Conceptualising state collapse: an institutionalist approach (original) (raw)
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Social and Legal Studies, 2020
In the last three decades, the categories of fragile and failed states have gained significant importance in the fields of law, development, political science and international relations. The wider discourse plays a key role in guiding the policies of international community and multilateral institutions and has also led to the emergence of a plethora of indices and rankings to measure and classify state fragility. A critical and theoretical analysis of these matrices brings to light three crucial aspects that the current study takes as its departure point. First, the formulas and conceptual paradigms show that fragility of states is far more ubiquitous than is generally recognised, and that the so-called successful and stable states are a historical, political and geographical anomaly. Second, in the absence of an agreed definition of a successful state or even that of a failed or fragile state, the indicators generally rely on negative definitions to delineate the failed and fragile state. They generally suggest that their reading is built on a Weberian ideal–typical state, which takes the idea of monopoly over legitimate violence as its starting point. The third and final point suggests that the indicators and rankings, misconstruing the Weberian ideal–typical state, actually end up comparing fragile states against an ideal–mythical state. The article argues that this notional state is not only ahistorical and apolitical, but it also carries the same undertones that have been the hallmark of theories of linear development, colonialism and imperialism.
An Anchor for a Dazzling Debate: Conceptualizing State
This paper proposes a theoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous operationalization of state collapse. It seeks to overcome several key deficits of research into fragile, failed and collapsed states which is often criticized as normatively problematic and methodologically deficient. We argue that this is a worthwhile topic to study but that scholarly inquiry needs to become more systematic and focus on extreme cases of state collapse. Following a Weberian institutionalist tradition, we disaggregate statehood into three dimensions: the state's capacity to make and enforce binding rules, to monopolize the means of violence and to collect taxes. Using a methodological framework by Gary Goertz, we then propose a set of indicators as well as a mode of aggregation based on necessary and sufficient conditions. In the end, we identify 17 cases of state collapse in the post-colonial era that meet our criteria.
Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism
Journal of International Relations and …, 2007
In the post-Cold War era, a voluminous literature has developed to define failed states, identify the causes and parameters of failure, and devise ways for dealing with the problems associated with state fragility and failure. While there is some theoretical diversity within this literature — notably between neoliberal institutionalists and neo-Weberian institutionalists — state failure is commonly defined in terms of state capacity. Since capacity is conceived in technical and ‘objective’ terms, the political nature of projects of state construction (and reconstruction) is masked. Whereas the existence of social and political struggles of various types is often recognized by the failed states literature, these conflicts are abstracted from political and social institutions. Such an analysis then extends into programmes that attempt to build state capacity as part of projects that seek to manage social and political conflict. Ascertaining which interests are involved and which interests are left out in such processes is essential for any understanding of the prospects or otherwise of conflict resolution.
Drawing upon the vast contemporary literature on state-building that has emerged since Helman and Ratner’s pioneer article in 1992-1993, this paper identifies two different schools of thought in the discussion, each of which reflects different sociological understandings of the state. The first one, an “institutional approach” closely related to the Weberian conception of the state, focuses on the importance of institutional reconstruction and postulates that state-building activities do not necessarily require a concomitant nation-building effort. The second, a “legitimacy approach” influenced by Durkheimian sociology, recognizes the need to consolidate central state institutions, but puts more emphasis on the importance of socio-political cohesion in the process. The institutional approach focuses on the institutional and physical basis of the state, while the legitimacy approach is more preoccupied with the social contract binding the citizens together. This contemporary debate has practical implications for practitioners in the field of state-building. Indeed, one’s conception of what to rebuild – the state – will necessarily impact the actual process of state-building. This paper tries to bring some clarity to a very confused debate, detailing the rise of the institutional approach and its limits when faced with unforeseen legitimacy issues.
The Nuts and Bolds of State Collapse: What to do when States Fail?
2005
This paper is the result of a research project designed to address two questions: 'why' do states collapse and 'how' do they collapse? Rather than testing existing theories (largely non existent), this paper suggests a new model. The first issue, the causes of state collapse, has been the focus of in depth research over the recent years. The bulk of the comparative work came through large N studies focussing on long-term structural conditions and often resulting in long shopping lists of indicators. Instead, this research develops a concise set of four core causes (rather than indicators) based on in-depth country research (small n) using 'soft' qualitative data (quantitative being often unreliable and constraining the research).
Making State Failure Work: Modelling Criteria and Competition for Sovereignty.
Media and politicians employ the notion of ‘failed states’, because it is appealingly simplistic: it invokes a clear image of a rock-bottom, broken-down-into-absolute-anarchy situation. Hence, its frequent use and that clarity of image make the concept of state failure as seductive for academic analysis, as it makes it unsuitable.1 On the other side of the spectrum, ‘sovereignty’ to states or peoples sounds like a noble and practical principle given its absolute character. Claiming however that a failed state is the highest authority over a people or territory, is a contradictio in terminis, or simply a “legal fiction”. The contribution of this article is fivefold. The first section outlines the problems in the current state failure literature, and thus sets the scene for what a new model of understanding and responding to poor state performance has to deal with. Section II explains how sovereignty should be considered in this context. Different defects of sovereignty lead to different situations lumped together under the definition of failed states. Third, it structures the discourse on state failure and sovereignty by sorting the different definitions and processes that are capturing by those terms, ordering their relation and pointing out why so much confusion emerges. Fourth then, this structure serves as a model to assess whether a) there is a political organisation that can effectively claim sovereignty over a situation; b) if there are contesting parties meeting that threshold, which one could be sovereign. Fifth, the existence of such assessment models leads to several considerations regarding its implementation and consequences for further research.
Saving failed states: sometimes a neocolonialist notion
Am. UJ Int'l L. & Pol'y
I. Introduction .................................................. 904 II. Disintegrating States: The Problem ............... ................. ... A. Defining the Problem ........................................ 913 B. Why Disintegration ........... .............................. 916 III. Trusteeship: The Proposed Solution ................................
The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure
Polity, 2016
The presence of failed states in the international system has increased, especially after the end of the cold war. Recent research demonstrates that state fragility and failure are strongly influenced by regime type, political instability, and economic growth. But these studies do not highlight the possibility that state fragility/failure is a function of historical path dependency. To address its prevalence and persistence in the modern world, we must focus on the unique histories of nation-states and examine how the colonial past may have led to substandard institutions and problematic state-society relations. Using an extensive dataset of nation-states in the developing world in order to conduct panel regression analyses, I find that state failure is largely a function of variations in the type of colonial rule and the duration of colonial control. British or Spanish rule, as well as the relative absence of European intervention into the polity, is associated with a lower risk of state failure, while French or Portuguese rule is associated with a higher risk. The findings imply that we need to reconsider our understanding of state failure; its very existence and persistence in the modern world are influenced by the historical process of colonialism and its institutional legacies.