The Spiritual Exercises of John Rawls (original) (raw)

John Rawls and the Task of Political Philosophy

The Review of Politics, 2009

In this article, I sketch a reading of Rawls's work that ties together many of the features that distinguish it from the work of other authors commemorated in this issue. On this reading, the two world wars and the Holocaust pressed the question of whether a just liberal democracy is possible. Seeking to defend reasonable faith in that…

Justice and the Public Sphere: A Critique of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism

2017

This article criticizes John Rawls’ conception of political liberalism, which insists that political sphere governed by his two principles of justice can be separated from any comprehensive moral doctrines, and that the validity of his conception of justice is political, not metaphysical nor comprehensive. I argue that Rawls’ project is flawed by showing that his two principles of justice and political liberalism are presupposed by the very comprehensive/ metaphysical doctrines which he denies. Whether he realizes it or not Rawls chooses a particular comprehensive theory of the good/person, specifically that of an unencumbered self. I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from two points of view. First, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from political economy points of view, which I argue that the foundation of Rawls’ principles of justice lies in his particular theory of the person. Second, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from philosophical points of view, which I argues th...

Gerechtigkeit als Versöhnung. John Rawls' politischer Liberalismus (Campus 2009)

Can members of democratic societies reach agreement about a political conception of justice despite the fact that our religious and secular views are mutually incompatible? What shall we make of this doctrinal pluralism? Do we have reasons to expect our fellow citizens to do their share in bringing about and maintaining a just democracy? These questions are central to John Rawls's political liberalism. The answers citizens give to these questions shape their attitudes to liberal democracy and politics in general. Schaub reconstructs Rawls's ambitious project of reconciliation with liberal democracy, subjects it to comprehensive criticism, and reveals its Hegelian roots.

John Rawls at the Ends of Politics

Angelaki, 2004

journal of the theoretical humanities volume 9 number 3 december 2004 F or any teacher, student or practitioner of the architecture and the law of states, the passing of John Rawls, over a year later, is doubtless still providing an unusual moment in modern liberal democratic discourse. On one level, this is quite naturally a moment in which those who admire Rawls' powerful and intensive achievement may find themselves drawn to considering this achievement anew, as Rawls' system itself sought at every moment to renew the cause of a democratic justice. It is at this moment , then, that I wish to offer such a fresh assessment of what is arguably the most important conception developed in Rawls' corpus, his great latter-day state of nature, the hyperdemo-cratic construct of the "original position." More specifically, however, I want to read Rawls in a mode which has everything to do with John Rawls "himself," as this self emerges in his discourse, as his discourse, with all the import for the study of democracy which the passing of his material self offers in parallel. Firstly, I want briefly to set out a short reading of the Rawlsian political subject, that agent who, from A Theory of Justice to The Law of Peoples, imaginarily dwells in the original position and guarantees the justice of the arrangements produced there. In this reading, I begin by considering further one common complaint: that this agent of Rawls' original-position exercise in A Theory of Justice is a subject which, though it be for purposes of egalitarianism and other sorts of fairness, is imaginatively emptied of all meaningful distinction between itself and other such subjects. It is this erasure, I want to contend, which seems to imply that "any" subject (if the idea of a plurality of subjects has not thereby lost its meaning) will carry out the original-position exercise in exactly the same way as Rawls' text claims, a fact which makes any enactment of the exercise after the first redundant. The original position's state of nature is thus foreclosed in favor of its very first performance , but this performance is that of Rawls' text itself. It is a text in/for which theory is practice. Leaving aside for the moment most of the relevant definitional questions, I should note that this reading will only be a "deconstruction" of Rawls' text (to use a term as out of fashion as "state of nature") in that (a) it will illuminate a governing structural feature which, running through both the writing and reading of A Theory of Justice, undoes this text's own claims to present a mere blueprint for state-building, 2 and (b) it will also, in describing this structurality, make use of tools supplied by various texts etc

Rawlsian Liberalism - A Constructive Critique

There are several things which I hope the reader will take away from this thesis. The first is that I believe contemporary political philosophy gravely misinterprets Rawls. Discussions are too concentrated on the theories contained in A Theory of Justice. However, as demonstrated in chapters two and three, there are criticisms we can level at his thinking which prove fatal. One of the most damaging is that Rawls repeats current liberal views without sufficient justification. If we look more deeply into Rawls’ views we find that at critical points of his construction key foundations are missing. Therefore, we also come to realise that the early Rawls cannot answer the charge of cultural subjectivity. It is essential to all discussions of Rawls that this fact be taken into account. The later Rawls rejects the universalist claims of his earlier theory and thus also rejects its precepts. He states that the justice as fairness of his earlier self was culturally subjective and admits that it is, in fact, only to be applicable to Western societies. Not only that, but justice as fairness, within our Western societies, is not to be taken as any more valid than any other rationally cohesive philosophy. He ultimately fails in his aim of finding a universal theory.