Is It Putin or Is It Oil? Explaining Russia's Fiscal Recovery (original) (raw)
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This paper is dedicated to the memory of Yegor Gaidar, who founded the Gaidar Institute and for whom fiscal sustainability and responsibility was of paramount importance. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19608.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.