Why should any body have a self? (original) (raw)
Related papers
Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review
Consciousness and Cognition, 2014
Viewing the brain as an organ of approximate Bayesian inference can help us understand how it represents the self. We suggest that inferred representations of the self have a normative function: to predict and optimise the likely outcomes of social interactions. Technically, we cast this predict-and-optimise as maximising the chance of favourable outcomes through active inference. Here the utility of outcomes can be conceptualised as prior beliefs about final states. Actions based on interpersonal representations can therefore be understood as minimising surprise -under the prior belief that one will end up in states with high utility. Interpersonal representations thus serve to render interactions more predictable, while the affective valence of interpersonal inference renders self-perception evaluative. Distortions of self-representation contribute to major psychiatric disorders such as depression, personality disorder and paranoia. The approach we review may therefore operationalise the study of interpersonal representations in pathological states.
Noûs
An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses.
Bolis Schilbach 2017 Beyond one Bayesian brain
In their thought-provoking and integrative target article Fotopoulou and Tsakiris cut across different bodies of literature to argue for a second-person account of interoception and social cognition. More specifically, they argue for the constitutive role of embodied social interactions in the development of interoceptive abilities and the ability for self-other differentiation. Furthermore, they review evidence to suggest that social interactions have a specific role in binding together subjective feeling states with the perception of the body and the (social) world. Along this line of reasoning, they refer to predictive coding and active inference frameworks of the 'Bayesian brain' function to suggest that basic inferential processes of embodied perception and action may be turned into more advanced forms of social understanding. We applaud Fotopoulou and Tsakiris for advocating a second-person account of social cognition and for connecting the predictive coding account of interoception to the dynamics of social interaction conceptually. We discuss these contributions in light of the existing literature and encourage the authors to be more precise about the computational processes, which they suggest may connect social interaction and interoception at the individual level. Furthermore, we describe a multilevel Bayesian framework that could be used to formally test a proposal, such as the one discussed by the authors, but also allows for going beyond one Bayesian brain, by modeling interpersonal processes during social interaction.
Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self
This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. I proceed in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of the cognitive self of the sort CPC offers, one that accommodates variety in the kinds of mechanism that, when integrated, constitute a cognitive system (and thus the cognitive self), to a theory according to which the cognitive self is composed of essentially one kind of thing, for instance, prediction-error minimization mechanisms. The final section focuses on one of the core functions of the cognitive self: to engage in conscious reasoning. It is argued that the phenomenon of conscious, deliberate reasoning poses an apparently insoluble problem for a PP-based view, one that seems to rest on a deep structural limitation of predictive-processing models. In a nutshell, conscious reasoning is a single-stream phenomenon, but, in order for PP to apply, two streams of activity must be involved, a prediction stream and an input stream. Thus, with regard to the question of the nature of the self, PP-based views must yield to an alternative approach, regardless of whether proponents of the predictive processing, as a comprehensive theory of cognition, can handle the various empirical challenges canvassed in preceding sections.
Cognitive neuroscience, 2015
What is the self? This is a question that has long been discussed in (western) philosophy where the self is traditionally conceived a higher-order function at the apex or pinnacle of all functions. This tradition has been transferred to recent neuroscience where the self is often considered to be a higher-order cognitive function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. However other lines of research demonstrate a close and intimate relationship between self-specificity and more basic functions like perceptions, emotions and reward. This paper focuses on the relationship between self-specificity and other basic functions relating to emotions, reward, and perception. I propose the basis model that conceives self-specificity as a fundamental feature of the brain's spontaneous activity. This is supported by recent findings showing rest-self overlap in midline regions as well as findings demonstrating that the resting state can predict subsequent degrees of self-specifi...
Ethology and Sociobiology, 1989
In the last three decades we have seen the pendulum of scientific fashion rapidly swinging away from the austere tenents of behaviorist doctrines and back towards the legitimization of the inner life of the mind. In its wake it has brought with it both a renewed interest in "innate knowledge"-ranging from the linguistics of Noam Chomsky to the sociobiological theorizing of E. 0. Wilson-and an exploding science of cognition-ranging from the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget to the serious consideration of animal thinking by Donald Griffin. This revolution is also cross-pollinated by the all-pervading growth of the information sciences, especially by research in artificial intelligence. As a result whole realms of investigation which hitherto have been only the province of philosophers are now becoming serious concerns of scientists in many fields. In this context a book by two of the most influential scholars of our time purporting to provide a new approach to the relationship between the mind and brain should be greeted with great excitement. Sir Karl Popper and Sir John Eccles, each of whom is without peer in their respective fields (the philosophy of science and neurophysiology, respectively), bring into focus the most central and least understood problem in the study of cognition: the nature of the self. To this problem they each bring their enormous talents and complementary backgrounds, as well as providing their readers with a glimpse of their lively conversations on the topic. Here is an opportunity to observe two great minds at work critically reviewing the many philosophical perspectives and neuropsychological findings bearing on the problem. They have brought together a wealth of information from two very different disciplines and have made them accessible to a wide audience. Both writers have approached their subject with a sense of perspective and reflection that provides a rich sense of their personal involvement with the problem. Both have the gift of writing in a casual and nontechnical style, often rapidly summarizing complex topics in a few paragraphs, without completely sacrificing the subtlety of the arguments or losing the narrative flow amidst a flurry of technical jargon. Unfortunately, those readers who are looking for a fresh and powerful new vision of this question will be disappointed at yet another footnote to Plato and Descartes dressed up in antireductionist and neurophysiological terminology. The book is organized into three distinct sections. The first section, by Popper, presents his theory of mind-body interactionism, including an explanation of his three-world system and a critical survey of the mind-body Ethology and Sociobiology
The ‘prediction imperative’ as the basis for self-awareness
Here, we propose that global brain function is geared towards the implementation of intelligent motricity. Motricity is the only possible external manifestation of nervous system function (other than endocrine and exocrine secretion and the control of vascular tone).
Subjectivity, 2010
Although explanations of human social behavior based directly on the activities of neurons in the brain are pervasive and entrenched in the natural sciences, scholars in the humanities and social sciences are not agreed about how to critique this new knowledge. ...
Is the Brain an Organ for Prediction Error Minimization
An influential body of research in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind asserts that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. I clarify how this hypothesis should be understood, and I consider a prominent attempt to justify it, according to which prediction error minimization in the brain is a manifestation of a more fundamental imperative in all self-organizing systems to minimize (variational) free energy. I argue that this justification fails. The sense in which all self-organizing systems can be said to minimize free energy according to the free energy principle is fundamentally different from the alleged sense in which brains minimize prediction error. Thus, even if the free energy principle is true, it provides no support for a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction error minimization - or any other substantive theory of brain function.