Responding to Potential Transitions: A New Dataset With a Discussion of Response Dilemmas in Mali and Syria (original) (raw)

The Perseverance of the Crisis in Mali

PISM Strategic Files, 2012

After yet another Tuareg rebellion, followed by a virtual takeover of the northern parts of the country by various terrorist organisations and a highly destabilising coup d'état, Mali finds itself engulfed in a protracted political, security and humanitarian crisis. The worrying series of events in Mali has brought the country to the attention of international actors, including the European Union (EU), which is concerned about the lack of stability and security in the Sahel, an area adjacent to the immediate EU neighbourhood. Unfortunately, the majority of the foreign ideas on how to address Mali's crisis lack an enduring commitment to improve the situation on the ground. Unless the international proposals are in line with the UN Secretary General's recommendations from 29 November 2012 and veer towards long-term solutions, Mali is likely to remain destabilised for the foreseeable future.

The Mali situation as I understand it #3– April 5-19, 2012

This summary covers a period of 2 weeks. It begins to occur to me that this crisis will not be over soon. This summary is not as complete or linear as the first two. The situation remains confusing and the weariness and trauma of the last month weighs on me. But here it is. I think it is important to understand that there are (at least) two inseparable fronts to the crisis.

The regional impact of the armed conflict and French Military Intervention in Mali

Despite the perceived threat to international peace and security presented by the crisis in Mali, the international community did not act to resolve it for nearly ten months, which allowed Islamists to militarily take control of the whole of northern Mali and impose sharia law. The French military intervention in Mali placed the country at the top of the international political agenda. But the conflict in Mali and the French intervention have wider implications not only for Mali and its neighbours, but also for Africa, the international community, and France's national security and strategic interests at home and abroad.

Mali: this is only the beginning

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2013

Finally, the situation in Mali was rotten enough for international intervention. First because the mujahideen of Ansar Dine, the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), along with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), only had to exercise a little pressure at the front in Konna, to let the last remnants of the Malian Army fall apart.1 Second because the Malian Interim President, Dioncounda Traoré, installed after the coup d’état against President Amadou Toumani Touré of 22 March 2012, faced yet another coup d’état from this same decrepit army, set heavily against foreign intervention as it might upset its power within Mali, which led him to formally ask France for military support, believing he had nothing to lose.2 Undoubtedly, the French Ministry of Defense and French Military HQ État-Major des Armées had a plan ready despite President Hollande’s public assurances that France would not pursue a neocolonial intervention in a sovereign state. France has historically ...

War at the Background of Europe: The Crisis of Mali

AARMS Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013) 247–271. In 2012 the seemingly stable country of Mali experienced a sudden collapse, this along with the declaration of independence of the brand new Tuareg state, the massive spread of extreme Islamism shocked the international community. Initial disbelief gave way to the UN Security Council’s resolution to restore Mali’s territorial integrity. Fueled by the fear of a greater and bloodier conflict and its overspill, limited military operations began. Along with the Economic Community of West African State–led operation, the country’s former colonial master, France, began its own controversial military operation. Many people think that by doing so, France is trying to prove itself a great power and able to intervene on the world political stage according to its own diplomatic interest and being a force to contend with. Others however think that France is facing another Indochina-like fiasco in Mali. Who is right, will be determined by the failure or the success of the current operations and by the results of the restoration afterward. In this paper I would like to clarify the reasons for the events taking place in the country, their dynamics and possible consequences. keywords: Mali, AQIM, Boko Haram, Tuareg, Azawad, rebellion, France, USA, European Union, peacekeeping, Operation Serval,