. 1) and the proportion of those killed are often higher than comparable rates observed in modern state conflict (5, 8). Some researchers consequently argue (i) that more individuals were exposed to violence in the past than at present (5) and (ii) that prehistoric violence was less constrained than modern violence, with fewer limits on the individuals and how many individuals were targeted and potentially killed (5, 6, 8). Prior studies have shown that both size and frequency of conflicts obey a log–log scaling law (13–15) and that population size and casualties follow a similar logarithmic relationship (16). These prior studies have focused only on periods of major or active conflict. Here, we expand on these results by examining the relationship between proportional participation in conflict [the ratio of war group size (W) to population (P)] and resulting deaths [overall group conflict deaths (G) as a proportion of war group size]. Notably, we find that, when modern states not actively engaged in conflict are included, a strong sublinear log–log relationship exists between population size and war group size, while casualties are driven by war group size and are not directly driven by population. The relationship between war group size and casualties is supralinear, suggesting that large populations (usually states) generate more casualties per combatant than in ethnographically observed small-scale societies or in historical states. Modeling Scaling Relationships Between Population, War Group Size, and Conflict Casualties or Deaths We propose that trends in size and proportions of both W and G are better explained by scaling relationships between P, W, G, and conflict casualties (C). In other words, we argue that population size is a significant driver of conflict investment, casualties , and deaths. By population (P), we mean the total number of individuals in the social unit (settlement, society, ethnic group, polity, city, kingdom, empire, state, or nation state) from which a war group is drawn and within which the casualties are generated. Decreasing proportions of W/P and G/P in more complex societies as opposed to small-scale societies might be the incidental product of the organizational needs and logistical constraints of different populations rather than the outcome of any measureable decrease in overall violence, increased investment in processes and institutions, and/or the " profitability of peace. " The scaling laws outlined here are analogous to allometric scaling properties observed in biological and social systems. For Significance Recent views on violence emphasize the decline in proportions of war groups and casualties to populations over time and conclude that past small-scale societies were more violent than contemporary states. In this paper, we argue that these trends are better explained through scaling relationships between population and war group size and between war group size and conflict casualties. We test these relationships and develop measures of conflict investment and lethality that are applicable to societies across space and time. When scaling is accounted for, we find no difference in conflict investment or lethality between small-scale and state societies. Given the lack of population data for past societies, we caution against using archaeological cases of episodic conflicts to measure past violence.
Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict1
International Studies Quarterly, 2012
Research on conflict traditionally focuses on its initiation, duration, and severity, but seldom on its consequences. Yet, demographic and economic recovery from the consequences of war lasts far longer and may be more devastating than the waging war. Our concern is with war losses and postwar recovery leading to convergence with prewar performance. To test this proposition, we choose the most severe international and civil wars after 1920. We find that all belligerents recover or overtake demographic losses incurred in war. Economic assessments differ. The most-developed belligerents recover like a ''phoenix'' from immense destruction in one generation. For less-developed societies, the outcomes are mixed. The less-developed belligerents recover only a portion of their prewar performance. The least-developed societies suffer the most and fall into lasting poverty traps. The overlapping generation growth model accounts for such differences in recovery rates based on prewar performance challenging arguments from Solow's neoclassical growth perspective. Our results imply that foreign aid is incidental to the postwar convergence for the most-developed societies, can prompt recovery for the less-developed societies, and is not effective-unless it is massive and sustained-for the leastdeveloped societies. World War II may provide a poor guide to current postwar challenges in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 1 Author's note: We would like to thank our two anonymous reviewers for their insights and helpful comments. The paper would not be where it is without them.
The Journal of Politics, 2008
We examine the propensity of states to initiate international conflict conditioned on four primary explanatory variables: (1) changes in population over varying lags, (2) democratic status of the state, (3) the power status of the state and (4) changes in the state's level of energy consumption. We hypothesize that the responsiveness of a government to the needs of its citizens is sufficiently important that the effect of population growth cannot be properly examined independently of democracy and that major powers tend to become involved in disputes for a much wider set of reasons than minor powers. Thus, we expect to find the strongest effect of population change on conflict initiation in democratic minor powers. We also expect that decreases in energy consumption concurrent with increases in population will lead to conflict initiation. A series of negative binomial regressions over 20 yearly time lags lends robust support to our expectations.
POPULATION DISPLACEMENT , AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION Conflict and Conflict Resolution
2008
Human history has been punctuated by widespread and recurring violent conflicts. Attempts to explain the causes, utility and effects of the phenomenon have engaged the minds of scholars and other stakeholders for centuries. At the centre of the inquiry are questions about human nature: whether and to what extent violence is innately determined in humans or influenced by the external environment. According to ethnology, aggression or violence is innate and essentially genetic, not learned or a response to environmental conditions. The role of the environment, K. Lorenz posits, is simply to provide stimuli that trigger or hinder intraspecific aggression. This view, which modifies and restates the Social Darwinian theory of natural selection, maintains that aggression is not dysfunctional. Rather, it serves a number of important functions: the preservation of species through natural selection; the creation of social ranks which imposes social order and stability, thus reducing intraspe...
Population and security: how demographic change can lead to violent conflict
2002
_________________________ s we cross into the new century, the world seems finally to have turned the corner on population growth. A combination of increased education for women, national and international support for policies of population planning and the spread of economic development and accompanying movement along the demographic transition frontier have led to falling population growth rates around the world.
Population and warfare: A test of the Turchin model in Puebloan societies
Pattern and process in cultural evolution, 2006
Ecologist Peter Turchin and anthropologist Andrey propose that pre-state societies exhibit a deterministic relationship between population size and incidence of internal warfare or sociopolitical instability. We examine their model with data from Southwest Colorado between A.D. 600 and 1300 and find that it fits well during those periods when this area is a more or less closed system. It fits poorly during the time from about A.D. 1000-1200 when this area is heavily influenced first by the spread of the Chacoan system, and then, by its collapse and the local political reorganization that follows. The model is helpful in isolating periods in which the relationship between violence and population size is not as expected. The mechanisms by which it achieves its success need to be elaborated, a task we begin here.
1A3: Population, the Lessons of War, and the Promise of Peace
2018
Nineteenth century Malthusian theory gained significant attention at the outbreak of World War I. Beginning with his 1798 book Essay on the Principle of Population, Thomas Malthus had argued that war served as a check on population when resources became scarce. His work gained a substantial number of followers. During the modernist era of science and progress that unfolded after 1900, neo-Malthusians observed real conditions leading to war, but they were now less willing to accept war as inevitable. They looked more carefully at Malthus’s assertions that overpopulation would lead to competition for resources and hence into violent conflict, and noted that humankind now had within its hands the power to control births.
Environment, population, and conflict: suggesting a few steps forward
Environmental Change and Security Project report, 2000
T he thesis that environmental stress and population change contribute to violent conflict has undergone intensive examination over the last ten years. 1 Both case study and quantitative efforts have sought to unpack the complex mix of causal factors leading to violent conflict. Historically neglected in the study of conflict, environmental stress has moved into mainstream debates for a combination of reasons including the findings of new research on the pervasiveness and magnitude of environmental degradation, opportune political timing, and the search for an orienting post-Cold War security paradigm.