European corporate governance and firm performance: an empirical analysis (original) (raw)

Abstract

This paper investigates whether differences in international corporate governance systems affect firm performance. We construct a firm-level panel database from three countries and perform regression analyses that controls for country-specific effects. Our study includes governance characteristics that are present in all of the three countries, but also characteristics that are unique to one of the three countries. For both sets of variables we find that the governance system has an important influence on the governance- ...

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