Milan Stojadinović and Italian-Yugoslav relations (1935-1941) (original) (raw)
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ITALIAN DIPLOMACY ON MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ AFTER HIS FALL FROM POWER
Istraživanja. Journal of Historical Researches, 2019
Based on primary sources, memoirs, and the relevant literature, this paper examines the attitude of Italian diplomacy towards Milan Stojadinović, a former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, after his fall from power in February 1939. The abovementioned refers primarily to the Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano and Italian envoys in Belgrade Mario Indelli and Francesco Mamelli, but it also includes other diplomats and the Italian press.
Milan Stojadinović and Count Ciano - A History of a Friendship
Tokovi istorije, 2019
Based on archives, memoirs and relevant literature, this article analyzes the relationship between Milan Stojadi-nović and Galeazzo Ciano, the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia and Italy, in the period leading up to World War II. This rapport had a considerable impact on relations between the two countries in the years between 1936 and 1939.
Mussolini of Yugoslavia? The Milan Stojadinović Regime and the Impact of Italian Fascism, 1937-1939
QUALESTORIA. Rivista di storia contemporanea. Anno XLIX, N.ro 1, Giugno 2021. L’Italia e la Jugoslavia tra le due guerre, 2021
The Yugoslav prime minister (and foreign minister), Milan Stojadinović, and Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, signed a friendship agreement on 25 March 1937, ushering in an atmosphere of confidence between the two formerly hostile countries. This rapprochement resulted from the changing international constellation: the resurgent Germany was expected to annex Austria and become a powerful neighbour to both countries. Ciano and Stojadinović struck close personal relations which no doubt buttressed the solidity of their agreement. Moreover, Ciano believed that Stojadinović was inclined towards authoritarian concept of power. There were also increasing signs that the Stojadinović regime was acquiring some fascist trappings in line with the new course of foreign policy. Indeed, Prince Regent, Paul, dropped Stojadinović from the government in February 1939 because he came to believe that his premier was intent on becoming a fascist dictator. This paper will explore whether there was substance to the often repeated accusations that Stojadinović was sliding towards fascism. Much of these accusations were centred on his foreign policy, especially his cordial relations with the fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. Therefore, this paper will analyse, on the one hand, to what extent Stojadinović aligned Yugoslavia's conduct of foreign affairs with Rome's foreign policy and, on the other, to what degree the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in internal developments which might smack of fascism. The analysis will be undertaken with reference to the recent and influential theories of fascism.
e paper analyses the evolution of the Italian cultural policy in Yugoslavia a er the conclusion of the Ciano-Stojadinović agreement in 1937. Since that year, the fascist regime launched a determined political-propagandist action in Yugoslavia with a view to making the Italian language and culture protagonists of the Yugoslav cultural scene. Strong Italian cultural presence was considered in Rome necessary in the light of the increased fascist political inuence in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Despite making great e orts, the results were disappointing overall.
This article analyses Yugoslav cultural policy towards Italy in the period since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1947 until solving of the Trieste crisis in 1954. This period is characterised by a political crisis between Yugoslavia and Italy. One of the ways in which the Yugoslav government was trying to achieve its foreign policy goals in this period was the popularisation of Yugoslav culture in Italy. The article is written on the basis of unpublished documents from the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, published documents from the Archive of Yugoslavia and the relevant literature in Serbian, Slovenian, English and Italian languages.
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The paper analyses the policy of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, and later PM, Vojislav Marinković towards Italy, during his mandates in 1927-1932. The bilateral relations are addressed in the scope of his broader concepts of foreign policy, which included closer cooperation with France and surmounting prevailing difficulties in the relations with the Great Britain. The main goal was to prove that the Yugoslav Kingdom was conducting pacifistic foreign policy in order to gain the sympathy of the Foreign Office and the international public as a counterweight to Italy’s aggressive plans towards the Balkans and the Danube region. During the course of five years, Marinković was changing attitude towards Italy according to the relations among the Great Powers.
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After the signing of the so-called Ciano-Stojadinović Pact (March 1937), Italian-Yugoslav relations suddenly improved. The turnaround in bilateral relations between the two countries (destined, however, to remain ephemeral) was clearly visible in the field of cultural relations. This essay aims to show how, after 1937, the Italian authorities tried to promote Italian culture and language in a big style in the capital of the Kingdom, Belgrade, in an attempt to counteract the supremacy enjoyed up to then by the cultural action of other countries such as France, Germany, etc., in order to promote the Italian language and culture. The fascination with the Italian civilization was also meant to contribute to bringing Yugoslavia politically and ideologically closer to the Fascist regime. Despite the invested resources and the success of some major events (for example, the great exhibition of Italian portraits through the centuries) the results were disappointing, showing once again the structural limits of Fascist political and cultural action abroad.
Milan Stojadinović, the Croat Question and the International Position of Yugoslavia, 1935-1939
Acta Histriae, 2018
This paper analysis the policy of Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1935–1939) towards the Croat question, i.e. the passive resistance with which the Croat Peasant Party led by Vlatko Maček opposed the Belgrade government, struggling for an autonomous status of Croatia. Based on the private papers of Stojadinović and Prince Regent, Paul Karadjordjević, the reports of the well-informed and shrewd British Minister in Belgrade, Ronald Hugh Campbell, as well as the rich literature on the Serbo-Croat relations in the Kingdom, this article attempts to examine Stojadinović’s approach to the Croat problem. It is argued here that Stojadinović’s treatment of the Croat question was closely related to his foreign policy, especially towards Italy and Germany.
The paper is based on the records of Military Archive in Belgrade, data from Official Military Gazette of Kingdom of Yugoslavia and literature. It emphasizes to reconstruct the activities of Yugoslav military intelligence towards Italy in the period between First and Second World War. Author has concluded that Yugoslav intelligence network was poorly developed on most of the Italian territory. Its activities were mostly focused on the Italian border zone (province Venetia Julia), settled by the Yugoslav minority population. In addition, the service supported Croatian and Slovenian irredentism on that territory. The Yugoslav military attaché in Rome also collected intelligence information mostly using as sources the members of the Yugoslav minority and Yugoslav citizens working on the Italian territory. He also obtained information from foreign military representatives, with a friendly attitude towards Yugoslavia, whose countries had much more finances and a much better‐developed network of agents and informants on the Italian territory. The greatest successes of the Yugoslav military intelligence towards Italy were achieved particularly thanks to the engagement of Yugoslav minority members, infiltrated at the time in all cells of Italian society.