How to Derive Aristotle’s Categories from First Principles (original) (raw)
Related papers
Aristotle’s Category Construction and the Why Behind It
2015
Aristotle’s Categoriae, or the Categories, is a comprehensive classification system for every object of human understanding that can be either a subject or a predicate of a proposition. There are ten categories: Substance, Quantity, Qualification, Relative/Relation, Place, Time, Position, State (Condition), Action, and Affection. The first part of this paper will explain each of the categories in the order in which they are presented in the chapters of Categoriae. The second half of the paper will discuss the question of ambiguity in the approach Aristotle uses to both construct and find meaning in these categories. Fr. Joseph Owens examines the use of metaphysical, logical and grammatical ways in which Aristotle presents the categories. Owens observes the benefits and disadvantages of Aristotle’s mixed approach, and questions the usefulness of the system as a whole. This paper will argue that Aristotle successfully uses all three approaches, sometimes separately and sometimes in co...
2018
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
Ontological Structures in Aristotle
1988
According to the traditional view of the Categories, the ten "categories" are the highest genera of beings. Each of them stands at the head of a tree-like division of the the items falling under it; this division is also sometimes called a "category". The metaphysical structure made up of these ten divisions is the "system of the categories". According to the traditional view, the system of the categories is very rigidly laid out. Not only is every being included in the structure, but every being has exactly one location. Each being is predicated essentially of those below it along the lines of division. Each being is related to those above it, if any, as a determination of them, and to those below it, if any, as a determinable. Because of these facts, the full analysis of the essence of any being can be gotten by stringing together the names of all the beings superior to it in the division, along with a final differentia. But this traditional view is very widely off the mark. In the first place, it is important to realize what a remarkable achievement the system of the categories as traditionally conceived would have been, if Aristotle had in fact achieved it. Plato in the late dialogues raises the specter that division leads to chaos: dismayingly many Forms are closely interwoven with dismayingly many others; some Forms are interwoven with all others. The number of different divisions which lead to any given Form is dismayingly large. Clearly, one óf the tasks the early Academy faced was to make order of this mess. The distinction in the Sophist between essential and non-essential predication was one tool invented for this purpose; the Academic distinction between the categories ti and prosti was another. For Aristotle to have developed criteria powerful enough to uniquely determine a single structure of divisions of everything there is-to have solved this problem completelywould have been extraordinary. Moreover, on the traditional view Aristotle's achievement is even more extraordinary than this. Since the work of Emst Kapp in the first half of this century it has been recognized that a major source of Aristotle's theory of categories is his research into "topics"-into classes of terms-or things-such that the members of each class share certain logical properties which are useful in constructing arguments. Armed with a theory of topics, one need only determine into which class a thing belongs in order to know what its most important properties are. Topics 1,9 introduces a theory of categories as part of the theory of topics. As Michael Frede has shown, the categories in the Topics are kinds of predicates or predications, whereas in the Categories we have to do with kinds of thing. But in the Categories Aristotle is careful to discuss the logical properties of each "category": whether it admits of contraries or not, whether it varies in degree, and so on. Somehow, the theory of kinds of thing in the Categories seems to be a development of the theory of kinds of predicate or predication in the Topics. If this is accepted, then, when it is combined with the traditional interpretation, we get the following thesis: the project of organizing beings in terms of genus and species into their ultimate divisions, and the project of groupings things according to their basic logical properties, coincide in their results. The same ultimate classes are arrived at by these two very different inquiries. If Aristotle did claim this for his theory of categories, then he claimed a very strong and remarkable result Of course, Aristotle was an extraordinary man. But one important sign that he did not take himself to have accomplished all that the traditional interpretation ascribed to him is his famous uncertainty over the number of categories. Sometimes Aristotle gives the number of categories as ten, smetimes as eight, and sometimes as six. It is unlikely that a person who was in a position to be certain that all being can be fitted into one unique division could be so unsure of how many basic divisions there are. Apart from this general misgiving, the traditional interpretation of the Categories faces obstacles in the text itself. The first of these is the well-known problem of the status of the differentiae. At Categories 3a21-28 and a33-b9, we are told that not only substances but also differentiae are said of, but not in their subjects. From this it follows, we are told, that the definitions, not only of substances, but also of their differentiae, are predicated of their subjects. Despite their similarity to substance, however, differentiae are ¡¡Q l substances; the text is clear on this. What are the implications of these remarks? First, they prove that the said of/present in distinction was not intended by Aristotle as by itself sufficient for the construction of the system of categories. Being said of a subject, being present in a subject, and their negations give one sufficient criterion to distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, and provide a help toward distinguishing substance from non-substance. But that is all. Differentiae are not substances, so they are not in the category of substance. But differentiae are beings, and many if not all of them are uncompounded, so they must be in some category or other. So many, if not all, differentiae will be in non-substance categories: perhaps chiefly quality, but others as well. Presumably items in other categories are defined in a manner similar to substance, through genus and differentia. Pale=penetrative color is a favorite Aristotelian example. But if the definitions of differentiae are predicable of whatever they are said of, and they are said of substances, then the definitions of substances are expandable in two ways: by further definitional analysis of the genus, and by further definitional analysis of the differentiae. The differentiae mentioned in the definitions of the differentiae must themselves have a place in the structure of the categories, presumably a rather different place from that of what they help to define, and they must themselves be definable. So a complete analysis of the definition of any item, substantial or not, while 12 Since substance is not divided into kinds in this text, it is unsafe to say how it would have been divided. Given the changes which Aristotle's view of substance underwent in the meantime. Metaphysics Delta 8 is not a safe guide. In Chapter 15 "having" does seem to be divided into kinds by means of differentiae. But as these differentiae include substance, defenders of the traditional interpretation will not want to count it as a discussion of the category "having".
Systems of Predication. Aristotle’s Categories in Topics I 9
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 2016
In this paper I investigate Aristotle’s account of predication in Topics I 9. I argue that in this chapter Aristotle (i) presents two systems of predication cutting across each other, in order to distinguish them and explore their mutual relationship. I propose a semantic interpretation of this relationship. Further, Aristotle (ii) explains the connection between these two systems and the ten items listed in Chapter 4 of the Categories.
Categorization' as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics
Vivarium, 1988
The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb 'kategorein' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b) 'nonstatemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure. 7 Katigorein and katêgoria in Aristotle Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category'
Predication in Aristotle's Categories: A Response to Plato's Theory of Forms
2021
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last Name: Zeynep DURAN