An ontology of meta-level categories (original) (raw)

1994, Principles of Knowledge …

AI-generated Abstract

This research presents an ontology of meta-level categories which seeks to address the structural limitations of traditional knowledge representation (KR) formalisms, particularly in distinguishing the implicit ontological commitments that arise during the development of knowledge bases. The authors argue that making clear ontological distinctions among logical predicates can enhance the expressiveness of KR systems and facilitate knowledge sharing across domains. Through the introduction of the notion of ontological levels, the paper outlines implications for the methodologies of conceptual design in data and knowledge base development.

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Formalizing Ontological Commitments

Formalizing the ontological commitment of a logical language means offering a way to specify the intended meaning of its vocabulary by constraining the set of its models, giving explicit information about the intended nature of the modelling primitives and their a priori relationships. We present here a formal definition of ontological commitment which aims to capture the very basic ontological assumptions about the intended domain, related to issues such as identity and internal structure. To tackle such issues, a modal framework endowed with mereo-topological primitives has been adopted. The paper is mostly based on a revisitation of philosophical (and linguistic) literature in the perspective of knowledge representation. 1 Introduction First order logic is notoriously neutral with respect to ontological choices: when a logical language is used with the purpose of modelling a particular aspect of reality, the set M of all its models is usually much larger than the set M i of the i...

Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics

Synthese, 2013

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view O and wants to interpret a formal language L, a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for L in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with O. Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. In those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, thus showing how we can quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. More generally I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and how metaphysical questions can be correctly treated, in those semantics, as simple questions of logic.

Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logic

Synthese, December 2013, DOI : 10.1007/s11229-013-0387-9

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view O and wants to interpret a formal language L, a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for L in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with O. Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification. I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism. In those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, thus showing how we can quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. More generally I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and how metaphysical questions can be correctly treated, in those semantics, as simple questions of logic.

Formalised Elementary Formal Ontology

2002

Formal ontology, as the science of the formal relations that structure reality as a whole, aims at a theory of categories corresponding to the most general features of possible objects, whether existing or non-existing. The present paper is an attempt to summarise and extend recent research in analytical metaphysics in a formalised theory of objects. Existence is characterised as a formal property, suggesting that the use of quantifiers alone does not involve any existential assumptions about the objects quantified over. However, the only non-existing objects allowed for in the present account are real or objective possibilities. De re modalities as well as ontological dependence are defined on the basis of a counterpart-theoretic specification of possibilia. The present framework allows for necessary and non-relative identity as well as for a granular parthood relationship satisfying the thesis of composition as partial identity. The paper culminates in the formalisation of an Aris...

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