Distinctiveness of the Unseen: Buddhist Identity (original) (raw)
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Research Features , 2023
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Minds, Intrinsic Properties, and Madhyamaka Buddhism
Zygon®, 2009
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the allegedly scientific view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna’s argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to “The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything.” Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world
Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism: An Epistemic Analysis
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Imagine a character, Mary Analogue, who has a complete theoretical knowledge of her subject matter: the illusory nature of self. Suppose that when presenting her paper on no self at a conference she suffers stage-fright – a reaction that implies she is under an illusion of the very self whose existence she denies. Might there be something defective about her knowledge of no self? The Buddhist tradition would claim that Mary Analogue, despite her theoretical omniscience, lacks deep ‘insight knowledge’ into the reality of no self. The only way for her to gain insight, and thereby improve her epistemic status, would be to divest her mind of the self-illusion. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what could be epistemically involved in the process of acquiring such insight knowledge whereby one becomes, in Buddhist parlance, ‘awakened’.
Imagining Enlightenment: Icons and Ideology in Vajrayāna Buddhist Practice
Journal of Dharma Studies, 2018
Iconography has been used to represent the experience of awakening in the Buddhist traditions for millennia. The Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions are especially renowned for their rich pantheons of buddhas and bodhisattvas who illuminate and inspire practitioners. In addition, the Vajrayāna branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism presents a host of meditational deities (yidam) who serve as catalysts of awakening. These awakened beings are regarded as objects of refuge for practitioners, both female and male, who visualize themselves in detail as embodiments of specific enlightened figures, female or male, with all their enlightened qualities. These meditational deities, which are mentally constructed and insubstantial by nature, are distinguished from worldly deities (deva) who also inhabit the Buddhist pantheon and may be supplicated for attaining worldly boons. This article explores the philosophical foundations of Varjrayāna Buddhist practices, the ontological status of these archetypes of awakening, and the epistemological process of visualizing oneself an enlightened being as a skillful means to achieve awakened realization. Keywords Deities. Iconography. Gender identity. Vajrayāna Scholars generally regard Mahāyāna Buddhism as a natural focus of religious studies because of its rich pantheon of buddhas and bodhisattvas. The Vajrayāna branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism especially has numerous Bmeditational deities^(yidam) who inhabit the tantric Buddhist pantheon, along with a host of other supernormal beings such as dakas, dakinīs, and dharmapalas who act as defenders of Dharma. 1 Many scholars understand yidams to be Buddhist versions of the divine, 2 but they are not
Buddha & the God Concept, 2021
Many people the world over, think that Buddhists are atheists. It is, however, more correct to say that Buddhists are non-theists or perhaps agnostic. An atheist is someone that does not believe in gods or an all supreme god. “Many people are interested in distinguishing between the words agnostic and atheist. The difference is quite simple: atheist refers to someone who does not believe in the existence of a god or any gods, and agnostic refers to someone who doesn’t know whether there is a god, or even if such a thing is knowable. This distinction can be troublesome to remember, but examining the origins of the two words can help. Agnostic first appeared in 1869, (possibly coined by the English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley), and was formed from the Greek agnōstos (meaning "unknown, unknowable"). Atheist came to English from the French athéisme. Although both words share a prefix (which is probably the source of much of the confusion) the main body of each word is quite different. Agnostic shares part of its history with words such as prognosticate and prognosis, words which have something to do with knowledge or knowing something. Atheist shares roots with words such as theology and theism, which generally have something to do with God. ” Buddha never said that one could not or should not believe in gods. However, he did discourage such beliefs, citing that there were hindrances for one to believe in such things that could have kammic (karmic) consequences. In 1996, the great Theravadin monk, Venerable Nyanoponika Thera wrote: “Theism , however, is regarded as a kind of kamma (karma) teaching, insofar as it upholds the moral efficacy of [one’s] actions. Hence, a theist who leads a moral life may, like anyone else doing so, expect a favorable rebirth. If, however, fanaticism induces him [the theist believer] to persecute those who do not share his beliefs, this will have grave consequences for his future destiny. For fanatical attitudes, intolerance and violence against others, create unwholesome kamma (karma) leading to moral degeneration, and to an unhappy rebirth. ”
No Self? Some reflections on Buddhist theories of Personal Identity
Recent years have seen a considerable growth in interest amongst Western philosophers and psychologists in the Buddhist idea of anattā – “no self”, as it is usually translated. A number of philosophers have published works, addressed to Western philosophical audiences, expounding and defending versions of anattā, some claiming that the Buddhist doctrine has significant affinities with various Western forms of reductionism or eliminativism about the self. In this paper I consider and criticize a number of these accounts. My concerns are not primarily exegetical; I am writing, not as a scholar of Buddhism, but as a philosopher, trained in the Western tradition(s), and interested in assessing the various recent interpretations/defences of anattā on their philosophical merits. I argue that none of them gives us grounds for abandoning a common sense, phenomenologically-based view of the reality of the self. I conclude by tentatively suggesting a way in which we might interpret anattā “practically”; one that would not see it as a theory about personal identity in the standard post-Lockean Western philosophical sense at all.
THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM AND ITS RELATION TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM AND ITS RELATION TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 2022
Anatta to contemporary society to understand how it can contribute to the improvement of human behavior and psychotherapy. This includes the fostering of mindfulness to develop empathy and create a therapeutic nexus between the patient and the therapist. It also provides techniques for coping with stress, and can act as a foundational basis for ethical and behavior and mollify the relentless pursuit of