Whose Support Matters for the Occurrence of Terrorism (original) (raw)
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DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt, 2008
This report assesses the literature on the inter-relations between the economy and security with particular focus on terrorism and the" human drivers of insecurity" to identify both available knowledge and crucial research gaps. In addition, the report surveys the European research capacity in the field of security economics. The study is based on a thorough literature survey of the newly emerging field of security economics, using a variety of electronic catalogues and search engines as sources. The study reveals that it is not just ...
Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2017
We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimat...
The Political Economy of Terrorism (2019)
Diego Muro (2019) 'The Political Economy of Terrorism' in Ron Matthews (ed.) The Political Economy of Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2019
The goal of this chapter is to apply political economy metaphors to examine the EU’s measures to contain and defeat terrorism. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 considers the ‘political economy of terrorism’ to depict the public policies that aim to integrate both counter-terrorist (supply-side) and prevention efforts (demand-side) into a coherent response. According to this approach an effective response to terrorism needs to involve the arrest and prosecution of those actively involved in acts of violence against civilians but also the development of an effective counter-recruitment strategy that deals with the driving forces of terrorism, also known as ‘root causes’, and prevents rank and file replenishing. Societies affected by terrorism need to engage with the social, political, religious, economic and ethnic ‘grievances’ motivating terrorists and do something about them. Section 3 discusses the EU’s counter-terrorist response to the ongoing threat of Salafi jihadism, particularly since 2014 when Islamic State started to claim responsibility for a number of high-profile attacks outside Iraq and Syria. The European ambition is to integrate both ‘hard’ counter-terrorist measures and ‘soft’ preventive measures designed to stop vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalised, joining extremist groups and carrying out acts of violence. The integration of supply- and demand-side approaches is far from perfect but it is providing fruitful responses in the fight against Salafi jihadism, perhaps even a blueprint that could be implemented in a variety of contexts experiencing the threat of both home-grown terrorists as well as returnees from combat zones. Section 4 pays special attention to the so-called ‘radicalisation agenda’ and the prevention of violent extremism, which includes measures such as the dissemination of counter-narratives to bring about attitudinal and behavioural change. The goal of prevention strategies is to delegitimise the use of violence means for political purposes and isolate the violent radicals from their supporters and sympathisers. Terrorist cells often hide in neighbourhoods where relative deprivation and criminality are rife and where their criminal activities go undetected. Ultimately, the goal of preventive strategies is to make it difficult for European jihadists to continue disguising themselves within communities of immigrants and diasporas. Section 5 discusses whether counter-terrorism and prevention efforts can be successfully integrated into a single strategy, for example at city level. As many as 75% of European citizens live in urban centres and existing evidence indicates that attacks on cities may continue in the future. Thus, cities have been at the forefront of a comprehensive strategy to integrate counter-terrorist and preventive strategies at the municipal level in order to stop terrorist attacks against civilians. Cities are obvious settings in which to implement the motto “think globally and act locally”. Finally, section 6 provides a set of concluding remarks and directions for future research.
Three Essays on the Economics and Finance of Terrorism
2007
Aa framework for the analytical treatment of terrorist problems is suggested and then brings out the importance of financial and socio-economic factors. The framework classifies the various causes of terrorism into necessary, precipitating, facilitating and perpetuating factors [WP 10]
The Economic Analysis of Terrorism
Economic and Evolutionary Approaches in Social Sciences, Mihai Ungureanu (ed.), Wolters Kluwer, Bucharest, 2014, 2014
In this chapter I discuss current economic approaches to the study of terrorism, focusing in particular on economic models of terrorist behavior. In the first two sections I provide an outline of the chapter and describe the main characteristics of terrorism, as they are interpreted in the economic approach. In the third section, which represents the central part of the chapter, I discuss the most salient economic models of terrorist behavior, starting from models which analyze terrorism as a rational choice of organizations, i.e. Crenshaw (1990), Pape (2003) and Enders and Sandler (2002), continuing with models which analyze terrorism as a rational choice of individuals, i.e. Caplan (2006), Wintrobe (2002) and Azam (2005) and ending with models inspired from the economy of religion, i.e. Berman (2003), Berman and Laitin (2005) and Iannaccone (2006). In the fourth section I discuss three alternative directions which are of considerable significance in the economy of terrorism, namely economic modeling of terrorist tactics, economic approaches to the determinants of terrorism and economic approaches to the targets of terrorism.
Terrorist Threats on the Economic System and Combating Financing Terrorist Organizations
Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, 2019
The complexity of the current economic development environment in Europe, as a result of the extremist-terrorist phenomenon, coupled with the accentuation of the economic and technological differences among the world’s states, has generated and continues to generate new risks and threats to the communities of people. The attack on civilian targets in Europe, by members of criminal groups has resulted in casualties within human communities. Because some terrorist-extremist organizations are criminal groups that have a specific organization, logistics, specific training and education systems that cannot work without having material and financial resources. As a result, one of the most effective ways to fight the threat of terrorist organizations is to combat terrorism financing.