Process traces of binary choices: Evidence for selective and adaptive decision heuristics (original) (raw)
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Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 2000
Levin and Jasper's (1995) phased narrowing technique for tracking changes in information usage across successive stages of the decision-making process was combined with Huneke's (1996) "pull-down menu" extension of Payne, Bettman, and Johnson's (1988) software package for generating measures of information processing. Because this technique provided considerable data for each individual subject at each stage, we were able to focus on individual differences in information processing across stages, most notably differences related to need for cognition (NC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). In a computerized information search and decision task, 60 college students were first asked to narrow their options for purchasing a notebook computer to form a consideration set and were then asked to make a final choice from this set. At the consideration set formation stage, half the subjects were instructed to adopt a mindset to include options while the other half were asked to e...
Individual differences in adaptive choice strategies
Research in Economics, 2003
Individual differences in compensatory and non-compensatory choice processes remain an unresolved issue for decision process researchers. This study investigates the stability and nature of individual differences in choice processes when individuals adapt to changes in the structure of the choice environment, namely the correlation among the choice attributes. By means of process tracing techniques, between-subjects differences in choice processing (option-based or attribute based) were found to be stable across different tasks. Individuals with higher openness to experience and ability to solve reasoning tasks were found to be more adaptive, that is to switch more promptly their choice process in adaptive ways, by using more option-based search strategies when attributes were negatively related. These results suggest that insight into individual differences in choice processes can be gained when attention is given to the structure of the choice task and to how decision makers adapt to it in the course of the choice task.
Ignorance or integration: the cognitive processes underlying choice behavior
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2009
The fast-and-frugal heuristic framework assumes noncompensatory tools for human preferences (i.e., priority heuristic) and inferences (i.e., take the best heuristic). According to this framework, these heuristics predict choice behavior as well as model the cognitive processes underlying such behavior. The current paper presents two studies that juxtapose predictions derived from these two simple heuristics with alternative predictions derived from compensatory principles. Dependent measures that included reaction time, choice pattern, confidence level, and accuracy were better predicted by compensatory indices than by noncompensatory indices. These findings suggest that people do not rely on limited arguments only, but tend to integrate all acquired information into their choice processes. This tendency was replicated even when the experimental task facilitated the use of noncompensatory principles. We argue that the fast and frugal heuristics can predict the final outcome only under certain conditions, but even in these particular situations they are not applicable to the processes underlying choice behavior. An integrative model for choice behavior is proposed that better represents the data.
As reflected in the amount of controversy, few areas in psychology have undergone such dramatic conceptual changes in the past decade as the emerging science of heuristics. Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information. Because using heuristics saves effort, the classical view has been that heuristic decisions imply greater errors than do "rational" decisions as defined by logic or statistical models. However, for many decisions, the assumptions of rational models are not met, and it is an empirical rather than an a priori issue how well cognitive heuristics function in an uncertain world. To answer both the descriptive question ("Which heuristics do people use in which situations?") and the prescriptive question ("When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make better judgments?"), formal models are indispensable. We review research that tests formal models of heuristic inference, including in business organizations, health care, and legal institutions. This research indicates that (a) individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and (b) ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information, for instance for low predictability and small samples. The big future challenge is to develop a systematic theory of the building blocks of heuristics as well as the core capacities and environmental structures these exploit.
Dimensions of decision-making: An evidence-based classification of heuristics and biases
Personality and Individual Differences, 2018
Traditionally, studies examining decision-making heuristics and biases (H&B) have focused on aggregate effects using between-subjects designs in order to demonstrate violations of rationality. Although H&B are often studied in isolation from others, emerging research has suggested that stable and reliable individual differences in rational thought exist, and similarity in performance across tasks are related, which may suggest an underlying phenotypic structure of decision-making skills. Though numerous theoretical and empirical classifications have been offered, results have been mixed. The current study aimed to clarify this research question. Participants (N = 289) completed a battery of 17 H&B tasks, assessed with a within-subjects design, that we selected based on a review of prior empirical and theoretical taxonomies. Exploratory and confirmatory analyses yielded a solution that suggested that these biases conform to a model composed of three dimensions: Mindware gaps, Valuation biases (i.e., Positive Illusions and Negativity effect), and Anchoring and Adjustment. We discuss these findings in relation to proposed taxonomies and existing studies on individual differences in decision-making.
Understanding contingent choice: a computer simulation approach
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1990
When making choices, people use a variety of information processing strategies, contingent upon a number of task and context variables. An approach to investigating contingent decision behavior using an effort/accuracy framework, production system modeling of decision strategies, and Monte-Carlo simulation to explore the interactions of task properties with decision heuristics (strategies) is illustrated. The simulation results suggest that the contingent use of choice heuristics may often yield relatively high levels of decision accurary with substantial savings in effort. The paper ends with a discussion of how the use of heuristics may vary during the course of the decision episodeas the structure of the task is learned. In addition, ways to opportunistically exploit the task sstructure simplify processing while still producing good decisions are identified.
Health Economics, 2002
It has been suggested that individuals employ simple decision heuristics when answering stated preference questions. Evidence from discrete choice experiments of individuals failing to trade may indicate that they employ simple decision making heuristics. However, individuals might not trade because their preferences are not captured by the range of trade-offs they are offered. This is explored by offering a series of choices where the trade-offs implied by subsequent choices depend on the subject's responses to previous choices. The results suggest that individuals answer discrete choices without recourse to simplifying heuristics, and that information is generated on their preferences rather than on how they make such choices.
Embedding multiple heuristics into choice models: An exploratory analysis
Journal of Choice Modelling, 2012
Contrary to the usual assumption of fixed, well-defined and context independent preferences, individuals are likely to approach a choice task using rules and heuristics that are dependent on the choice environment. More specifically, heuristics that are defined by the local choice context, such as the gains or losses of an attribute value relative to the other attributes, seem to matter significantly. Recent empirical findings also demonstrate that previous choices made by respondents and previous choice tasks shown to respondents can affect the current choice outcome, indicating a form of interdependence across choice sets. This paper reviews some of the key findings about heuristics and decision rules across the psychology, marketing, transport and environmental disciplines. Using experimental data in the context of a proposed toll road, we find that for certain components of the time and cost attributes, allowing for non-linearity and for referencing to the least desired attribute level in the local choice set offers improvement over the standard linear-in-theattributes and linear-in-the-parameters specification. Other heuristics, including the majority of confirming dimensions and reference point revision can also be embedded into the model. An alternative approach to identifying and weighting multiple heuristics in a utility function by means of a logit-type specification for the weights is then introduced. While acknowledging the need for more work in this area, we suggest that such an approach may be a useful way of testing what happens when multiple heuristics are "mixed" in the model.
Embedding Decision Heuristics in Discrete Choice Models: A Review
Transport Reviews, 2012
Contrary to the usual assumption of fixed, well-defined preferences, it is increasingly evident that individuals are likely to approach a choice task using rules and decision heuristics that are dependent on the choice environment. More specifically, heuristics that are defined by the local choice context, such as the gains or losses of an attribute value relative to the other attributes, seem to be consistently employed. Recent empirical findings also demonstrate that previous choices and previously encountered choice tasks shown to respondents can affect the current choice outcome, indicating a form of interdependence across choice sets. This paper is primarily focused on reviewing how heuristics have been modelled in stated choice data. The paper begins with a review of the heuristics that may be relevant for coping with choice task complexity and then proceeds to discuss some modelling approaches. Next, relational heuristics, such as prospect theory, random regret minimisation and extremeness aversion (compromise effect) are discussed. These are heuristics which operate within the local choice set. Another major class of heuristics reviewed in this paper pertains to ordering effects and more generally, on past outcomes and past attribute levels of the alternatives.
Fast or Frugal, but Not Both: Decision Heuristics Under Time Pressure
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Heuristics are simple, yet effective, strategies that people use to make decisions. Because heuristics do not require all available information, they are thought to be easy to implement and to not tax limited cognitive resources, which has led heuristics to be characterized as fast-and-frugal. We question this monolithic conception of heuristics by contrasting the cognitive demands of two popular heuristics, Tallying and Take-the-Best. We contend that heuristics that are frugal in terms of information usage may not always be fast because of the attentional control required to implement this focus in certain contexts. In support of this hypothesis, we find that Take-the-Best, while being more frugal in terms of information usage, is slower to implement and fares worse under time pressure manipulations than Tallying. This effect is then reversed when search costs for Take-the-Best are reduced by changing the format of the stimuli. These findings suggest that heuristics are heterogeneous and should be unpacked according to their cognitive demands to determine the circumstances a heuristic best applies.