Game theory and the spectrum auctions (original) (raw)
Related papers
Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003
The Federal Communications Commission uses an ascending bid auction called the Simultaneous Multi-round Auction (SMA) to assign spectrum for personal communication service licenses. Congress recently mandated that the SMA be evaluated to determine if it could be modified to allow "combinatorial" bids for packages of licenses. We review the theoretical background and prior experimental evidence relevant to the SMA procedures and their inherent defects which are driven largely by the presumption that values are common or affiliated and that bidder identities must be revealed in real time. We present results from experiments to evaluate the SMA and some its more important rules, along with a comparative test of the SMA with a combinatorial auction specifically designed for the Federal Communications Commission by Charles River and Associates. We find that several of the SMA rules hinder efficiency and create a trade-off between efficiency and time to complete the auction. In addition, when license values are superadditive the combinatorial auction outperforms the SMA, but requires much more time to complete and is not robust with respect to boundary cases.
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multipleround auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
A Guide to Auctions: Special Reference to Spectrum Auctions
2012
Auction is a mechanism for selling goods and services. Today, auctions are employed in a variety of transactions that extend from online sales to sales of public resources such as spectrum. The ubiquity of auctions has generated tremendous interest among economist and public alike. It has also led to many open questions about the auction design. The paper reviews the seminal literature on auctions, focusing on its basic models, and issues involved in auction design. The primary objective of the review is to offer some critical thoughts on auction design for its application in spectrum allocation.
2002
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and
Designs on the Mechanism: Economics and the FCC Spectrum Auctions
2004
My heartfelt thanks goes to Philip Mirowski, who has provided me so much in the way of intellectual stimulation and encouragement during my years at Notre Dame. I would like to thank David Ruccio for being a valuable interlocutor, and for pushing me in his inimitably aggressive, yet warm, manner, and Esther-Mirjam Sent for her consistent support from the very beginning of my attendance at Notre Dame Economics. I would also like to thank Teresa Ghilarducci for providing help under impossibly difficult circumstances. I was lucky to have encountered many talented professors at Notre Dame Economics, and doubly so to have attended with such high caliber graduate students. Two I would like to single out for their helpful comments are Kyu Sang Lee and Thomas Scheiding. Over the course of completing this dissertation I encountered several individuals willing to give of their time to help out. I would especially like to acknowledge John Ledyard and Lauren Patrich. I have benefited from presenting portions of this dissertation at the Performativities Workshop at the École des Mines de Paris (2004), the Eastern Economics Association Meetings (2003), the Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economic Thought at George Mason University (2002), the History of Economics Society Meetings (2001), the Theory and Methods Workshop at the University of Notre Dame (2001), and the Ph.D. seminar sponsored by the University of Amsterdam and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics vi (2000). Francesco Guala offered particularly helpful comments on portions of this work.
Auction mechanism for spectrum allocation and profit sharing
2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, 2009
We examine the problem of designing an auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we prove that there exists an incentive for risk neutral sellers of the spectrum to cooperate to maximize their expected profits at the SMSNEs of buyers' noncooperative game. Finally, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This indicates that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits in a such manner that no subset of sellers will deviate from cooperating with the remaining sellers.
Spectrum access models and auction mechanisms
The demand for spectrum is growing rapidly as data intensive mobile communications and high-definition television are getting more popular. The spectrum regulators are preparing for flexible spectrum use and the implementation of new technologies. To make the appropriate decisions, the regulators need to identify and evaluate the different alternatives. In this paper, we examine a systematic classification of the spectrum access models that can be used together with suitable auctions in order to evaluate and decide between the different models. The basic idea of the taxonomy is to distinguish the different forms of spectrum sharing. For example, multiple systems may coexist in the same frequency band so that the low priority systems may transmit only if the high priority systems are not occupying the band. The hierarchy of the systems can be implemented by using a variety of technologies like centralized databases or distributed sensing devices. The taxonomy clarifies the regulatory alternatives and highlights the differences in ownership and usage rights. We also discuss how to incorporate the new spectrum access models in the auction design and how to support spectrum management using economic modeling and mechanism design framework.
Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market
SpringerBriefs in Computer Science, 2014
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.