European corporate governance and firm performance: an empirical analysis (original) (raw)
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Our finding contributes towards the understanding of movements regarding the adoption of corporate governance practice in emerging countries such as Romania and its impact on business performances of a company. We have developed two econometric models to assess the business performances of the companies listed on Bucharest Stock Exchange, in order to point out the impact of corporate governance on business performances. Our results are inconsistent for the period 2001-2011, but if we consider only 2011, the results document a positive correlation between corporate governance quality and market value of companies, such it is reflected by Tobin's Q. Therefore, our results contribute to the studies relating corporate governance and business performances, as it confirms a positive relationship between the two variables which appears once the Romanian emerging economy has began to adopt the best corporate governance practices. Firstly, our research has important implications for managers in order to know that the adoption of the best corporate governance practices could contribute to the financial success of the firm. Secondly, the results are useful for any investor who needs to consider the quality of corporate governance as a good predictor for the best rate of return of theirs investments. Moreover, our findings have also implications on policy-makers and regulatory authorities in European developing countries and offer them a barometer of adopting the best corporate governance practices in European space.
Corporate governance and firm performance
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How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature: First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107-155.] and , What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance. Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.
2008
Globalisation includes international product markets and capital, but also involves internationalisation of corporate governance mechanisms. We propose that internationalisation of governance mechanisms is related to improved performance of the corporation. For example, listing at several stock markets implies pressure to improve information flow and stronger adherence to international standards, which will reduce possibility for slack. Recruiting top managers and board members from an international arena will, among other things, enlarge the market for managerial labour and the market for board members, presumably putting more pressure on present managers and board members, and increase the probability of finding an adequate new manager or new board members. An integrated EU would support the internationalisation of the mechanisms through reducing the transaction costs of Europeanization. An initial test on a sample of listed Swedish corporations indicates that the proposition could be rejected. Two main reasons can be found as an interpretation of the results 1.) that mechanisms with governance functions, such as capital structure and the board have several functions, and that the governance function is not always the most important one, and 2.) that governance mechanisms cannot be analysed in isolation, since they are included in a coherent corporate governance strategy.