Inequality-Led Financial Instability (original) (raw)

An increasing number of economists argue that income inequality was a root cause behind the subprime crisis of 2007. The aim of this paper is to outline and contrast the theoretical underpinnings of Marxian, Post Keynesian and mainstream crisis theories and to compare their viewpoints regarding the role that inequality plays. The main finding of this paper is that despite important theoretical differences, economists from all three strands provide a similar explanation for the link between inequality and the subprime crisis (even though conventional mainstream crisis theories do not regard inequality as destabilizing factor). This suggests that the rise in income inequality indeed played an important role in the build-up of the crisis. To ensure that a wider audience accepts inequality as a prominent causal factor for the crisis it is however necessary that the negative effects of wealth concentration are also taken into account.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to show how some of the assumptions about the current financial crisis are wrong because they misunderstand what takes place in the mortgage market. Design/methodology/approach: The paper discusses four wrong assumptions: one related to regulation, one to leveraging, one to subprime lending and one to predatory lending. It briefly discusses some policy implications. Findings: (1) The role of the state in the mortgage market is more complex than suggested by those who blame the state for not doing anything. (2) The concept of leveraging can explain, at least in part, why the losses in financial markets are bigger than the losses in the housing market. (3) Many subprime loans were sold to prime borrowers. (4) Subprime lending was not designed to increase homeownership rates, but to fuel profits by exploiting vulnerable borrowers. Practical implications (if applicable): It is too easy to argue that everyone made mistakes; most borrowers cannot be blamed for being sold risky, overpriced loans. A rescue plan is needed for defaulting borrowers and those already in foreclosure. Originality/value: This paper does not present new research, but brings together research that demonstrates that the roots of the crisis in the mortgage market are in many ways different from what is suggested by professionals and journalists alike. Keywords: Financial crisis, Credit crunch, Mortgage market, Securitization, Subprime lending, Predatory lending, Regulation

The causes of the 2007-8 subprime crisis continue to be the subject of much debate, with explanations ranging from de-regulation and fraudulent behavior to global imbalances and rising inequality. However, a comprehensive analysis of the endogenous forces that made the crisis inevitable has yet to be presented. This paper offers a ‘structural’ interpretation of the crisis by synthesising insights from conventional financial economics and the Minskyian and Schumpeterian literature. While highlighting the innovative character of US financial firms evolving from credit providers to producers of financial commodities, we stress the key features of their path towards financial fragility. We contend that financial institutions were able to achieve progressively unsustainable positions due to the ‘enforced indebtedness’ of US households, which played a functional, albeit secondary, role in the development of the crisis.

In many Western capitalist economies, private indebtedness is pervasive, but it has received little attention from political philosophers. Economic theory emphasizes the liberating potential of debt contracts, but its picture is based on assumptions that do not always hold, especially when there is a background of structural injustice. Private debt contracts are likely to miss their liberating potential if there is deception or lack of information, if there is insufficient access to (regular forms of) credit, or if credit is overly expensive. Markets for private debt can be mechanisms of structural injustice: rather than playing a neutral role, they reinforce injustices, because the failures of debt to be liberating disproportionately hit individuals in disadvantaged positions. By individualizing what are in fact structural problems, private debt can contribute to stigmatization, social exclusion and oppression. What is at stake, from a perspective of structural justice, is not only the distribution of income, but also the distribution of risk. The problems of private debt markets therefore require political attention. In addition to fighting the structural injustices that form the background condititions of private debt, it is also worth addressing private debt markets themselves.