Sejm parties change: Party Institutionalization and Legislative Organization in The Polish Legislature (original) (raw)

The executive-legislative balance of power is central to the modern comparative study of political institutions, shaping the differences between "consensus" and "majoritarian" models of democracy. 1 Legislative organization regulates the cabinet's power relative to individual members of Parliament (MPs). It also determines the influence non-government parties have, compared to those in government. In explaining the ability of governing majorities to limit opposition influence, the early literature on parliamentary systems emphasized formal characteristics of legislatures. 2 Recent research, however, has paid more attention to the role of parties and party organizations in exercising such control. 3 The formal structure of many parliaments produces opportunities for non-cabinet actors to influence policy, 4 but the practice of legislative politics depends on the incentives that parties themselves have to exploit these institutions. Legislative institutions originating out of regime transitions lead to the formation of newly competitive party systems. Over time, the institutions themselves are shaped by their respective party systems. The legislative power of governing coalitions results from a dynamic process in which parties interact with, adapt to, and eventually shape legislative institutions. This feedback loop is particularly important in emerging democracies in which legislative institutions are designed by actors who are uncertain about the relationships between rules and their political consequences. One of the politicians interviewed for this project described the risks associated with this uncertainty in Hungary. She characterized Prime Minister Victor Orban's practice of changing constitutions to favor ruling majorities as the danger of "petrifying oneself " and elaborated: "you think you will always be enjoying the same majority support, but if you lose it, the majoritarian institutions will cut your party out entirely." 5 In light of the events that have taken place in Poland since the new PiS government came to power in 2015, one could make a very similar comment about Prime Minister Beata Szydlo. In this article, I draw on U.S. Congressional literature to theorize how governing majorities use legislative organization to increase their influence in contexts where the