Policy Area: Middle East Peace Process (original) (raw)
Related papers
Prospects of reinvigorating the Middle East Peace Process: a possible joint EU-US undertaking
Study requested by the AFET Committee, European Parliament, 2022
The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has been an issue of strategic and common interest for the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA), for which they have both sought to cooperate from the onset. The Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) was initiated through the 1991 Madrid Conference co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the USA. However, the most recent developments, such as the clashes in Gaza and the acts of violence in the West Bank that began in the summer of 2022, demonstrate that despite the numerous initiatives of international actors, these efforts have failed to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. This study recommends that the EU should realise that the current status quo is not sustainable, considering that this situation could be further eradicating its influence over the MEPP and the Israeli and Palestinian actions, as well as undermining its legitimacy on the global scene. Instead of focusing on creating a new standing EU-USA mechanism on the MEPP, the EU should take a new stance of acting more independently while remaining loyal to its principles and approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Evaluate the role of the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process
2010
Despite the EU’s willingness to participate in the MEPP it would appear that this effort does not always translate into achievement. Throughout this essay there is the belief that the EU has been working hard to achieve success in the MEPP, yet external and internal dynamics have often been stronger in shaping the EU's results than the EU itself has. A for Effort, C for Achievement.
2007
This thesis examines the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership during the peace process, from the Madrid conference in 1991 to the breakdown of Oslo in 1997. Through an historical survey, an assessment of the structure and documents of the peace process, and an analysis of the strategies ofthe Palestinian leadership, it demonstrates that the invitation to the peace process arrived when the Palestinian leadership in exile outside was at its weakest, simultaneously seeking to further weaken it by restricting participation in the peace talks to Palestinians from the OPT except East Jerusalem. The outside leadership decided to fall back on the strong political support and loyalty of the leadership by appointing a delegation from inside in order to avoid the political danger of exclusion and marginalization. The Palestinian delegation from inside was selected from individuals with credibility and the credentials of struggle, which meant that they were loyal to the inside's main source of power, the Palestinian public in the OPT. Thus the relationship between the inside and outside leaderships was complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and political access of the outside, and the outside needed the unity and representation of the inside. This mutual opportunism exposed, however, each leadership's differences in structure and priorities, which stemmed from their different realities. Because its priorities and approach Jimmy Carter adopted a similar approach in his latest book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. Criticising the negotiation performance of the PLO, which he judges by its results, Carter writes that: Arafat had failed to obtain other specific concessions concerning a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. In effect, what he got from the Oslo Agreement was the assurance of organizing a form of Palestinian government and staying in power so that he could administer Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted and achieved much more.Z 0 Carter argues clearly that the Palestinian side was disadvantaged in the negotiations. He writes that: "A key advantage that the Oslo Agreement gave to Israel was the shedding of formal responsibility for the living conditions and welfare of the territories' rapidly increasing population, still completely dominated by Israeli forces." 21 Carter also observes that even Rabin expressed the position that the Oslo Agreement was an improvement on the Camp David accords, from the Israeli point of view. He thus argues that Palestinians, who rejected the Camp David agreement, later accepted a worse deal. 22 Carter notes the impact of Jewish settlement expansion in the territories. "As President Clinton made efforts to promote peace, there was 90 per cent growth in the number of settlers in the occupied territories, with the greatest increase during the administration of Prime Minister Ehud Barak." 23 In a more explicit reference to the Israeli policy of consolidating the occupation through these settlements, Carter quotes Ariel Sharon; thenforeign minister, stating during the Oslo peace process that "Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours ... everything we don't grab will go to them." 24 Menachem Klein raises an interesting aspect ofthe outcome of the peace process. The agreement laid a trap for the Palestinian leadership, he writes. The PLO derived its popularity and power from its role in leading the Palestinian struggle for political, social
lu.se
The European Union's role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been evolving since 1970, moving from declaratory diplomacy to concrete and wide-ranging forms of political and financial assistance to the peace process. The Union's approach to the conflict has been shaped by three key elements: external and internal constraints on its ability to act, the overarching contexts of various peace processes, and the formalization of the EU's peacebuilding framework towards the Middle East in general. In light of these different constraints and contexts, the EU's approach has focused much less on obtaining peace agreements and final status settlements but rather on the process of building a democratic and viable Palestinian state and using multilateral and bilateral policy programs to promote region-building, the normalization of relations, and the respect of democracy and human rights. While these objectives are important to building long-term peace, they face numerous difficulties in the short-term. The achievement of a viable Palestinian state with a Western-style democracy and productive economy is very unlikely to occur without first bringing an end to the Israeli occupation and erecting a sovereign Palestinian state.