Review of the New European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), Part 2: The work of the European Systemic Risk Board – The ESFS'S Macro-Prudential Pillar (original) (raw)
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Risk management through the lens of macroprudential policy
is an economist at the ESRB Secretariat. Previously, he worked at the UK Financial Services Authority in the financial stability department, where he specialised in bank stress tests and financial network analysis. He attended the universities of Oxford and London.