ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN EAST AFRICA 1940-41 - Orders-of-battle and strengths Part II 1941 (original) (raw)
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ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN EAST AFRICA 1940-41 - Orders-of-battle and strenghts Part I 1939-1940
The orders-of-battle and strengths of the Allied forces in The East African Campaign (June 1940-November 1941). Based, mostly, on the official British, South African, Indian and French histories of that campaign, but, also, on the indispensable, unofficial, history of the King's African Rifles, Chris Kempton's study of the Indian Army and the Supplements to the London Gazette referring to the operations on that forgotten theatre of war. Additionally, important information is given into the East Africa Force/East African Command orders-of-battle (Sudan and Kenya mostly), not necessarilly directly involved in the campaign.
New Perspectives on the East Africa Campaign of the Second World War
International journal of military history and historiography, 2023
The East Africa campaign of the Second World War-although the first Allied victory of this conflict-has been largely forgotten by scholars and popular historians. The causes are multi-factored and due mainly, perhaps, to the concurrent and interrelated military operations that occurred in North Africa, the Soviet Union, Greece, and Crete between 1940 and 1941-operations that had first call on Allied resources, and drew popular attention then as they continue to do now. The East African campaign is as a result one of the war's forgotten campaigns, despite significant military engagements, the unique military operating environment, the allure of iconic personalities, and the rich human stories associated with it. The historiography remains fragmented with a focus on individual, national histories of the contributions made by the British, Italian, Indian and South African forces, for instance. This special issue, as a counterpoint, brings together a variety of articles covering a range of heretofore neglected topics.
The Union Defence Force and the East African Campaign, 1940-1941- a Critical Analysis
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had to undergo a rapid transformation from an ageing peacetime defence force to one that could project its offensive power across the African subcontinent. The formation of the 1st South African Division (1st SA Div) during 1940 and the subsequent deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre afforded the UDF the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian threat in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. It had been 21 years since the Union of South Africa had last been in a state of war, and the UDF’s first battle in East Africa is a prime tool with which to measure concepts such as force design, military innovation and the operational employment of forces, to name but a few. The Battle of El Wak, fought on 16 December 1940, was not only the UDF’s first battle in the East African campaign but also its first battle of the Second World War. This paper analyses the Battle of El Wak, fought by the 1st South African Brigade, against the theoretical notion of “first battles”. Emphasis is placed on the South African road to war, the planning for the East African campaign, the Battle of El Wak and the way this battle subsequently influenced the remainder of the UDF operations in East Africa. In doing so the South African offensive operations in the theatre is critically evaluated against the backdrop of the changing nature of the South African operations, the at times haphazard Anglo-South African relations during the campaign, the character and effectiveness of the Italian military forces, and the adverse influence of climate and terrain on the campaign in East Africa.
Scientia Militaria, 2012
After J. C. Smuts (1870-1950) managed to unseat J.B.M. Hertzog (1866-1942) as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa it was clear that the country would enter the Second World War on the side of Great Britain. In spite of extensive changes and an increased budget the Union Defence Force (UDF) found itself in a state of war on 7 September 1939 with a Permanent Force of only 5400 men with limited training and antiquated equipment. While Hitler’s armies conquered Western Europe the Springboks prepared to go North and spite of trepidations about the might of Mussolini’s East African Empire the First South African Infantry Division set sail for East Africa in mid-July 1940. In 5 short months Mussolini’s East African Empire had been torn to shreds. Victorious in every major engagement, the South Africans embarked for Egypt in June 1941. Here they encountered similar logistical problems as was prevalent before they embarked for East Africa. With two divisions in the field and a third in training UDF planners had a trying time marshalling enough motorised transport to enable the Springboks to keep pace with the increased mobility that was a hallmark of desert warfare. Expecting to build on their success over the Italians the South Africans confidently went into battle but by November 1941 the Fifth South African Infantry Brigade was annihilated and the victors of East Africa badly mauled. Fighting low-moraled Italian armies in the bush and mountains of Abyssinia was quite easy, beating the Germans in the desert would be a different story altogether.
It is well-established that there is an ever-present relationship between warfare and the physical environment. Throughout history, key elements of geography have served as decisive factors in the conduct and outcome of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In each area of military operations, a number of geographic characteristics, unique to that area, combine to create a distinctive operational environment. The elements making this operational environment unique, provide useful tools in the study of the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare. The deployment of South African troops to the East African theatre during 1940, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the opportunity to test its military capabilities under operational conditions against the Italians in Ethiopia and Somaliland. This shows that the East African operational environment, best described as complex and hybrid, distinctly influenced the operational deployment of the UDF throughout the campaign. From the sprawling deserts of the Northern Frontier District to the coastal plains of Somaliland and the mountainous bastions of central and northern Ethiopia, the East African climate and terrain served as key determinants during the planning and execution of the South African and Allied military operations throughout the campaign. This paper evaluates the influence of climate and terrain on the South African military deployment in East Africa during 1940-1941.
World War I in East Africa 1916-1918
The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the First World War. Strategically unimportant to the main war effort, East Africa has remained in the shadows of the much better known Western, Mesopotamian and Palestine Fronts. Despite this, the campaign lasted from August 1914 to November 1918 and covered a large portion of East Africa as well as drawing in the majority of its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. However, he had failed to bring the German Schutztruppe to battle and it remained a powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and dependent on inadequate lines of communication. Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 1917, the South African, General van Deventer assumed command, an appointment that he would hold until the end of the war. Van Deventer continued to build on Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 when the war ended with the Schutztruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa into Northern Rhodesia. For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road construction.F or the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were never smooth as imperial rivalries often created friction and misunderstanding. In the end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East.
Armoured Warfare: the South African Experience in East Africa 1940-1941
Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.
West Africa | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)
2019
This article examines the deployment of West African soldiers for military service in West Africa, including the manner of mobilization and recruitment. By demonstrating the heavy reliance on West African soldiers for the ‘European’ conduct of the Great War campaign in the region, it shows how West Africans helped determine the outcome of war in the region. Furthermore, the frenzy of European recruitment of West African soldiers produced adverse effects on the region.
A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43
The Journal of Military History, 2004
War as a diversified, multipurpose force prepared to engage in a variety of tasks, including the support of the ground forces. Lacking recent experience, the War Department relied on ideas developed in response to lessons learned during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and the German invasion of Poland (1939) to produce Air Corps Field Manual 1-5, Employment of the Aviation of the Army. American tactical air support doctrine would be revised a number of times during the course of the