On being objective and being objectified (original) (raw)

Commentary on " Feminist Reasoning About Reason

2018

Dr. Makus's carefully researched paper recognizes significant tensions among feminist accounts of theory and practice, in particular problems in postmodern feminist critiques of reason. Her formulation of the "masculinist" bias of reason, of which formal logic has been seen as the highest expression, draws upon existing critiques skillfully drawn by many philosophers. The abstraction, god's eye objectivity, neutrality, and positivistic character of a disembodied, nonnatural faculty of reason, are aptly summarized in her paper, and carry the weight of much feminist critique. Ingrid outlines three forms of feminism. The first, feminism of sameness-often called feminism of equality-has as its primary goal a recognition that males and females do not differ in capacity, character, or ability; women should be incorporated into the category of humanity without remainder. The second-feminism of difference-a view which provides the means whereby the aspects of humanity which have been devalued since classical times, and which have symbolically appeared in multiple exclusions of women, are given positive status; for example, bodiliness, particularity, emotions, nature. The difference in question is difference from men, difference from the homogeneity of humanity, which is regarded as "male". Ingrid identifies a third form, postmodern feminism-as the most comprehensive critique of western reason. The elements which overlap in postmodernist critiques are "deconstruction", along with a repudiation of (1) the stable coherent natural self (2) the ideals of a privileged white male elite and (3) the power exerted over others by this knower-this last as crucial to the critique of reason. She notices that postmodern feminists are self-critical, intending to avoid the oppressive practices so easily replicated under the hegemonic views of the knower and reason, which "marginalize and oppress those whose lives, experiences and situations are not included in the theoretical formulations of the "knower". But she suggests that postmodernism cannot but fail in its political strategies, that a feminism of sameness might be a more productive route for feminists, since postmodern feminism results in either no politics, or a politics of difference which advises that "care" extend to as many as possible.

Circles of Reason: Some Feminist Reflections on Reason and Rationality

Episteme, 2005

Rationality and reason are topics so fraught for feminists that any useful reflection on them requires some prior exploration of the difficulties they have caused. One of those difficulties for feminists and, I suspect, for others in the margins of modernity, is the rhetoric of reason – the ways reason is bandied about as a qualification differentially bestowed on different types of person. Rhetorically, it functions in different ways depending on whether it is being denied or affirmed. In this paper, I want to explore these rhetorics of reason as they are considered in the work of two feminist philosophers. I shall draw on their work for some suggestions about how to think about rationality, and begin to use those suggestions to develop a constructive account that withstands the rhetorical temptations.

Objectivity and the Space of Reasons

Why and How We Give and Ask for Reasons, 2024

This chapter explores the relation between two capacities whose development enables the kind of self-conscious thinking that we humans are capable of. (1) We can assess our judgements with a view to whether they get things right. (2) We can also assess them with a view to reasons for or against them. A common view seems to be that (1) is more basic and makes (2) possible. Michael Tomasello's recent account of their ontogeny seems to lean towards this view. I articulate three considerations that, taken together, suggest a more symmetrical account: namely, any grip on thoughts as objectively correct always already involves some grip on them as located in a space of reasons. On the view I urge, a basic grip on both correctness and reasons is embodied in discursive abilities, and both of these grips co-develop from simpler, pre-reflective forms towards increasingly complex, reflective forms of understanding.

(Philosophia_2023) Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality

2023

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.

A Puzzle about Reasons and Rationality

Journal of Ethics, 2017

According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality, where the latter is assumed to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons. In this paper, it is argued that subjectivism is able capture an ordinary, non-technical, sense of ‘rational’ whereas objectivism is not. The basic reason is that objectivism fails to account for the essential connection between rationality, malfunctioning, and rational criticism. This means that we face a puzzle: While objectivism appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons, it fails to capture a central sense of ‘rational’. It is finally argued that this puzzle can be solved by abandoning the standard claim about the link between reasons and rationality.

Reason is not objectivity: A response to Julian Baggini's narrowly rational criteria for objectivity

In terms of our total response to the world, reason provides only the tip of the iceberg of the ways in which we can improve our adequacy and objectivity. A variety of recent advances make the limitations of reason increasingly clear. My aim here is to show how these advances undermine the model of ‘reason’ as the basis of objectivity that is still being assumed by many analytic philosophers and naturalistic scientists. This is done through a critical analysis of the 'five characteristics of the objective' used by Julian Baggini in his recent book 'The Edge of Reason', as typifying this approach.