At the Crossroads Between the Acquired and Infused Virtues: Cases of Conflict and Possible Resolutions (original) (raw)

In her seminal essay The Subversion of Virtue: Acquired and Infused Virtues in the “Summa theologiae”, Jean Porter notes a key challenge for offering a persuasive account of Aquinas’ theory in the contemporary context; namely, one must explain how the acquired and infused moral virtues relate to each other. The debate that has ensued has not yet definitively resolved this issue, and at least two contrary Thomistic interpretations have developed. While a large amount of scholarly literature has covered the intricacies of this debate, this paper seeks to approach the problem from the perspective of cases in the life of a Christian where the acquired and infused virtues seem to conflict. Following the theory of Angela Knobel, I will argue that rather than a true conflict between virtues, this could be better understood as a conflict between the residual dispositions of acts of acquired virtue and the infused moral virtues. This claim ultimately relies on a transformation theory, but what exactly is transformed needs to be further clarified. The structure of this paper consists in three parts. In the first part, I will present the cases of apparent conflict between the acquired and infused moral virtues. One case is drawn from Scripture and two from possible experiences in the lives of recently converted Christians. The question these cases pose concerns the nature of the conflict and the ensuing status of acquired virtues after the infusion of grace. Before providing an answer, the second part of the paper will draw from three developments in the recent Thomistic debate in order to conclude that, after the reception of grace, previous acts of acquired virtue leave behind residual dispositions that potentially conflict with the infused moral virtues. Finally, in the third part of the paper, I will attempt to use the resources gained from part two in order to provide a plausible resolution to the question that arose from the conflict cases. In short, the conflict in the cases is only apparently between the acquired and infused moral virtues. This implies, however, that the acquired virtues no longer remain in the life of the Christian after grace. Since this claim is often taken as a violation of the basic Scholastic axiom that grace perfects nature, I will further show how grace transforms not the acquired virtues but the faculties and powers of the human person. Lastly, in answer to an objection by David Decosimo, I will focus on two conclusions made by Jean Porter concerning the necessity of the infused virtues in the thought of Aquinas.