Prediction of the Winner by Using a Weighted Approach of Preferential Balloting Systems on the Basis of Their Satisfied Criterions and Artifice Behavioral Complexity (original) (raw)

A selection method for a preferential election

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2004

This paper deals with a recently proposed method for a ranked voting system. It is based on a data envelopment analysis model. It is shown that the number of problems to be solved and the number of constraints in the model can be decreased. In addition, the winner can be selected with a fewer efforts and in some cases without solving any problems. The obtained results also illustrate the importance of selecting a proper norm in the model.

Three New Models for Ranking of Candidates In the Preferential Voting Systems

International Journal of Management Research and Social Science , 2021

Election is the main challenge to the political and social science. In the meantime, in the literature, several methods to decide the winner of elections have been proposed; theoretically there is no reason to be limited to these models. Hence, in this paper, we assume three new approaches (1. election result prediction by pre-election preference information using Markov chain model [to identify the efficient electoral strategy for each candidate]. 2. Improved Borda's function method using the weights of decision makers [or voters]. And 3. A new interval TOPSIS-based approach applying ordinal set of preferences [so, data is ordinal form that first convert to interval value and then inject them into the conventional interval TOPSIS model]) for ranking candidates in voting systems. Ultimately, three numerical examples in social choice context are given to depict the feasibility and practability of the proposed methods. In sum, this paper suggests a mind line for decreasing the wrong choice winner risks correlated with voting systems.

Ranking of candidates in the preferential voting framework based on a new approach

2012

In ranked voting systems, each voter selects a subset of candidates and ranks them from most to least preferred. The preference score obtained by each candidate is the weighted sum of votes receives in different places. The main drawback of this approach is that it assumes there is no preference among voters. In this paper we first attempt to analyze and show some drawbacks of this approach. Then, we propose a new method in which voters are classified into several categories based on their priorities that the vote of a higher category may have a greater importance than that of the lower category.

A simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections

2024

An obstacle to the implementation of Condorcet voting methods in political elections is the perceived complexity of these methods. In this note, we propose a simple Condorcet voting method for use in a Final Four election, i.e., after a preliminary process in which up to four candidates qualify for the election. In the Final Four election, voters submit rankings of the candidates. If one candidate beats each of the others in a head-to-head majority comparison using the voters' rankings, that candidate is elected; if not, then among the candidates with at most one head-to-head loss, the candidate with the smallest loss is elected. We analyze this voting method from the perspective of voting theory. It avoids some standard objections to the related Minimax voting method, and it has advantages over the Instant Runoff method that has already been implemented in a number of cities and states.

Taxonomy and Nomenclature of Preferential Voting Methods

2012

Voting plays an important role in many decision making problems. Various conventional preferential voting methods where the voters rank candidates in order of preference are reviewed for syntactic patterns and categorized. Several other new voting methods are devised from the conventional procedural patterns and metrics as well. Explicit formulae for over fifty different voting methods are presented and the hierarchical clustering technique is adopted to reveal semantic similarities among them. A nomenclature for voting methods is suggested to reveal their syntactic patterns. All preferential voting methods perform significantly different from the simplest plurality method.

Analysis of dynamics of voting system for small number of candidates

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2018

A significant research topicin the area of computational social choice is the complication of different kinds of dishonest behaviour like manipulation, dominance and bribery. Whereas most of the work on this issue assumes that the opposite party has incomplete knowledge regarding every agent, they did not know the true preferences of other voters. We have analysed the dynamics of voting rules with the help of some manipulative and non-manipulative moves. Voters have incomplete information. The voters are aware of the winner at every stage and they make short term rational decisions. The number of candidates and voters are small, and the decisions need to be made quickly. We want the better reply as low as possible while keeping the best reply as high as possible. The voting rules we have used are Plurality rule and Borda rule. We have analysed the dynamics for these two voting rules for small number of voters and candidates.

Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination

2007

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we fully characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems. Additionally, we show that several tailor-made multi-winner voting schemes are impractical, as it is N P-hard to select the winners in these schemes.

A new approach for ranking of candidates in voting systems

OPSEARCH, 2012

This paper proposes a new approach to allow the voters to express their preferences on a set of candidates in ranked voting systems. This approach assumes that the votes of all voters have not equal importance and there is a priority among voters. Here, voters are classified into several groups in terms of their priorities that the vote of a higher category has a greater important than that of lower category. Then, the existing ranking methods are extended to discriminate efficient candidates in our proposed model. Moreover, a new criterion to obtain a total ranking by evaluating different ranking methods based on classical voting system is given. Finally the proposed method is illustrated with an application example and shows to be effective and practical.

A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 1999

The paper describes a weighted-voting system for the election of a Parliament. The system is easy to implement, and it dominates plurality, where "dominates" means that it performs better with reference to both representativeness and stability. The system has some other nice properties, namely (a) it offers an easy-to-read evaluation of the loss of representativeness of an electoral system; and (b) it makes it relatively easy to adopt the best system after the vote, i.e. the best system conditional to the choice of electors. Indicators for representativeness and stability are defined. Results are experimental.