Game theory and the spectrum auctions (original) (raw)
Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and profit sharing
2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, 2009
We examine the problem of designing an auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we prove that there exists an incentive for risk neutral sellers of the spectrum to cooperate to maximize their expected profits at the SMSNEs of buyers' noncooperative game. Finally, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This indicates that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits in a such manner that no subset of sellers will deviate from cooperating with the remaining sellers.
Spectrum access models and auction mechanisms
The demand for spectrum is growing rapidly as data intensive mobile communications and high-definition television are getting more popular. The spectrum regulators are preparing for flexible spectrum use and the implementation of new technologies. To make the appropriate decisions, the regulators need to identify and evaluate the different alternatives. In this paper, we examine a systematic classification of the spectrum access models that can be used together with suitable auctions in order to evaluate and decide between the different models. The basic idea of the taxonomy is to distinguish the different forms of spectrum sharing. For example, multiple systems may coexist in the same frequency band so that the low priority systems may transmit only if the high priority systems are not occupying the band. The hierarchy of the systems can be implemented by using a variety of technologies like centralized databases or distributed sensing devices. The taxonomy clarifies the regulatory alternatives and highlights the differences in ownership and usage rights. We also discuss how to incorporate the new spectrum access models in the auction design and how to support spectrum management using economic modeling and mechanism design framework.
Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market
SpringerBriefs in Computer Science, 2014
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.
This paper is part of the author's MBA Negotiation Analysis project at the Solvay Business School, Brussels, Belgium.
The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum
2002
Auctions play an important role in economics. In their most basic form, they are one of the ways in which various commodities, financial assets and concession rights are allocated to individuals and firms, particularly in a market-oriented setting. An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants. Since some products such as spectrum concessions have no standard value, auctions provide one way approaching the question of price formation of these products.This paper explores the details of Turkish GSM 1800 MHz auction held in April, 2000 within auction theory and competition policies framework. According to the findings of this study, since the auction design inappropriately dealt with market conditions, Is-Tim, winning bidders of one of two spectrums on offer, was able to make a high bid by deriving the price of first license, the reserve price of second one, up to excessive ...
Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, 2002
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids and code bids in the DEF-block PCS spectrum auction. We find that only a small fraction of the bidders commonly used retaliating bids and code bids. These bidders won more than 40% of the spectrum for sale and paid significantly less for their overall winnings.
What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions
2000
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. We also discuss the current 3G spectrum auctions in Germany and the Netherlands. Auction design is a matter of "horses for courses", not "one size Þts all". 1 Disclaimer: I was the principal auction theorist advising the U.K. government's Radiocommunications Agency, which designed and ran the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction. Ken Binmore had a leading role and supervised experiments testing the proposed designs. Other academic advisors included Tilman Borgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel, and Joe Swierzbinski. The views expressed in this paper are mine alone. The views expressed on past and future radiospectrum auctions in Germany, Holland, and the U.S.A., gold auctions, electricity markets, takeover battles, and football TV-rights auctions are also mine alone.
An Economic Framework for Dynamic Spectrum Access and Service Pricing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2000
The concept of dynamic spectrum access will allow the radio spectrum to be traded in a market like scenario allowing wireless service providers (WSPs) to lease chunks of spectrum on a short-term basis. Such market mechanisms will lead to competition among WSPs where they not only compete to acquire spectrum but also attract and retain users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic trading system will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms.