Reply to Miller (original) (raw)
Ethics and the Environment, 2020
Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 99 goodness: (1) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goods, and (2) the distinction between ends and means. two HolIsts on tHe IntrInsIc Value of tHe envIronment Aldo leopold Aldo Leopold understands ethics as originating from the "tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation" (1993, 373). He is concerned with the lack of an ethic that deals with the relation between human beings and the land, where the "land" includes various systems, the waters, the soil, and the numerous and diverse inhabitants of the "land." Leopold's land ethic aims at enlarging the boundaries of the "community," which presupposes interdependency of the various parts that constitute a given whole, to include soils, waters, plants, and animals as fellow members of an intricately interdependent system whose survival and "health" depends on an appropriate understanding and evaluation of the various interdependencies. "In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such" (1993, 374). Leopold criticizes conservation systems based solely on economic motives; he states that such conservation systems do not assign value to most of the members of the "land-community" because most members do not have any economic value. However, the land ethic points to the fact that such members, being integral parts of the biotic community, contribute to the stability of the entire system. Therefore, a system of conservation based solely on the economic self-interest of human beings "assumes, falsely… that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts" (1993, 178). Although Leopold does not explicitly state it, one can infer that in such a manner, shortsighted economic self-interest not only destroys the integrity of the environment upon which the stability of the various life-generating (as well as resource-generating) systems depends, but also, by direct entailment, endangers the very resources it values (since their existence is deeply intertwined with the stability of the entire system). Leopold offers the metaphor of The Land Pyramid, which consists of interrelated layers of energy transfer. At the bottom layer, plants absorb energy from the sun, which continues to flow upward through a circuit called the biota (represented by the layers of the pyramid). The bottom layer consists of the soil with a plant layer resting on top of it and "an insect layer [resting] on the plants, a bird and rodent layer [resting] on the insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer, which consists of the large carnivores" (1993, 378). Each layer depends on the one below it for food and various other services. The lines of
The Journal of Environmental Education, 2011
A philosophy of action consists of a theory about how and why we do things and what motivates us to act. By juxtaposing the theory of environmental action implied by the works and life of John Muir with the philosophy of action suggested by Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic, we will illuminate the importance of a philosophy of action in determining one's approach to environmental decision making. This discussion is important for environmental education and the ethics these experiences inspire because both philosophies advocate very different visions of environmental action. In short, Muir demonstrates an ethic guided by the expected results of actions, an approach parallel to the responsible environmental behavior model (REB) of environmental education, whereas Leopold, demonstrates the role of intention and emotion in ethical decision making through the lens of community.
CETAPS, 2022
Conference program Coining the term ‘the land ethic’ in 1949, Aldo Leopold has become an influential figure for the development of ecology until today. Despite Leopold’s enduring legacy, however, many have increasingly come to challenge and expand on his thesis. This paper proposes to take a brief look at Leopold’s seminal land ethic in contrast with strands of contemporary environmental ethics that see the intersectional entanglements that make up ‘land.’ It reconsiders Leopold’s notion of ‘land’ in light of postcolonial, queer, feminist and environmental ethical philosophies. Not only Leopold, but other prominent biocentrist thinkers such as Arne Naess, have been criticized for neglecting the importance of good human-to-human relationships as part of their ecological thinking about nature. Indigenous environmental ethics, for instance, goes further than Leopold by considering the reciprocities and interdependencies between both sentient and non-sentient beings. Our responsibilities to the land are connected to our responsibilities to one another. Moreover, it should go without saying that Indigenous peoples had to be murdered and dispossessed of their land in Turtle Island, so that Leopold could stand on and make an argument for ‘his’ North American land. Notwithstanding, the ethical qualities of the land must be addressed across the world. This may be done, one could argue, by taking into consideration not only the biological imperative for land conservation and sustainability, but also my relationship with the land as socially, historically, culturally, and affectively constructed. This requires that I learn and feel with my land and the land that I stand on. The approach taken in this paper hopes not only to displace Western, capitalist and anthropocentric notions of the land from environmental ethics, but also to recognize my own embeddedness to the land as an ethical principle which includes all human and more-than-human ecologies.
Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory
Ethics & The Environment, 2007
Callicott's claim to have unified environmentalism and animal liberation should be rejected by holists and liberationists. By making relations of intimacy necessary for moral considerability, Callicott excludes from the moral community nonhuman animals unable to engage in intimate relations due to the circumstances of their confinement. By failing to afford moral protection to animals in factory farms and research laboratories, Callicott's biosocial moral theory falls short of meeting a basic moral demand of liberationists. Moreover, were Callicott to include factory farm and research animals inside the moral community by affording them universal or noncommunitarian rights, his theory would fall foul of environmentalists who seek to promote ecosystem stability and integrity via therapeutic hunting. If factory farm and research animals can have rights irrespective of their particular circumstances, then so can freeroaming animals from overabundant and exotic species.
Re-Examining the Darwinian Basis for Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic
Many philosophers have become familiar with Leopold's land ethic through the writings of J. Baird Callicott, who claims that Leopold bases his land ethic on a 'pro-tosociobiological' argument that Darwin gives in the Descent of Man. On this view, which has become the canonical interpretation, Leopold's land ethic is based on extending our moral sentiments to ecosystems. I argue that the evidence weighs in favor of an alternative interpretation of Leopold; his reference to Darwin does not refer to the Descent, but rather to the Origin of Species, where Darwin discusses the interdependencies between organisms in the struggle for existence. It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. (Darwin, 1876, p. 430)
The Land Ethic, Moral Development, and Ecological Rationality
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2007
There has been significant debate over both the implications and the merit of Leopold's land ethic. I consider the two most prominent objections and a resolution to them. One of these objections is that, far from being an alternative to an “economic” or cost-benefit perspective on environmental issues, Leopold's land ethic merely broadens the range of economic considerations to be used in addressing such issues. The other objection is that the land ethic is a form of “environmental fascism” because it subordinates the welfare of humans to the good of the ecological whole. I argue that these objections are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of his theory by advocates and detractors alike. The land ethic is centrally a psychological theory of moral development and ecological rationality that advocates a shift in the way that environmental problems are conceptualized and approached.
Annotated bibliography in animal ethics and environmental philosophy
2023
This annotated bibliography is the first assignment for the "Environmental Philosophy" course of the "Philosophy and Religion" master programme at the University of Wales Trinity Saint David. In this assignment, I present and discuss four papers in animal ethics and environmental philosophy: * Joel Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations” (1974) * Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal” (1974) * Paul W. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature” (1981) * Mark Sagoff, “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce” (1984)