Viewing Power flow in an Electricity Market as Confluence of Stable Multilateral Trades (original) (raw)
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Coordination of multilateral trades in electricity markets via power vectors
European Transactions on Electrical Power, 2011
A transmission restructure model is presented, which resolves line abuse, conflict of incentives and information asymmetry in electricity markets. It uses market compatible game theory, graph theory, market mechanism, multilateral trade structure, etc. rather than conventional tools. The model is useful to emulate any active, competitive transmission sector. It has more relevance in countries like India with high T&D loss and power deficit problems. Cooperative game theory (CGT) is holistically applied in organizational, operational, commercial and planning aspects of restructure. A three phase CGT environment to model entity interactions, an elastic transmission service charge (TSC) to penalize abuse and a powerful power vector to resolve information asymmetry are some proposals developed in this context. In the scheme, Discos use power vectors to play the game and negotiate for agreeable TSC share and engineer fruitful mergers. A stable set of coalitions contracting optimal trades at lowest TSC is finally obtained. The method is illustrated on a 5 bus and successfully tested on a 24 bus Indian power system. The outcome is that agents aggregate sequentially, to safeguard network security as a common agenda, despite market activities starting at diverse locations. These results are important because transmission is the most difficult zone to model in electricity markets due to several issues and this model addresses most of them. Copyright
Modeling transmission sector of electricity markets is a challenge due to issues like violation of network operating limits, information asymmetry and conflict of incentives. A model that addresses these concerns is a significant solution because it integrates the power business seamlessly when transmission also is competitive. In this paper, a model for transmission zone restructure is proposed. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is also presented. Using this TSC as a common incentive or coalition value, transmission is modeled in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors and information asymmetry is resolved. The method when applied to a 24 bus Indian power system gave a set of trades addressing above concerns.
Power Vector Coordination of Socially Stable Multilateral Trades
2008 Joint International Conference on Power System Technology and IEEE Power India Conference, 2008
This paper presents a new set of methodologies and tools to implement multilateral trades in a restructured electricity market. Loss minimization is made an objective, realized through elasticized transmission charge. This charge is designed to acts as a financial instrument that penalizes deviation from least loss formulation. To reduce its impact coalition formation is envisaged in a cooperative game theory environment. Power vectors are derived to guide coalitions. Marginal vectors are used as socially stable pay-off vectors to share the charges. This model that exemplifies an electricity market is proposed as most suitable since all aspects are based on market engineering principles. A five bus power system is used to illustrate the suitability. Index Terms INSPEC Controlled Indexing game theory , power markets , power transmission economics Non Controlled Indexing cooperative game theory , electricity market , financial instruments , five bus power system , power vector coordination , socially stable multilateral trades , transmission charge
Competition and Cooperation in a Bidding Model of Electrical Energy Trade
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2015
A cooperative game-theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical-energy providers in the wholesale market considering price-preference rational consumers. We study the physical and economic aspects of the power transmission system operation focussing on the incentives for group formation. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the network is lossless and is operated by an independent network operator who ensures network stability and fulfillment of consumption needs while taking into account the preferences of consumers over generators. We show that cooperation of generators may be necessary to divert consumers from their previous providers. In the second part of the paper we assume an iterative process in which the generators publish their price offers simultaneously, based on which the consumers preferences are determined. We study the dynamics of the prices and profits as the system evolves in time while each coalition is trying to maximize its expected profit in each step. The model deals with network congestion and n − 1 line-contingency reliability as not every generator-consumer matching is allowed to ensure the safe operation of the transmission system. The profit of the generators is determined as the dif-This work was supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Programme (LP-004/2010), by the Hungarian National Fund (OTKA NF-104706) and by the Fund KAP-1.2-14/001.
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2003
In this paper we provide a simulations-based demonstration of a hybrid electricity market that combines the distributed competitive advantages of decentralized markets with the system security guarantees of centralized markets. In this market, the transmission service provider (TSP) guides an electricity market towards the optimal power flow (OPF) solution, even when maximizing its own revenue. End users negotiate with each other to determine an energy price and then submit separate bids for transmission to the TSP. The TSP returns with prices for transmission, allowing end users to respond. In simulations, this hybrid-decentralized market approaches the near-optimal results of fully coordinated and constrained markets. Additionally, this market exhibits properties that remove incentives for the TSP to withhold capacity. This hybrid market leads a market towards the optimum while allowing the TSP and the end users to act out of self-interest.
Lying generators: manipulability of centralized payoff mechanisms in electrical energy trade
Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2015
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power transmission network can be operated in the most economic way. The general aim in such scenarios is to optimize generator scheduling in order to meet consumption requirements , transmission constraints and to minimize the overall generation cost and transmission losses. We use a simple lossless DC load flow model for the description of the transmission network, and assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of generators with different parameters for each generator. We consider a scenario in which the generation values regarding the OPF are calculated by a central authority who is aware of the network parameters and production characteristics. Furthermore, we assume that a central mechanism is applied for the determination of generator payoffs in order to cover their generation costs and assign them with some profit. We analyze the situation when generators may provide false information about their production parameters and thus manipulate the OPF computation in order to potentially increase their resulting profit. We consider two central payoff mechanisms and compare their vulnerability for such manipulations and analyze their effect on the total social cost.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2002
In this paper we provide a simulations-based demonstration of a hybrid electricity market that combines the distributed competitive advantages of decentralized markets with the system security guarantees of centralized markets. In this market, the transmission service provider (TSP) guides an electricity market towards the optimal power flow (OPF) solution, even when maximizing its own revenue. End users negotiate with each other to determine an energy price and then submit separate bids for transmission to the TSP. The TSP returns with prices for transmission, allowing end users to respond. In simulations, this hybrid-decentralized market approaches the near-optimal results of fully coordinated and constrained markets. Additionally, this market exhibits properties that remove incentives for the TSP to withhold capacity. This hybrid market leads a market towards the optimum while allowing the TSP and the end users to act out of self-interest.
Competition and cooperation in a PFF game theoretic model of electrical energy trade
2013
A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the network is lossless and is operated by an independent regulator who ensures network stability and fulfillment of consumption needs while taking into account the preferences of consumers over generators. We assume an iterative process in which the generators publish their price offers simultaneously in each step, based on which the consumers preferences are determined. The model deals with network congestion and safety as not every generator-consumer matching is allowed to ensure the fault tolerant operation of the transmission system. To make the model as simple as possible we do not deal with transmission fees, the profit of the generators is determined as the difference between their income,...