DOE weapons laboratories' contributions to the nation's defense technology base (original) (raw)
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Ways of Knowing About Weapons: The Cold War's End at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
2001
Anthropologists, you miss a chance By examining not what makes A warhead scientist salivate. Homo Los Alamos! How deservedly unique!-Don Eduardo de Los Alamos (Edward B. Grothus) Local resident and antinuclear activist, Los Alamos, NM CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION I did not begin my doctoral fieldwork intending to write an ethnography of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers. When I arrived at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the summer of 1997, I knew a great deal about the town of Los Alamos, a little about the organization, and nearly nothing about nuclear weapons. Like most anthropologists, I came to my field site prepared to study the people in its margins, not at its center: I went to the laboratory to explore the formation of social networks among women and minority scientists, to see how they built supportive, career enhancing mentoring relationships in the traditionally white, masculine domains of physics and engineering, in a weapons laboratory whose management structure was replete with men, not women. However, after several months at my field site I found a more compelling topic: the fear, widely shared among many staff members, that crucial skills and understandings, local "ways of knowing" about nuclear weapons, might be disappearing. By the time I began my fieldwork, knowledge loss had been a major concern at Los Alamos since the late 1980s, when political trends at the end of the Cold War began to impact the laboratory's research environment. Throughout the Cold War, Los Alamos was the nation's flagship nuclear weapons research and development laboratory, one of three such facilities owned by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). Los The Nuclear Posture Review put the Clinton administration in the odd position of reaffirming the importance of nuclear weapons for American security while simultaneously seeking an international ban on nuclear testing. This meant that the Department of Energy would have to develop an alternative means of maintaining confidence in the nuclear stockpile without placing the test ban in jeopardy. In 1994, both President Clinton and Congress each issued separate official directives requiring the DOE to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons" (United States
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
2006
This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not focus on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. Instead it addresses how the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where it already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. Developing a coherent strategy can lessen the risk that the United States will be surprised, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even as the Administration employs diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation to derail Iran from the nuclear path, it should also develop a clear sense of how it will react if, as is possible, Iran emerges as a nuclear power, led by a radical government with a menacing foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that Iran should consider the consequences of a U.S. "defense umbrella over the region." This paper explores many of the issues related to such an umbrella. Key questions arise regarding an extended deterrence regime. What Iranian threats would this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect them? How much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would a deterrence regime take, how would it operate, and would it be effective? What options are available? This paper addresses these and related questions. Its intent is to illuminate issues and options, not to advocate any single approach.
Redefining the U . S . Nuclear Weapons Program and the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex
1999
1993 Number 21 Los Alamos Science As we look back on the fifty-year history of Los Alamos National Laboratory, we can be justifiably proud of the accomplishments that are the foundation of our rich heritage. While the nation faced World War II and then the Cold War, we developed nuclear and thermonuclear explosives. In the early years we were also instrumental in developing the manufacturing technologies employed at the production plants in the nuclear weapons complex. Over the intervening decades we met the challenges of changing national security needs. As weapons-delivery systems changed and the need for lighter, smaller, and more specialized warheads became apparent, we developed weightand size-optimized designs. As increased attention was directed toward warhead safety and security, we developed insensitive high explosives, fire-resistant weapon components, and other enhanced surety (safety/security) design features. Once again the security needs of the nation are changing—this...
The U.S. military has a long and complicated history in developing directed energy (DE) weapons. Many past efforts have failed for a variety of reasons and not all failures were attributed to scientific or technological challenges associated with weaponizing DE. At present, a number of U.S. military DE weapons-related programs are beginning to show promise, such as the Navy's Laser Weapon System (LaWs), the first ever Department of Defense (DOD) laser weapon to be deployed and approved for operational use, according to the Navy. With a number of U.S. Army weapons-related DE programs showing promise during concept demonstrations and their potential relevance in addressing a number of current and emerging threats to U.S. ground forces, some believe the Army is making progress to field viable DE weapon systems designed to counter rockets, artillery, and mortars (C-RAM) and address certain types of short-range air defense (SHORAD) threats.
2000
The Union of Concerned Scientists is a partnership of citizens and scientists working to build a cleaner environment and a safer world. For more information about UCS's work on arms control and international security, visit the UCS website at www.ucsusa.org. The Security Studies Program (SSP) is a graduate-level research and educational program based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies. The program's primary task is educating the next generation of scholars and practitioners in international security policymaking. SSP supports the research work of graduate students, faculty, and fellows, and sponsors seminars, conferences, and publications to bring its teaching and research results to the attention of wider audiences. Cover illustration: An artist's rendition of two kill vehicles approaching a cluster of balloon decoys, one of which might enclose a warhead.
Resource Paper on the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal
Bulletin of the atomic scientists, 1984
Since its inception the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has sought to increase public knowledge of nuclear weapons issues. This supplement-a condensation and updating of the 340-page first volume of the authors' Nuclear Weapons Databook-continues that tradition. Published earlier this year under the auspices of the Natural Resources Defense Council, volume one of the Databook is a comprehensive and detailed compilation of U.S. nuclear forces and capabilities. (The second volume, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production Complex, is in preparation.) This condensed version is a concise reference work of nine sections: the Reagan Administration's nuclear weapons buildup; the current US. stockpile; the land-based missile force; the sea-based missile force; the strategic bomber force; nonstrategic nuclear forces on land; the Navy's non-strategic nuclear weapons; and weapons research and development. The authors conclude by outlining the future.shape of US. nuclear forces; they note that the Reagan Administration does not appear to consider arms control a viable way of improving U.S. security. The Bulletin acknowledges the support of the Ruth Mott Fund in the preparation of this supplement.
Exploring Advancements in Science and Technology for National Security
This paper discusses the concept of national security, examining its theoretical framework and situates some of the definitions within the Nigerian context. It catalogues some advances in science and technology that are being or can be deployed to enhance national security. It examines the role that the Science Association of Nigeria can play in drawing on recent advances in science and technology to support the Nigerian effort in tackling threats to national security.