Truth, truthfulness and philosophy in Plato and Nietzsche (original) (raw)
2007, British Journal for the History of Philosophy
AI-generated Abstract
The paper explores the philosophical approaches to truth and truthfulness in Plato and Nietzsche, arguing that the common perception of them as oppositional figures in Western philosophy is oversimplified. It suggests that a nuanced understanding reveals significant ambivalence in Nietzsche's critique of Plato, and also a deeper complexity in Plato's thought. The discussion focuses on the 'new philosopher' envisioned by Nietzsche, who navigates nihilism while striving to create meaningful truths, thus highlighting the psychological paradox in reconciling truthfulness with perspectivism.
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