Responding to Potential Transitions: A New Dataset With a Discussion of Response Dilemmas in Mali and Syria (original) (raw)
Mali: this is only the beginning
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2013
Finally, the situation in Mali was rotten enough for international intervention. First because the mujahideen of Ansar Dine, the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), along with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), only had to exercise a little pressure at the front in Konna, to let the last remnants of the Malian Army fall apart.1 Second because the Malian Interim President, Dioncounda Traoré, installed after the coup d’état against President Amadou Toumani Touré of 22 March 2012, faced yet another coup d’état from this same decrepit army, set heavily against foreign intervention as it might upset its power within Mali, which led him to formally ask France for military support, believing he had nothing to lose.2 Undoubtedly, the French Ministry of Defense and French Military HQ État-Major des Armées had a plan ready despite President Hollande’s public assurances that France would not pursue a neocolonial intervention in a sovereign state. France has historically ...
War at the Background of Europe: The Crisis of Mali
AARMS Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013) 247–271. In 2012 the seemingly stable country of Mali experienced a sudden collapse, this along with the declaration of independence of the brand new Tuareg state, the massive spread of extreme Islamism shocked the international community. Initial disbelief gave way to the UN Security Council’s resolution to restore Mali’s territorial integrity. Fueled by the fear of a greater and bloodier conflict and its overspill, limited military operations began. Along with the Economic Community of West African State–led operation, the country’s former colonial master, France, began its own controversial military operation. Many people think that by doing so, France is trying to prove itself a great power and able to intervene on the world political stage according to its own diplomatic interest and being a force to contend with. Others however think that France is facing another Indochina-like fiasco in Mali. Who is right, will be determined by the failure or the success of the current operations and by the results of the restoration afterward. In this paper I would like to clarify the reasons for the events taking place in the country, their dynamics and possible consequences. keywords: Mali, AQIM, Boko Haram, Tuareg, Azawad, rebellion, France, USA, European Union, peacekeeping, Operation Serval,
MALI: REBUILDING A COUNTRY FROM CIVIL WAR
2018
Not for the very first time in its history, after the military coup and the rebellion in 2012, the situation of Mali has become uncertain. The country's position on the Fragile States Index1 has gone through a major increase from the 76th place in 2011 to the 38th in 2013, and the 29th in 2016 out of a total of 178 countries. However, it was neither the coup nor the rebellion of the tribes that generated a crisis. Mali as part of the countries of the Sahel region had to face numerous challenges and these led to the outbreak of the crisis in 2012. Different peacekeeping missions of the European Union and the United Nations needed to deal with the root causes in order to stabilise the country and to bring long-term peace.
The regional impact of the armed conflict and French Military Intervention in Mali
Despite the perceived threat to international peace and security presented by the crisis in Mali, the international community did not act to resolve it for nearly ten months, which allowed Islamists to militarily take control of the whole of northern Mali and impose sharia law. The French military intervention in Mali placed the country at the top of the international political agenda. But the conflict in Mali and the French intervention have wider implications not only for Mali and its neighbours, but also for Africa, the international community, and France's national security and strategic interests at home and abroad.
The coup in Mali : the result of a long-term crisis or spillover from the Libyan civil war ?
2012
unexpected, although most national and international players were eager to maintain an unrealistic view of political developments in this Sahelian country. This crisis reflects the decay of state institutions and practices: the Malian army collapsed and patronage does not mean democracy. The crisis is built on four dynamics that have their own effects: the debatable implementation of previous peace settlements with the Tuareg insurgency; the growing economic importance of AQIM activities in the Sahelian region; the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya; and the inability or unwillingness of Algeria to play the role of regional hegemon now that its rival (Libya) has stopped doing so.
Review of African Political Economy, 2013
* Although the first two authors named carried out the editorial work necessary for this article, the article would not have been possible without the input of any of its contributors. Each of the authors therefore reserves the right to claim primary authorship over this article in personal bibliographies. 1 As this article will make clear, several groups fought against the Malian government and sometimes against each other. They fall into two broad categories. The first, the Tuareg separatists known as the MNLA, are in rebellion against their own government; we refer to them as 'rebels.' Those in the second category are engaged in a violent jihad with ideological roots in Salafism. They see themselves as fighting for Islam, although the vast majority of their victims are Muslims who do not recognize their religion in the actions of these fighters. We refer to this second category as the mujahideen; some of them are in rebellion against their own government, but many are citizens of foreign countries. They are not therefore 'rebels.' As we argue below, individual fighters and commanders have shifted back and forth across the permeable boundary between these two categories, but we maintain it for analytical purposes.
2013
This is an exercise in contemporary history that aims to give a comprehensive background and analysis to the current (2012) political crisis in Mali, generated by the start of a new Tuareg nationalist uprising against the state, complemented by a coordinated attack on the state by both international (AQIM) and local Jihadi-Salafi movements, leading to a coup d'état against the incumbent President Touré, and finallly a political stalemate of great concern to the international community. By pooling sources and analysis, a group of eight scholars tries to give a comprehensive overall picture.
The Mali situation as I understand it #6: The Crisis after 6 Months
I have been a peace activist all my life but I see no alternative to a war in this case. The humanitarian crisis will only get worse until the criminals are gone. Europe and ECOWAS have refused to help Mali with ammunition and logistics that Mali requested insisting that they will only help with "boots on the ground". This leaves Mali without options. The longer the regions are occupied, the harder it will be to dislodge the criminals. The occupation has already been in place for six months. The US position only calls for new elections and plays no part in this conversation.