Understanding Foucault: The Shift from Archaeology to Genealogy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Foucault, Archaeology, Transgression
In this paper, I examine Rabinow and Dreyfus' critique of Foucalt's archaeology. I argue that their stance on his archeological methodology is insightful, but overlooks that if archaeology is, as they hold, indeed 'but' a modern human science in the Foucaldian sense, then its doubling, an "archaeology of archaeology" must (be able to) exist, too. This however I argue not to be impossible. Thus I bring forward a different understanding of the archaeological enterprise: One of a fundamentally transgressive undertaking, accounting for its unique insights through, or in spite of, all its vaguenesses and epistemological precarities.
What is a “history of the present”? On Foucault’s genealogies and their critical preconditions
Punishment & Society, 2014
In this article Michel Foucault’s method of writing a “history of the present” is explained, together with its critical objectives and its difference from conventional historiography. Foucault’s shift from a style of historical research and analysis conceived as “archaeology” to one understood as “genealogy” is also discussed, showing how the history of the present deploys genealogical inquiry and the uncovering of hidden conflicts and contexts as a means of re-valuing the value of contemporary phenomena. The article highlights the critical observations of present-day phenomena from which a history of the present begins, paying particular attention to Foucault’s concept of “ dispositif” and his method of problematization. Foucault’s analyses of Bentham’s Panopticon, of the disciplinary sources of the modern prison, and of the technology of confession are discussed by way of illustration.
Genealogy and Subjectivity: An Incoherent Foucault (A Response to Calvert-Minor)
Kritike, 2010
he essay "Archaeology and Humanism: An Incongruent Foucault" argues, among other things, that Foucault "endorses a kind of humanism." Moreover, Calvert-Minor attempts to show that without such an endorsement then the curative aspects regarding Foucault's genealogy of subjectivity would be nonsensical. To be sure, the author seems to demonstrate that there is a clear tension in Foucault's oeuvre regarding the Frenchman's changing stance towards, and at times unconscious embracement of, philosophical humanism. Such a claim, if true, would certainly be damaging to Foucault's archaeological and genealogical projects as he stridently rejected humanism in all of its myriad forms. What makes this paper interesting is that it claims that Foucault backslides into two different humanistic positions with respect to at least two of the three principal periods of his work. In this respect, the paper seems to be on the other side of the fence with regard to some recent work in the secondary literature which has also sought to show Foucault's conscious avowal of humanism. For example, Eric Paras argues in his seminal work, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power Knowledge, that Foucault comes to embrace, quite consciously, many key elements of humanism in his late work. Paras, however, seems to suggest that such humanistic leanings are the direct result of the epistemic and ontological aporias Foucault found himself in at the conclusion of his power/knowledge period and, as such, these leanings were conscious admissions by Foucault that his power/knowledge period explanation of subject formation was in drastic need of revision. 1 Calvert-Minor however, unlike Paras, does not let Foucault off the hook, as it were, and charges Foucault with epistemic and ontological incongruency; a charge that, in my view, is off the mark. Rather, the true problem is much deeper: it is the charge of incoherency that is more appropriate. For the purposes of space, I shall limit my essay to the third section of Calvert-Minor's work as I think this part is the most interesting and fecund. But, before examining Calvert-Minor's arguments in any further detail, I would like to flesh out why, precisely, Foucault's seemingly clandestine humanism is
Archaeological Methodology: Foucault and the History of Systems of Thought POSTPRINT
Theory, Culture & Society, 2021
Existing accounts of Foucault's archaeological methodology have not (a) contextualized the concept properly within the intellectual field of its emergence and (b) explained why it is called 'archaeology' and not simply 'history'. Foucault contributed to the field of 'history of systems of thought' in France around 1960 by broadening its scope from the study of scientific and philosophical systems into systems of 'knowledge' in a wider sense. For Foucault, the term 'archaeology' provided a response to new methodological questions arising from this initiative. Archaeological methodology had already been developed into a distinct comparative approach for the study of linguistic and cultural systems, notably by Dumézil. Foucault redevised archaeological methodology for the post-Hegelian tradition of studying 'problems' prevalent in the history of systems of thought. The article thus furnishes the groundwork for a 'sociological archaeology' or 'problem analysis' that is not particularly dependent on Foucault as a social theorist of power.
‘Method’ is usually a ‘means’ towards an ‘end’ (a ‘way’). As such, method stands midway of an assumption/hypothesis and an end. For example, one may start with the hypothesis that there is an increasing tendency for individuals to commit suicide in modern societies and that individual decisions to give an end to one’s life are affected by the different forms of social solidarity in different societies. One would then need a ‘method’ whereby to test the above hypothesis. Accordingly, one may proceed by using and analyzing the suicide statistics of different societies. The goal would then be to identify different types of suicide. These turn out to be four; namely, “egotistic”, “anomic”, “altruistic” and “fatalistic” suicides (E. Durkheim, "Suicide"). Can genealogy operate in the same way? This paper discusses what Foucauldian genealogy consists in, while showing Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche. A simple definition of Foucauldian genealogy would be that it is a type of history. However, it is a specific type of history. Foucault’s genealogical history seeks to deconstruct what was previously regarded as unified (i.e. history as a chronological pattern of events emanating from a mystified but all-determining point of departure), while also attempting to identify an underlying continuity which is the product of “discontinuous systematicities” (OD*, p. 69). Moreover, in contrast to the Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history, ‘genealogy’ is not an holistic project but a perspectival enterprise. Foucauldian genealogy is an history of tracing ‘origins’ and, as such, it questions the idea of origins or deeper meanings. It unearths the force relations operating in particular events and historical developments. Foucault describes his genealogy as an “effective history” (NGH**, pp. 87-90). Foucauldian genealogy debunks the assumption underlying conventional historiography that there are ‘facts’ to be interpreted; rather, facts are themselves constructed out of the researcher’s ‘will to truth’. Furthermore, Foucauldian genealogy shows how ‘subjects’ are constituted in discourses ("Discipline and Punish"; "The History of Sexuality", Vol. 1). The paper also discusses Foucault’s “analytics”*** of power and the extent to which genealogy is a critique. * “The Order of Discourse”, in R. Young (ed.), "Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader" (Boston, London, Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). ** “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in The Foucault Reader, P. Rabinow (ed.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). *** Foucault insisted that he did not offer a “theory” but an “analytics” of power.
Archaeological Methodology: Foucault and the History of Systems of Thought
Theory, Culture & Society, 2021
Existing accounts of Foucault’s archaeological methodology have not (a) contextualized the concept properly within the intellectual field of its emergence and (b) explained why it is called ‘archaeology’ and not simply ‘history’. Foucault contributed to the field of ‘history of systems of thought’ in France around 1960 by broadening its scope from the study of scientific and philosophical systems into systems of ‘knowledge’ in a wider sense. For Foucault, the term ‘archaeology’ provided a response to new methodological questions arising from this initiative. Archaeological methodology had already been developed into a distinct comparative approach for the study of linguistic and cultural systems, notably by Dumézil. Foucault redevised archaeological methodology for the post-Hegelian tradition of studying ‘problems’ prevalent in the history of systems of thought. The article thus furnishes the groundwork for a ‘sociological archaeology’ or ‘problem analysis’ that is not particularly ...
Michel Foucault: Mapping the Terrain of “Nouvelle histoire”
The main aim of this paper is to explain the institutional and theoretical relationships, developing between Michel Foucault and the representatives of “Nouvelle histoire” in France during the period of his formation as an independent scholar and intellectual (the so-called “archaeological” period). I am going to define more precisely the place of Foucault’s historical studies in the context of historical science and to reshape and expand the denotation of the “Nouvelle histoire” concept.