revised version forthcoming in the World Bank Economic Review Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and Free Riders (original) (raw)
Related papers
Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing Countries ? An Empirical Analysis
2004
The aim of this paper is to examine whether developing countries have disadvantageous position in the WTO dispute settlement procedure (DSP). We provide an econometric study which suggests that the DSP does not still completely eliminate power-based relationships between countries. Although the DSP succeeds in founding a system in which asymmetry in countries sizes doesn’t affect the dispute outcome, it remains a series of biases which affect developing countries performance. Our results suggest that developing countries are unlikely to win dispute because of (i) asymmetric legal capacity (ii) economic dependence via bilateral assistance (iii) international politics factors.
Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System, 2009
A significant body of research has sought to examine claims that developing countries are underrepresented as complainants, and/or over-represented as respondents in the WTO dispute settlement system. Most of this literature has focused on their propensity to participate, the idea being that under-representation as complainants or over representation as respondents would suggest a bias in the system. This paper provides some descriptive statistics that could shed light on a different manifestation of a "bias" against developing countries. It employs a dataset containing information on the legal claims made in each WTO dispute between 1995 and 2006, as well as a rough classification as to whether each specific claim was accepted or not by the respective panel. The data is used to compare the extent to propensity by which G2 countries, other industrialized countries, and developing countries have won the claims that they have made before panels.
The WTO dispute settlement system: a first assessment from an economic perspective
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000
We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO dispute settlement system. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the dispute settlement system does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make trade restrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor, GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased toward the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. Empirical evidence based on a first dataset of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims.
A number of recent studies have shown that using the WTO's dispute settlement procedure is seldom a straightforward proposition of dispute resolution through an open juridical process (Dunoff 2008, Froese 2010, Nordstrom 1999. A majority of members have never used the DSU, and for those who have used it, participation in dispute settlement can be explained by a number of factors such as trade volume, income level and legal capacity (Francois, Horn and Kaunitz, 2008). It stands to reason that members who use the panel system very little, or hardly at all, are also slow to use it -that there is an inverse correlation between number of dispute panels and time until first dispute. This paper asks a simple question: what is the average time after accession that a member brings a complaint, receives a complaint, and joins a dispute as a third party? The first section provides a brief overview of some of the recent literature pertaining to dispute settlement participation at the WTO. The second section provides a statistical analysis of the pace of dispute settlement, by examining cases initiated in the fifteen years since the WTO Agreement came into force, between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2009. The third section examines a number of possible factors that may explain the pace at which countries at different income levels engage in dispute settlement. The paper concludes that there is much less uniformity in when members undertake dispute settlement than might be expected given the global divisions of wealth, access to information and availability of legal talent.
Trends of trade disputes show that the developed countries are more active in the dispute settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO) than the developing countries. Our analyses show that financial strength is an important factor for countries to participate in the dispute settlement process of the WTO. It also plays significant role in winning trade disputes. Therefore, lack of financial strength could be an explanation for the low rate of participation of the small-developing countries in the dispute settlement process. A close look at the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) reveals that it has considerable inability to provide feasible remedies against unfair trade practices. This also discourages the small-developing countries to participate in the dispute settlement process. To ensure equitable participation of the developing countries in the dispute settlement process, the WTO should increase legal and technical assista...
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
International Journal of Law, Humanities & Social Science, 2020
In the Preamble of the WTO defined that there is a need to make sure that developing countries especially the LDC ones, share growth in international trade proportionate with the needs of their economic development. This paper begins with the historical background of the developing countries participation in both GATT and the WTO. There is a broad discussion about the developing countries and the WTO dispute settlement system. Significant appraisals of the present and possible benefits from developing country engagement in the WTO focus mainly on the recent development. This paper examines a different feature of developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system. The WTO dispute system is providing the developing countries with some special benefits and developing countries are also trying to increase their status, that's the main reason for the participation in the WTO dispute system. This paper is also trying to find the obstacles that are creating a problem for developing countries to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system. The WTO dispute settlement system is working actively for developing countries, but the GATT system was also tried to develop the status of the developing countries. The comparison between the GATT system and the WTO dispute system developed country and developing country is also referred in this paper.
Why Developing Countries are at Disadvantage Position in WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management, 2014
The Dispute Settlement Board of WTO aims to solve the disputes of WTO members regarding international trade. Dispute settlement process involves the parties and third parties to a case, and it operates through the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions. Although the dispute settlement mechanism provides opportunities to the developing countries to seek remedies if they are aggrieved by any other country, yet there are certain challenges for the developing countries to participate effectively in DSM. The study finds out the challenges that caused the role of developing countries less significant in the WTO dispute settlement process. Moreover, several recommendations have also been made for making the role of developing countries more effective.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/ijssm.v1i2.10103 Int. J. Soc. Sci. Manage. Vol-1, issue-2: 60-63
Does Trade Comply? The Economic Effect (ivenes) s of WTO Dispute Settlement
This paper addresses the economic impact of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement process. It analyses the degree to which the settlement of a dispute affects trade between the formerly disputing parties. Building on a previous paper that addressed a surprising and serious gap in the existing literature on the politics and legal dimensions of WTO disputes, namely the lack of theoretical and empirical research on what happens after disputes are arbitrated through panel/Appellate Body rulings, we are now interested in the economic effects of compliance with WTO dispute rulings. We analyze whether WTO dispute rulings lead to trade recovery that can be observed in actual trade flows. Deriving hypotheses from existing 'trade creation vs. diversion' and endogenous trade policy models, we empirically test our theoretical arguments using an original data set that covers WTO disputes in the time period 1995-2010. Comparing the complex changes in trade flows pre-and post-compliance with panel/Appellate Body report recommendations, we examine the factors that condition the effects of WTO rulings on trade and assess the institutional effectiveness of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.
Yuridika, 2015
Economic actors are the main trade player in the World Trade Organization, although, the relation between WTO and economic actor is built by trade regulation that is negotiated among the WTO Members. Nothing in the WTO regulates economic actors to involve directly in the WTO, especially in the WTO dispute settlement system. Nevertheless, the debate amongst experts regarding the involvement of economic actors in the WTO dispute settlement system is unavoidable. This article therefore discusses the possibility of the involvement of economic actors in the WTO dispute settlement system, whether there is legal and political point of views.