VOLUNTARY PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AMONG THE OVER 50s IN EUROPE (original) (raw)
Related papers
2008
Using data from SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe), we analyze the effect of having a voluntary health insurance policy (VPHI) on out-of-pocket (OOP) health spending for individuals aged 50 or more in a host of European countries. We control for self selection into VPHI policy holding, and find that VPHI policy holders do not have lower OOP's than the rest of the population: in Southern European countries they even spend more. We also find that the main determinants of VPHI are different in each country and this reflects the differences in the underlying health care systems.
2008
Abstract. Using data from SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe), we analyze the effect of having a voluntary health insurance policy (VPHI) on out-of-pocket (OOP) health spending for individuals aged 50 or more in a host of European countries. We control for self selection into VPHI policy holding, and find that VPHI policy holders do not have lower OOP's than the rest of the population: in Southern European countries they even spend more.
Age and Choice in Health Insurance: Evidence from Switzerland
2004
Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are a uniform package of bene…ts and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a welfare loss if preferences differ. This suggests introducing more contractual choice; however, it is widely believed that this would not bene…t the aged. This study examines the relationship between age and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for additional options in Swiss social health insurance. Through discrete choice experiments, a marked diversity of preferences can be established. The …ndings suggest that the aged require less rather than more compensation for all cutbacks considered, pointing to potential for contracts that induce self-rationing in return for lower premiums.
Age and Choice in Health Insurance
The Patient: Patient-Centered Outcomes Research, 2008
Elements of regulation inherent in all social health insurance systems are a uniform package of bene…ts and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a welfare loss if preferences di¤er. Since the debate about rationing importantly involves age as a criterion, this study examines the relationship between age and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for modi…cations in Swiss social health insurance. Through discrete choice experiments, a marked diversity of preferences with regard to health insurance parameters can be established. The …ndings suggest ine¢ ciency of age-based rationing but also potential for self-rationing.
Age and choice in health insurance: evidence from a discrete choice experiment
The patient, 2008
A uniform package of benefits and uniform cost sharing are elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems. Both elements risk burdening the population with a welfare loss if preferences for risk and insurance attributes differ. This suggests the introduction of more choice in social health insurance packages may be advantageous; however, it is widely believed that this would not benefit the elderly.A representative telephone survey of 1000 people aged >24 years living in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland was conducted. Participants were asked to compare the status quo (i.e. their current insurance contract) with ten hypothetical alternatives. In addition, participants were asked questions concerning utilization of healthcare services; overall satisfaction with the healthcare system, insurer and insurance policy; and a general preference for new elements in the insurance package. Socioeconomic variables surveyed were age, sex, total hous...
2003
In this paper we investigate whether the presence of private insurance leads to improved health status. Using the Health and Retirement study we focus on adults in late middle age who are nearing entry into Medicare. Estimation addresses endogeneity of the insurance participation decision in health outcome regressions. Two models are tested, an instrumental variables models, and a model with endogenous treatment effects due to Heckman (1978). Insurance participation and health behaviors enter with a lag to allow their effects to dissipate over time. Separate regressions were run for groupings of chronic conditions. We find that the overall impact of insurance on health tends to be significantly downwards biased if no adjustment for endogeneity is made. With corrections there is a four-fold increase in the insurance effect; yielding a 7 percent increase in the overall health measure for the uninsured. Results are consistent across IV and treatment effects models, and for all major groupings of medical conditions. Thus, the effect of private insurance on health may be larger than previously estimated. As for policy, expanding coverage to the uninsured should result in substantial health improvement. By conjecture, this is likely to reduce the need for health care when individuals retire and enter Medicare, potentially leading to savings.
Subscribing to Supplemental Health Insurance in France: A Dynamic Analysis of Adverse Selection
2010
Adverse selection, which is well described in the theoretical literature on insurance, remains relatively difficult to study empirically. The traditional approach, which focuses on the binary decision of “covered” or “not”, potentially misses the main effects because heterogeneity may be very high among the insured. In the French context, which is characterized by universal but incomplete public health insurance (PHI), we study the determinants of the decision to subscribe to supplemental health insurance (SHI) in addition to complementary health insurance (CHI). This work permits to analyze health insurance demand at the margin. Using a panelized dataset, we study the effects of both individual state of health, which is measured by age and previous individual health spending, and timing on the decision to subscribe. One striking result is the changing role of health risk over time, illustrating that adverse selection occurs immediately after the introduction of SHI. After the initi...
Journal of European Social Policy, 2006
Several European countries have considered introducing choice of public or private health insurance - usually by allowing people to ‘opt out’ of the statutory scheme - under the assumption that enhancing consumer choice and stimulating competition between insurers will be beneficial. This article examines the impact of opting out on equity and efficiency in European health systems. Focusing on Germany
Private Supplementary Health Insurance: Retirees' Demand
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice, 2008
In France, private health insurance, that supplements public health insurance, is essential for access to health care. About 90% of the population is covered by a private contract and around half of them obtain their coverage through their employer. Considering the financial benefits associated with group contracts compared to individual contracts, we assume that the switching behaviors vary among different beneficiaries during the transition to retirement. Indeed, despite a 1989 law, the gap in premiums increases at retirement between group and individual contracts affords the opportunity to study the marginal price effect on switching behaviors. In this study, we consider the nature of the contract prior to retirement (compulsory or voluntary membership group contract and individual contract) as an indirect measure of the price effect. We focus on its role and check for a large number of individual characteristics that may influence the new retirees' health insurance demand.