Reflective Knowledge (original) (raw)
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Theory and Research in Education, 2013
Virtue epistemologists hold that knowledge results from the display of epistemic virtues – open-mindedness, rigor, sensitivity to evidence, and the like. But epistemology cannot rest satisfied with a list of the virtues. What is wanted is a criterion for being an epistemic virtue. An extension of a formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative yields such a criterion. Epistemic agents should think of themselves as, and act as, legislating members of a realm of epistemic ends: they make the rules, devise the methods, and set the standards that bind them. The epistemic virtues are the traits of intellectual character that equip them to do so. Students then not only need to learn the standards, methods, and rules of the various disciplines, they also need to learn to think of themselves as, and how to behave as, legislating members of epistemic realms who are responsible for what they and their fellows believe. This requires teaching them to respect reasons, and to take themselves to be...
“ Daring to Believe ” : Epistemic Agency and Reflective Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology
2009
A feeling of paradox "Knowledge" refers to a theoretical achievement while "agency" refers to a practical one. They are achievements of a subject able to hold beliefs, to have purposes and to make judgments and choices. In both cases, too, the subject eventually needs to reflect about her own position in order to make an ending judgment or decision. By taking such reflective stance the agent gets a reason to make up her own mind and hence she reaches a result in a fully intentional way. Suppose that one is asked: "Do you know that?", or, "Can you help me?" If accepting the challenge, the addressee will bring about a conscious answer, yes or no; and such choice will demand from her a careful evaluation of her own cognitive position, or ability to help the requester respectively. Although the overall reflective process presents different facets, it is likely to suppose that some sort of self-knowledge should be available to such agent. However, this putative self-knowledge raises two controversial questions becoming the topic of a large amount of literature: the first is the supposedly transparency or luminosity of the states involved in the bringing about the asked answer (Williamson (2000). The second one, which precisely represents our main target in this paper, is a related question about what should be a necessary degree of integration for the faculties in charge of such reflective process. Since it is plausible to imagine that a non wellintegrated mind could conclude in a possible right belief, and, from a normative point of view, such belief still could fail in attaining theoretical or practical success, the problem of integration arises as a question of epistemological force. Our aim is to argue that integration is a main requirement, in addition to other virtuous traits of the
A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the reflective epistemic agency
Trans/Form/Ação
This paper aims to discuss one specific feature of Sosa's performance epistemology, which is what we call Reflective Epistemic Agency. We argue that Sosa defends a problematic version of epistemic agency on its reflective level. We contrast Sosa's idea of reflective epistemic agency with Proust's theory of metacognition to argue that the argument in favor of Reflective Epistemic Agency may lack some empirical plausibility, thus, it should be either revised or abandoned.
Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge
Erkenntnis (forthcoming), 2017
I argue that current discussions of the epistemological significance of reflection have entangled concerns about reflection with agential concerns. I begin by showing that a central strand of internalist criticism finds externalism unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a particular kind of self-knowledge, knowledge about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Identifying this internalist motivation as the desire for a kind of self-knowledge opens up new possibilities and suggests new conceptual resources. I employ one of these resources—Richard Moran’s distinction between the theoretical stance and the deliberative stance—to locate two types of reflection: mere reflective awareness of one’s attitudes and agent-awareness of one’s attitudes. I then examine Ernest Sosa’s account of the importance of reflection, showing how Moran’s distinction brings out the centrality of agential concerns in Sosa’s argument for reflective knowledge. I also consider briefly its relevance to fully apt knowledge. While I focus on Sosa’s epistemology, the point extends to internalism more generally.
XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2008
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind-world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that an internalist view of epistemic feelings is unable to account for the contrast between norm-tracking, educated sentiments, and illusory feelings.
Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2001
Taking a cue from Aristotle’s writings on ethics, an epistemology centered on the intellectual virtues has become popular recently. This type of virtue epistemology is motivated at least in part by its ability to account for epistemic agency (the capacities and practices involved in the pursuit of knowledge), so in the first section of this paper it is broadly sketched how such a view compares to the resources some other positions have for explaining agency. Section II takes up the relation of the virtues to other basic epistemological concepts (knowledge, most importantly). A schematic principle connecting the virtues to knowledge will be presented. Such a principle may be taken either as a criterion for knowledge or as an analysis of knowledge. In the third section, several problem cases will be posed that force amendments to the basic principle. In the fourth section, I will argue that, when amended to deal with these cases, an account based on the virtues becomes inadequate as an analysis of knowledge and of limited use as a criterion for knowledge. Finally, in section V the framework of a more complete theory of agency is outlined, as well as the implications of such a theory for the analysis of knowledge. Although the account is not entirely centered on them, the intellectual virtues may still be shown to play a vital role in our epistemic lives.
Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be employed to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified with the variety of actions characteristic of inquiry; that contrary to what has been maintained by recent pluralists about epistemic value, the only goal relevant to inquiry is that of forming true belief; and that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to implement epistemically paternalistic practices that constrain our freedom to exercise agency in substantial ways. For example, we are often better off by gathering only a very limited amount of information, having our selection of methods be greatly restricted, and spending our time less on reflecting than on simply reading off the output of a simple algorithm. In other words, when it comes to our freedom to express epistemic agency, more is not always better. In fact, less is often so much more.
Character Virtues, Epistemic Agency, and Reflective Knowledge
2015
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. Repository Citation Baehr, Jason, "Character Virtues, Epistemic Agency, and Reflective Knowledge" (2015). Philosophy Faculty Works. 19. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil\_fac/19
Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2018
It will be argued that personal agency, far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it will be claimed that what Sosa calls an epistemic perspective is necessary to solve the binding problem in epistemology at the three junctures at which it can occur: as the Pyrrhonian question of whether one can rationally endorse one's epistemic rationality; as the problem of the epistemic status of guessing; and as the enquiry into the contribution of the agential perspective for evading coincidental luck. Our aim has been that of elucidating and expanding Sosa's virtue perspectivism.