Qatar and Iran: Regional Roles, Risks and Opportunities (original) (raw)

Abstract

Qatar has the most complex yet pragmatic relations with Iran among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), i.e., Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Qatari- Iranian partnership has withstood decades of volatile Gulf policies— a region prone to recurring crises and hostilities— and enabled Qatar to stay stable while sitting as a small state between the two most powerful regional countries in the Persian Gulf, i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran.1 Having one of the world’s largest arms importers, i.e., Saudi Arabia, and a revolutionary state, i.e., Iran, in its proximity has required Qatar to balance its policies with both neighbors so as to comfortably maintain somewhat equal relations with them. For Qatar, this policy choice is not an option but a question of survival given that as a small state, it is required to seek regional partnerships to protect itself against volatile events.

Key takeaways

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  1. Qatar's pragmatic relations with Iran are crucial for its survival amid regional tensions.
  2. The 2017 Qatar-Gulf crisis highlighted Iran's role in regional diplomatic dynamics.
  3. Qatar's ongoing trade with Iran surged by 181% during the blockade.
  4. GCC states have differing perceptions of the Iranian threat, complicating unified policy.
  5. Iran's support during the blockade allowed Qatar to maintain essential supply lines.

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