Comparing Forest Commons in Norway and Sweden Part I: What is to be Compared (original) (raw)
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A tragedy of errors? Institutional dynamics and land tenure in Finnmark, Norway
Reindeer herding in Finnmark has been widely perceived during the last few decades as a perfect example of the tragedy of the commons. The present article claims that this discourse relies on flawed assumption regarding land tenure. Our historical analysis of the term 'common' in relation to resources in Finnmark shows the term to reflect a misunderstanding of local categories, practices, and concerns related to pastures, territories, and natural resources more generally. In this sense, it exposes a case of 'mistaken identity' between the formal legal conception of 'commons' and the customary rules and thinking of reindeer herders. We turn to different strands of critical institutionalism to analyse the processes of institutional change that have allowed these errors and misunderstandings to be formalised and naturalised in the current governance system. We show that a process of institutional bargaining between the Norwegian Parliament, the Sámi Parliament, and the International Labour Organisation has recently re-enforced an alien conception of a 'commons' to which ambiguous groups of people have equivocal rights. In parallel, a process of institutional layering of new regulatory actors and rules on top of existing ones has taken place. This regulatory ratcheting has resulted in the blurring of the authorities and jurisdictions intrinsic in the customary tenure system. Moreover, the new layers of regulations have actively overemphasized the Sámi customary obligation of sharing resources to legitimize 1 The "Results" section of the present article is developed from our book chapter "Er Finnmarksvidda en allmenning?" forthcoming in Norwegian in .
Swedish forest commons — A matter of governance?
Forest Policy and Economics, 2010
Around 100years ago, when Crown land in the interior of northern Sweden was privatized, part of the forest land was set aside as forest commons. Today, there are 33 such forest commons jointly managed and owned in common mainly by private forest owners. The forest commons may be looked upon as a means by which the state controls the production
2008
The thesis explores the emergence of local natural resource management arrangements as a contextual and negotiated process in two rural communities in northern Sweden: Ammarnäs and Coastal Ring. It analyses particular practices and meanings that appear in the ...
Power, Knowledge, and Conflict in the Shaping of Commons Governance
2011
This article aims at contributing to governance conceptualization and its application to case study analyses. Two of the challenges which the theoretical and empirical work in the article addresses concern facilitation of the comparability of diverse governance cases and a specification of several key mechanisms of governance formation and reform. A proposed model of the architecture of governance systems – their major components and inter-linkages – contributes, as argued and illustrated here, to greater comparability among cases and with the possibility of improved accumulation of knowledge about governance systems. The work also identifies a few key drivers explaining how governance systems are established, maintained or changed through power, knowledge, and contestation/conflict processes.These tools are applied to empirical cases of governance structure and their functioning and reformation. I consider briefly for comparative purposes food security, chemicals, gender relations,...
Despite the static image of formal common pool resource institutions (CPRIs), interest communities always attempted to adapt their institutional framework to their particular needs and interests. The hypothesis of Ensminger, that formal and informal institutional environments were steered by the interplay of external socioeconomic factors, ideology and bargaining power, will be tested by a comparative analysis of three regions within the North Sea area, namely the Campine, within the Low Countries, the Brecklands in England and the Geest area in Schleswig Holstein. Due to this scope, we will advance that especially the distribution of power was vital for the evolution of one specific aspect of CPRIs, namely accessibility. Only communities with relatively balanced distributions of power could retain an inclusive access regime throughout the early modern period, while polarised societies evolved towards more restrictive access to the common wastelands. * Email: Maika.dekeyzer@ua.ac.be 517 518 M AÏ K A D E K E Y Z E R institutions, manipulated these same institutions to serve their changing needs remains to be questioned. According to the classical neo-institutionalist Douglas North, institutions, as embodying the rules of the game in a society, structured the incentives involved in human exchange through formal rules and informal constraints . On the other hand, Ensminger claimed that individuals try to shape institutions to their own ends by committing resources to bring about changes in institutional environments . Through the interplay of external socioeconomic factors and evolutions in relative prices, different interest communities would alter the institutions regulating their commons, based on their particular ideology, bargaining power and economic interests. The transformation of the institutions does not, however, always follow the path towards the highest efficiency or economic rationality, but rather evolves according to the needs of those interest groups with the most bargaining power and resources necessary to subsidise the, often costly, campaigns to change institutions . This point of view has been supported by Tobias Haller, who has undertaken extensive research into the floodplains of Zambia. He found that due to commercialisation, monetarisation, the introduction of new technologies and immigration, the old institutions were put under serious strain. As a result, completely new institutions were created, retaining only a minor unchanged basis to justify the continuity of their existence. 'The original content and purpose has been erased completely'. Haller did, however, stress that some particular institutional rules, more specifically the ones favouring those with more bargaining power, remained virtually intact, even though they were not the most rational or sustainable (Haller, 2007: 22). For historical CPRIs, 1 the same issues and questions arise. According to José Miguel Lana Berasain, the very design of the normative structure of the communal organisation could be understood as a point of equilibrium in a complex process of interaction with the natural environment and the powers that subtracted surplus value. The formation of CPR institutions therefore enshrined these disparities while legitimising them .
Community Commons in Norway: The role of common property in Norwegian outfield management
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