From Plato to Ellis. A Short Investigation of the Concept of Emotions (original) (raw)
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Within the discipline of psychology, the conventional history outlines the development of two fundamental approaches to the scientific study of emotion-"basic emotion" and "appraisal" traditions. In this article, we outline the development of a third approach to emotion that exists in the psychological literature-the "psychological constructionist" tradition. In the process, we discuss a number of works that have virtually disappeared from the citation trail in psychological discussions of emotion. We also correct some misconceptions about early sources, such as work by Darwin and James. Taken together, these three contributions make for a fuller and more accurate account of ideas about emotion during the century stretching from 1855 to just before 1960.
A Short History of Psychological Perspectives on Emotion
The Oxford Handbook of Affective Computing, 2015
This chapter presents a short history of psychological theory and research on emotion since the beginnings of psychology as an academic discipline in the last third of the 19 th century. Using William James's theory of emotion as the starting point and anchor, the history of research on five main questions of emotion psychology is charted. These concern, respectively: (1) the causal generation of emotions; (2) the effects of emotion on subsequent cognition and behavior; (3) the nature of emotion; (4) the evolutionary and learning origins of the emotion system; and (5) the neural structures and processes involved in emotions. A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 3 A Short History of Psychological Perspectives on Emotion Psychology as an independent academic discipline emerged during the last third of the 19 th century (see e.g., Leahey, 2003). I have therefore chosen this period as the starting point of the present, short history of psychological perspectives of emotion. However, readers should be aware that academic emotion psychology did not start from scratch. On the contrary, it build on a rich tradition of theorizing about emotions by philosophers, historians, and literary writers that dates back to the Ancient Greeks (see e.g., Strongman, 2003) and has remained influential up to the present (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Nussbaum, 2001). When psychology became an independent discipline, it defined itself initially as the science of consciousness (of conscious mental states; e.g., Brentano, 1873; Wundt, 1896). Given that emotions are salient exemplars of conscious mental states, it is not surprising that the psychologists of consciousness also had a keen interest in the emotions. In fact, most of the basic types of psychological emotion theory discussed today were already present, at least in the outlines, in the psychology of consciousness. During the subsequent, behaviorist phase of psychology (about 1915-1960), and due in large part to its restrictive research doctrines, research on emotions subsided again (see e.g., Arnold, 1960), although behaviorists did make some important contributions to emotion psychology (e.g., research on the classical conditioning of fear; see Gray, 1975; LeDoux, 1998; Watson, 1919). Immediately after the so-called "cognitive revolution" of the early 1960ies, when behaviorism was replaced by cognitivism-a modern version of mentalism guided by the metaphor of information processing in computers-emotion research took up speed again, until in the 1990ies, it became a boom that also began to affect other scientific disciplines. Today, emotion is an important topic in nearly every subfield of psychology, as well as in many other disciplines ranging from biology to neurophysiology to computer science, linguistics and literary studies. Some already see the emergence of a new interdisciplinary research field, analogous to A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 4 cognitive science: affective science, the interdisciplinary study of emotions and related phenomena (Scherer, 2009). One important reason for the recent surge of interest in emotions has been a reevaluation of the adaptive utility of emotions. Traditionally, emotions have often been regarded as maladaptive (because, it was held, they interfere with rational thinking and decision-making; see e.g., Roberts, 2013). In contrast, during the past twenty or so years, emotions have increasingly come to be seen as overall adaptive (e.g., Feldman-Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Frijda, 1994). Some theorists even regard emotions as indispensable for adaptive behavior (e.g., Damasio, 1994). This changed view of the usefulness of emotions has also been an important motive for launching of the field of affective computing (Picard, 1997). Five Questions of Emotion Psychology The task of emotion psychology can be defined as the reconstruction, or "reverse engineering" of the structure and functioning of the human emotion system, including its relations to other subsystems of the mind (Reisenzein & Horstmann, 2006). The central subtasks of this task are to explain (Q1) how emotions are elicited, or generated; (Q2) what effects (in particular what adaptive, or functional effects) emotions have on subsequent cognitive processes and behavior; and related to both questions, (Q3) what emotions themselves are-how they are to be theoretically defined; what kinds of mental and computational states they are (Reisenzein, 2012). Answering Q1-Q3 amounts to reconstructing the blueprint of the emotion system. However, as already argued by McDougall (1908/1960; see also, Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), to achieve this goal it is helpful and even necessary, to address a further question that is also of independent interest, which concerns the origins of the emotion system; namely (Q4) which parts of the emotion system are inherited and which are acquired through learning. Finally, to help answer questions Q1-A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 5 Q4, it would be useful to know (Q5) how emotions are biologically realized or implemented, that is, which neural structures and processes underlie them. A generally accepted theory of emotions that gives detailed answers to all these questions, or even just to the central questions Q1-Q3, still does not exist today. Nevertheless, progress has been made. In what follows, I will trace the history of the most important proposed answers to the five main questions of emotion psychology. As the starting point and anchor of my report, I will use a classical theory of emotion, which was proposed by one of the founding fathers of psychology, the psychologist and philosopher William James (1884; 1890; 1894). My reason for choosing James's theory of emotion for structuring this chapter is not that the theory has stood the test of time particularly well (see Reisenzein & Stephan, in press); but that it has been highly influential, is widely known, and is possibly the first emotion theory that tries to give answers-if partly only very sketchy answers-to all of the five main questions of emotion psychology. I will first describe James's answers to these questions and then discuss, in separate sections, what has been learned about them since James's time. James's Theory of Emotion The starting point of James's theory of emotion is the intuition, which I believe readers will confirm, that emotional experiences-experiences of joy, sorrow, anger, fear, pity or joy for another, pride, guilt etc. (see e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988)-have a special phenomenal quality; that is, it "is like" or "feels like" a special way to have them.
The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction (with Andreas Elpidorou)
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13: 507-511, 2014
Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate to and engage with others. A phenomenological study of emotions is thus meant not only to help us to understand ourselves, but also to allow us to see and to make sense of the meaningfulness of our worldly and social existence.
No aspect of our mental life is more important to the quality and meaning of our existence than emotions. They are what make life worth living, or sometimes ending. So it is not surprising that most of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume—had recognizable theories of emotion, conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behavior. What is surprising is that in much of the twentieth-century philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect them—perhaps because the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word " emotion " and its closest neighbors tends to discourage tidy theory. In recent years, however, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science. In view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and even economics. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those approaches here, some sidelong glances in their direction will aim to suggest their philosophical importance. I begin by outlining some of the ways that philosophers have conceived of the place of emotions in the topography of the mind, particularly in their relation to bodily states, to motivation, and to beliefs and desires, as well as some of the ways in which they have envisaged the relation between different emotions. Most emotions have an intentional structure: we shall need to say something about what that means. Psychology and more recently evolutionary biology have offered a number of theories of emotions, stressing their function in the conduct of life. Philosophers have been especially partial to cognitivist theories, emphasizing analogies either with propositional judgments or with perception. But different theories implicitly posit different ontologies of emotion, and there has been some dispute about what emotions really are, and indeed whether they are any kind of thing at all. Emotions also raise normative questions: about the extent to which they can be said to be rational, or can contribute to rationality. In that regard the question of our knowledge of our own emotions is especially problematic, as it seems they are both the object of our most immediate awareness and the most powerful source of our capacity for self-deception. This results in a particularly ambivalent relation between emotions and morality. I will conclude with a brief survey of some recent trends, particularly as they affect and are influenced by the neighboring disciplines in which the study of emotions has become increasingly prominent.
Perceiving Emotions (from Proc. of Aristotelian Society)
I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout’s challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivabilityof- emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout’s suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights.
Emotions: Philosophical Issues About
WIREs Cognitive Science, 2015
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.
Philosophy and the Emotions ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52 EDITED BY
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003
Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.
The phenomenology of emotions-above and beyond 'What it is Like to Feel'
The Routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotion, 2020
Second, talking of a 'rediscovery' of emotions in philosophy is, in fact, highly misleading. After all, emotions have never been completely ignored in the history of philosophy. Quite the contrary, the nature of affectivity and the role of emotions in human existence and social reality as well as the notorious relation of emotions and rationality always been at issue in philosophy-even where explicit discussion of the emotions is missing or is deliberately relegated to the conceptual background. Moreover, the relation of philosophical reasoning to emotions, and the role that emotions (ought to) play therein, has never been philosophically neutral. 'What's your take on emotion' seems, then, to be the 64,000-dollar question for philosophers, ever since emotions entered philosophical thinking (see Landweer and Renz 2012). 2 Affects and emotions have played a central role in Western 3 philosophy ever since they were introduced by Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek and Roman (Neo-)Stoics (cf. Nussbaum 2001). They were extensively discussed as key factors in rhetoric, political life, moral psychology, and social interaction. Most classical authors, such as Aquinas, Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, Malebranche, or Spinoza, up until the Scottish moralists, explored a panoply of particular affects, sentiments, and emotions, taxonomizing the so-called 'passions of the soul' (Descartes); many of these authors also offered general theories of emotions. It is, however, also true that after Kant and Rousseau, starting roughly with the dominance of German Idealism, emotions ceased to play any systematic role in philosophy. 4 In this period of relative marginalization, we find only a few isolated discussions of specific emotions, such as compassion in Schopenhauer 5 or anxiety and fear in Kierkegaard.