The ends of the dead (original) (raw)

The human person: Animal and spirit

1992

In 3988 David Braine, who has taught philosophy at the University of Aberdeen for many years, published The Reality of Time and the Existence of God, a metaphysical proof of God's existence. Now, in this second book, The Human Person: Animal and Spirit (Duckworth, London, 1993) which certainly stands on its own although we are frequently referred back to the earlier book and forward to two (if not three) forthcoming volumes, he reconstructs the argument advanced by Thomas Aquinas in favour of our immortality, an even more audacious enterprise in the present intellectual climate.

Human, nonhumans, and personhood

1993

Are chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans persons? In this chapter I explore this question, which is obviously relevant to the proposal that these great apes be included in the community of equals and granted some basic rights. I consider the question of personhood from a particular philosophical position in relation to nonhumans in general, and then discuss implications of my findings for the proposal.

Are Persons Human Beings?

Res Philosophica, 2020

In this article, I suggest that reflection on a broadly Aristotelian-cum-Hegelian conception about the determination of the conditions of identity and individuation of objects and properties shows that it entails (what Brandom calls) the Kant-Sellars thesis about modality and identity, one consequence of which is that persons are not identical to human beings. This view is in conflict with the Aristotelian liberal naturalist view to the effect that to be a person is identical to being an individual of a specific animal kind -namely, homo sapiens- characterized by a specific and unique 'form of life' (and natural history) which differentiates it from all other animal kinds. I conclude that this novel and unorthodox liberal naturalist view about personhood constitutes an interesting and viable liberal naturalist alternative to more 'orthodox' liberal naturalist neo-Aristotelian views like Thompson's, as it can better accommodate certain counterfactual 'person-human being decoupling' scenarios in our modern conception of ourselves-in-the-world.

What Is A Person And How Can We Be Sure?

Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 2014

A Paradigm Case Formulation (PCF) of Persons is developed that allows competent judges to identify areas of agreement and disagreement regarding where they draw a line on what is to be included as a person. The paradigm case is described as a linguistically competent individual able to engage in Deliberate Action in a Dramaturgical Pattern. Specific attention is given to the ability of paradigm case persons to employ Hedonic, Prudent, Aesthetic and Ethical perspectives in choosing their Deliberate Actions and Social Practices. It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk." But-they simply do not talk. Wittgenstein (1953) Apparently, humanity has matured enough for us to ask in a non-trivial way, "Are human beings the only persons we encounter?" Historically, we have only recognized others who share our human embodiment as fellow persons. This matters legally, morally and ethically since we grant people rights, privileges and protections that are not offered to nonpersons. These rights, privileges and protections are subject to revision. We no longer allow people to be kept as the property of other people.

"Persons, Souls and Life After Death"

Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature, 2021

Thomistic Hylomorphists claim that we human persons have rational or intellective souls which can continue to exist separately from our bodies after we die. Much of the recent scholarly discussion of Thomistic Hylomorphism has centered on this thesis and the question of whether human persons can survive death along with their souls or whether only their souls can survive in this separated, disembodied, post-mortem state. As a result, two rival versions of Thomistic Hyomorphism have been formulated: Survivalism and Corruptionism. This chapter makes a new contribution to the debate between Survivalists and Corruptionists by identifying a heretofore undiscussed problem for Corruptionist Thomistic Hylomorphism. In particular, it is argued that if Corruptionists were right that human persons cannot survive their deaths along with their souls, this would undermine the grounds on which all Thomistic Hylomorphists, including Corruptionists, rely to justify their belief that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths. Given this, it is argued that Thomistic Hylomorphists have grounds for thinking that our souls can continue to exist after our deaths only if they allow, as Survivalists do and Corruptionists do not, that we human persons can continue to exist after our deaths, with souls but no bodies.

TRANSCENDING THE HUMAN/NON-HUMAN DIVIDE

This article focuses on the analysis of the geo-politics and body-politics of being, and perception as the key concepts in the decolonial option grounded in the spatiality and corporeality of our cognitive and perceptive mechanisms. Revived spatiality refers in this case not only to a physical space that we inhabit but also to our bodies as specific spatial entities – the privileged white male bodies or the damned, non-white, dehumanized and often gendered and sexualized bodies from the underside of modernity. The article presents a decolonial interpretation of the human/non-human binary aimed at rethinking the fundamental modern/colonial division into anthropos and humanitas and the subsequent animalization of large human groups. The main questions are then what does it mean to be animalized by and in modernity and what ways out are possible, desired and attainable for the dehumanized others? The main goal of the article is to further question liberal Western humanism from a decolonial perspective, without yet dropping this concept altogether, and considering instead another humanism model suggested by Sylvia Wynter. Contemporary critical anti-humanist and “other humanism” theories often find a much more accurate and immediate realization through artistic metaphors and activist art projects than traditional theory, problematizing the border between the human and the animal, the man-made and the natural, the individual and the communal. Therefore, the article dwells at some length on one such project balancing between art and critical anthropology – the works of the Northern Caucasus decolonial artist Taus Makhacheva.

The Demarcation of Species: Ontological Aspects of the Human Incarnation

J. Acad. (N.Y.), 2014

While human beings are without any doubt orders of magnitude removed from animals in the degree of development, no difference in degree alone can constitute a difference in kind. The formalization of this phenomenological inability to define the demarcation of species is not only of utmost highest importance with respect to the conception of human dignity but also to the ethical classification of the human ability to design hybrid-creatures. The heuristic principle of inability motivates an ontological consideration suggesting an unambiguous species-barrier defined by a generic and specific analysis of the human incarnation.