Panentheism and its neighbors (original) (raw)

The Image of God in Western (Christian) Panentheism: A Critical Evaluation from the Point of View of Classical Theism

Sophia, 2022

A considerable group of contemporary philosophers and theologians-including those engaged in the science-theology dialogue, such as Barbour, Clayton, Davies, and Peacocke-support panentheism, i.e., a theistic position which assumes that the world is in God, who is yet greater than everything he created. They see it as a balanced middle ground between the positions of classical theism and pantheism. In this article I offer a presentation and a critical evaluation of the most fundamental principles of panentheism from the point of view of classical theism. First, I list six main species of panentheism and the motivations of those who support it. In the second part I analyze the three main difficulties concerning its ontological and theological principles, i.e., (1) the meaning of the preposition "in" (en) in "panentheism"; (2) the accuracy of panentheistic definition of divine immanence, and (3) the question of whether panentheism is successful in protecting God's transcendence. I conclude that panentheism fails as a Christian theistic position. Nevertheless, it might still be valuable and play an important role in addressing the cognitive drama of the modern man, oftentimes seduced by secular (scientific) or spiritual naturalism, or pantheism.

How to prove the existence of God: an argument for conjoined panentheism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2018

This article offers an argument for a form of panentheism in which the divine is conceived as both 'God the World' and 'God the Good'. 'God the World' captures the notion that the totality of everything which exists is 'in' God, while acknowledging that, given evil and suffering, not everything is 'of' God. 'God the Good' encompasses the idea that God is also the universal concept of Goodness, akin to Plato's Form of the Good as developed by Iris Murdoch, which is inextricably conjoined with God the World because it is the nature of the world which determines the nature of perfect Goodness. This form of 'conjoined' panentheism yields a concept of divine personhood which includes both divine agency and human/divine engagement. God the Good is an agent of change by providing human persons with a standard of Goodness against which to measure the goodness of their own actions, while God the World provides the physical embodiment through which God acts. Human engagement with the divine may take a number of forms and may lead to moral action, the means by which the divine acts upon the world and changes it for the better.

Where in the World is God? Philosophical and Biblical Evaluations of Panentheism

2019

This paper attempts to define panentheism in general and introduces a variety of panentheistic God-World models. It traces some of the historical roots and attempts to explain its appeal. From a thomistic perspective, it gives a philosophical evaluation of panentheism with a focus on metaphysics. With a mildly-Calvinistic and evangelical Christian perspective, it also attempts to evaluate some of the biblical data for and against panentheistic God-World models.

The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism

In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation.

Panentheism is Still Vague: A Reply to Lataster and Bilimoria

Journal of World Philosophies, 2019

In a recent paper on panentheism, Raphael Lataster and Purushottama Bilimoria offer a critique of several contemporary attempts to define what panentheism is and what panentheism is not. Lataster and Bilimoria find the recent attempts to define panentheism deficient. In particular, they find my approach to panentheism to be riddled with problems. In my reply, I explain that Lataster and Bilimoria have failed to explain what panentheism is and what it is not. Raphael Lataster and Purushottama Bilimoria's recent article, "Panentheism(s): What It Is and Is Not," attempts to offer a description of what panentheism is. 1 This is an important goal because panentheism is a notoriously vague position that fails to demarcate itself from well-defined rival models of God. As Benedikt Paul Göcke points out, there appears to be no clear paradigm for what counts as panentheism. 2 Lataster and Bilimoria would seem to agree when they assert that recent attempts to define panentheism fail to adequately capture this model of God. I am sympathetic to this assertion because I have previously argued that many of the recent attempts to clearly demarcate panentheism from its rivals have failed. 3 However, Lataster and Bilimoria find my arguments wanting, and assert that they have offered a clear definition of what panentheism is. A bit of background is necessary to understand the debate. In my previous work, I identify the Demarcation Problem, which says that panentheism cannot distinguish itself from well-established and clearly articulated rival models of God such as classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. These other models of God have clearly stated what they are and what they are not. To be sure, there is a range of diversity of views within each model, but the diversity within each model of God is unified by unique claims about God that are not contained within other rival models. In setting up the Demarcation Problem, I explain what the unique claims are of each model of God, then ask what are the unique defining claims of panentheism that demarcates it from its rivals. I consider several different attempts to avoid the Demarcation Problem, and argue that each fails to establish any unique claims for panentheism-thus calling into question if panentheism is even a model of God. For example, I consider contemporary panentheists, such as Philip Clayton and Benedikt Paul Göcke, who recognize this taxonomy of models of God and try to demarcate panentheism accordingly. 4 Their awareness of this problem and the various rival models of God is one reason why I focus on their attempts to avoid the Demarcation Problem in my previous work (Mullins 2016). I consider Clayton's attempt to demarcate panentheism from pantheism, and argue that his attempt fails, thus collapsing panentheism into pantheism. I also consider Göcke's attempt to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, and argue that his account of panentheism collapses into classical theism. This leaves us with no identifiable thing that one can call panentheism.

Panentheism and Panpsychism

Panentheism and Panpsychism, 2020

Two great forms of unity metaphysics enjoy energetic discussion in the current debates of philosophy and theology. Firstly, panpsychism as a naturalistic, non-reductive ontology of mind has gained ground in the analytic philosophy of mind over the last 25 years. Additionally, and dating back to early 20th century, panentheism has found use in theology and the analytic philosophy of religion to describe the relationship between God and the world. This volume is the first attempt to create an anthology of the more recent history of philosophy and theology, and aims to bring these two research directions together in an interdisciplinary conversation. Our aim is to examine the benefits which panpsychism and panentheism offer to one another; which problem-solving proposals are made possible by a synthesis of the two; and where the limitations of their interplay need to be demarcated.

Ancient and contemporary expressions of panentheism

Philosophy Compass, 2017

Panentheism has been one major view of God and the God‐world relation for many centuries. It is a middle view between classical theism on the one hand and pantheism on the other. This essay examines several expressions of panentheism. It begins with two ancient expressions, one by Plotinus and the other by Ramanuja. It then considers some reasons for the rise of panentheism in recent decades. One example of this rise is Charles Hartshorne's dipolar expression. After exploring Hartshorne's view, the article concludes by noting several objections to panentheism.